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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
rS,
I, fi
The airline equipment process can be viewed from several
prospectives.
	
This study focuses on what might be termed the
macro-process, that is, an identification and discussion of
the key variables accounting for the nature, timing and magni-
tude of the equipment and re-equipment cycle. 	 The study con,
f tains forecasts of aircraft purchases by U.S. trunk airlines
IT over the next 10 years.	 These are given not to add to the
G i already plentiful list of forecasts but to examine the anatomy
of equipment forecasts in a way that serves to illustrate how
certain of these variables or determinants of aircraft demand
a	 t can be considered- in specific terms.
Given the complexity of the subject under review, it
., would have been possible to expend the entire study' resources
m
on any single topic covered such as airline profit potential,
the ` meaning and possible impacts of deregulation of the air-
a
! lines	 and the like.	 The span of coverage versus the depth'
!
f^
1'^Y of coverage presented conflicting demands which had to be re-
'
solved by the study team.	 It is hoped that a reasonable
=.balance was struck.
-^' The most pervasive impression that emerges from an
Al. examination of the airline equipment markets and its determi-4
nants is that actions by the Federal government t- more than
}
Pt
any other single force or combination of forces'-- will 'shape
its future size and health.	 While the government since the
Y
infancy of the air carrier industry has always'pla
	
eY	 Ypl yed  laroY
role in its development, its role and influence has continued
to expand. For example, the introduction of Federal 'noise
'standards for aircraft certification (FAR 36) has been hanging
i^
ArthL1r D Little, Inc
over the heads of the airlines like the sword of Damocles.
i
In this instance the thread was relief from FAR 36 compliance
by odder aircraft which account for around 80 percent of the
E
fleet.
As this report goes to printing, a-firm policy has been
announced by the Administration.	 All aircraft must comply
with FAR 36 within six years. 	 What is not clear is whether
fthis will speed up the purchase of new more fuel efficient,
n
quieter and more productive aircraft or will slow up the re-
!
equipment, process as many ,airlines with limited financing_
capabilities opt for engine retrofit on existing fleets. 
Recent statements of the ATA, if truly reflective of indus-
try views, suggest that the airlines would prefer to replace
rather than retrofit. Very likely some carriers will decido to i
retrofit, others to buy new aircraft, and still others to do i?
both.	 For the industry overall, the mix of retrofit to new },.
orders will be largely determined by whether or not and, if
so, to what extent the Federal government decides to help
finance the cost of compliance.
The above examples illustrates how deeply the Federal gov-
ernment is involved in shaping the market for airlines equip-
I J
ment and thus the sales of airframe and engine manufacturers'
which supply the airlines. ','Government involvement is by no ^$
means limited to regulation of air carriers and such matters
as airline fare policy, setting maximum rates of financial 5'
return and a host of other regulatory areas.' 	 It is also in-
volved with the aircraft manufacturers and suppliers who,
r in addition to their commercial business, are frequently
among the top corporations in the defense and space business. t
The state of the airlines equipment market is a matter
of national concern because the airline and aerospace indus- r.
try is a major employer of the U.S. workforce and the sale
V
of aircraft and parts heads the list of U.S. exports of
i 3	 s
2
t^C^.'.
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manufactured goods.	 Its criticality to national defense is
undisputed and its health is vital to the economy.
The airline equipment market is now at a critical junc-
ture in its development.	 The airline industry was brought
nearly to its knees over the last few years by a series of •.,
! blows which have impaired its ability to finance the purchase
of additional and replacement aircraft.	 The first was adding
too much capacity with wide body aircraft, then the energy of
crisis, then a recession and high inflation rates (stagfla-
tion).	 While one can argue that overcapacity was a self- A^
LH inflicted blow, others ,argue that it was an inevitable result
of economic regulation under prevailing _policies 'of the Civil
D, Aeronautics Board (CAB).	 The other blows suffered by the f
industry, however, clearly were not of their own making and
are similarly a matter of utmost concern to the entirek
_nation.
Any forecast of the future of this industry (both air-
lines and manufacturers) necessarily;, involves making estimates_ i
and/or assumptions about future government action. 	 Further-
more, it is equally clear that because industry is so
important to the nation the government must be prepared and
willing to act if the industry shows signs of faltering.
Understanding how the airline re p-equipment process works is
y ^ an essential first step in formulating alternative govern-
ment strategies to aid it.
Estimates of the airline equipment market among the
major U.S. domestic and international certificated air car e- r
t?
riers range between $21 billion and $47 billion over the
next decade.	 Whether the lower or u pper ends of the range i
{ are realized is not a matter of mere academic interest. 	 The .,
difference of $26 billion is a matter of important national 1
'' t interest that means thousands of jobs and may spell the dif- t AV
;. "ference between a marginal aviation industry and a healthy i
" 3
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and dynamic industry that contributes substantially to the
-h ndgrowth of the U.S.-econom . The difference in the hi
i	
g	 I'	 g-
low estimates is alone over twice the total capital invest -
ment committed to launch the U.S. airline industry into the
E L
'	 jet age.
A stronger and more active role for the government asIN
ii a monitor of and catalyst in the airline equipment process
is emerging. The process must be reviewed in the light of
regulatory changes, the environmental demands promulgated in
response to social needs, and the disposition and capability
l
of industry to meet new requirements for technology. In
ft
this direction lies the way from promise to fulfillment of
(	 the potential of the next decade in the airline equipment
,?
^l	 market.
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i CHAPTER II
IN
A.	 FORECAST OF AIRLINE CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS - U.S. TRUNKLINES
L AND PAN AMERICAN
4 ( 1.	 Introduction
An in-depth review, and forecast of the capital require-
.: _G 
ments of the U.S. Trunk Airlines (including Pan Am) for the
period 1976 through 1984 is instructive as to the forces that
r both shape and constrain the airline equipment market.i L
This chapter contains summary data accumulated from
+ i, analyses of individual airlines (see Appendix) which involved
j an evaluation of the individual airline's probable course of
I	 ` action in the context of the airline's route structure,rz ,^
competitive status, fleet characteristics, known plans, and
financial situation.	 The judgments made concerning probable
'U. equipment programs of the trunkline industry are also based
on discussions with airline officials responsible for the
}
r disposition and purchase of equipment. 	 Thus the forecasts
i reflect the views and uncertainties expressed by the industry	 y
(and its financiers).
2.	 Summary
This study of the airlines equipment market forecasts
i that in the .nine years 1976 to 1984 the U.S. trunklines will
purchase 744 aircraft at a cost of $18.5 billion. 	 t
Total capital requirements, when ground equipment, debt
^i retirement and dividends are included, will be $29.6 billion.
Inter_ial cash generation will provide for $18.3 billion,
	
!
or 62 percent of the total need.
	 Outside financing of $11.3
billion will be required; the additional financing can be
;^
1
absorbed without undue strain on the ,;.ndustry, assuming a
{ az
k
6
( Arthur D Little, Inc.
Ireasonable earnings. level can be achieved.
j The study projections assume that over 500 aircraft not
-meeting FAR Part 36 noise levels can be remaining in the
operating fleet as of December 31, 1984.	 If these aircraft
^f must be replaced prior to that date, due to an advancement of
t^ the timetable for qualification under FAR Part 36, an additional
expenditure of $6.2 billion will be required.
4
p}! 3.	 Traffic Growth
The Last reequipment cycle of the U.S. airline industry
began in the late 1960's with the introduction of the -wide-
a	 f body aircraft, namely the 747 1 s, DC-10's and L-1011's.	 Orders
`
:l
for these aircraft had been placed during and following a
period of record traffic growth.'
Eli!
Between 1962 and 1968, scheduled traffic of the trunks
in the domestic	 from 31.8 billionN sector grew	 Revenue Passenger
R7 Miles (RPM) to 81.6 billion RPM'-- an annual rate of 14_.4 percent.
The international sector of the trunks and Pan American grew
at an even faster pace of 14.7 percent annually.` 	 In this -
Uil
 context, it is not surprising that large aircraft orders were
a
placed, based on highly optimistic traffic forecasts.
	
Intro-
ii duction of this new capacity soon proved to be an indigestible
burden for the industry, however, as the United States and the
world economies soon entered a severe recession.
	 Between 1970
and 1975, trunk passenger traffic in the domestic sector grew
by only a 4.4 percent annual rate, while the international
sector	 by only;a 2.4	 rate.grew	 percent
We believe that the most recent traffic growth experience'
€I is not representative of future trends. 	 The industry will
return to a more normal growth pattern, perhaps not as high
,} is as the late 1960 1 s, but well in excess of recent experience.
WE are, 'therefore, projecting Trunk RPM's to increase at an
average anavial rate' of 7. 3 percent for the 1976-1984 time
1
;;
ff ILI ; 7
^. Arthur D Little, Inc.
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LI
i4 E	 period with the growth rate tapering down over the period
(see Table 1)
f Some of the air carriers are expected to do better and
others worse than the industry, (see Table 2 for industry
1	 traffic forecasts) . The above-average rate increase for
i,
	
	 National is caused by its "catch-up operation," an especially
vigorous effort to regain traffic after its strike in 1975.
This strike benefited Delta and Eastern substantially, and,
therefore, their growth rates have been adjusted to project
	
r	 a lower rate of future growth. The only other carrier e n joy-
	
+ r• ,	 	 Y	 j Y-
ing traffic growth at rates much better than the industry is
fx Pan Am, reflecting more rapid growth forecast in the inter-
r ` 1 # national market.	 (see Appendix for individual carrier fore-
casts)-'
flTable 2 also shows Available Seat Miles (ASM) and load
:Factor projections for the airlines individually and for the t
group.	 Load factors have been	 .	 projected to rise from the
1975 level of 55 percent to 60 percent range in 1984, reflecting
4? the expectation that the airlines will continue their current7 .^
trend of cautious expansion and their apparent determination
I to absorb part of the impact of rising costs in load factor.
Of course, the result of this equation is a growth rate for
^ ASM' s which is below the RPM rate.
4.	 Capacity
Today's airline capacity is generally considered excessive
by the industry and U.S. regulators; however, planned additions '.
' in the next few years are minimal (see Table 3).
	 Aircraft on
^^ All forecasts were made by 5imat,, Hellie'sen and Eichner,
Inc. under a subcontract to Arthur D. Little, Inc.' (ADL)
^ and do not necessarily reflect the -views`and'opinions of
ADL about individual air carriers.
8
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Table 1
U.	 S. TRUNKS AND PAN Ark
1975 ACTU2 RIP1,11
RPM FORECAST 1976-1984
F
Domestic International
Schedule-3 "harter Scheduled Charter System TotalF 0 o0 o,0 o0 0,
Bil. 	Change Bil. Change Bil. Change Bil. Change Bil. Change
1975 119.4 1.6 4.73 5.4 -31.1 (6.3) 5.42 (18.0)	 ;i 160 (0.6)
1976 131.3 10.0 4.65 25.0 33.9 9.0 6.40 18.1 17-6..: 10.5
1977 139.9 6.6 5.58 20,0 37.0 9.0 7.3/J' 14.1 190 7.7
1978 149.0 6.5 6.42 15.0 40.3 8.9 8.7,/10 12.3 204 7.4
1979 158.7 6.5 7.06 10.0 43.4 7.7 °.20 12.2 218 7.1
;
1980 169.0 6.5 7.76 10.0 47.0 8.3 10.0 -	 8.7 234 7.0
1981 179.5 6.2 8.54 10.0 50.7 7.9 10.8 -8.0 250 6.7
1982 190.3 6.0 9.40 10.0 54.3 7.1 11.7 8.3 26,6 6.5
1983 201.5 5.9 L0.1 8.0 58.1 7.0 12.7 8.5 282 6.3
u
1984 212.8 5.6 11.0 8.0 62.0 6.7 13.8 8.7 300 6.1 j
e:
r
h,
'
t
r°I
D
4
1	
NWINOWWON h
s	
ppV
.........._.
te
4
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Table 2
U.S. TRUNKS AND PAN AM TRAFFIC AND CAPACITY (SYSTEM-ALL SERVICES)
1975 Actual & 1984 Projected'
' 1984 Projected
Load
4
u 1975 Actual l Growth Rates Factor
(in billions) Load (in billions) Load Compounded Increase
^a Carrier RPM's	 ASM's	 Factor RPM's ASM's Factor RPM'S ASM's (Points)
o (1) (2)	 (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (1-0) x-.
' AA 22.1	 38.1 58.0% 41.7 66.6 62.5% 7.3% 6.4% 4:5
BN 6.6	 13.2 50.1 12.3 21.6 57.0 7.1 5.6 6.9
CO 6.4	 11.9 53.9 11.2 ^8.7 60.0 6.4. 5.2 6.1 I
° DL 16.5	 29.6 55.7 29..2 -,47.9 61.0 6.5 5.5 5_3 #
EA 18.3	 32.5 56, 3 32.3 53.8 60.0 6.5 5.8 3.7
4 NA 3.9	 7.5 51.5 8.9 16.3 55.0 9.7 90 3.5
NW 10.:.0	 21.5. 46.4 18.6 35.0 53.0 7.2 5.6 6.6
.; TW 22.5	 41.0 54.9 42.8 70.1 61.0 7.4 6.1 6.1
UA 28.2	 48.7 57.9 53.9 86.2 62.5 7.5 6_5 4.6
i WA 7.1
	 11.7 60.7 12.7 20.3 62.5 6.7 6.3 1.8
PA 18.2	 34.9 52 .2 36.9 61.6 60.0 8.2 6.5 7.8 a
, t
Total 159.8	 290.6 55.0 300.5 498.1 60.3 7.3 6.2 5.3
r
r^7 1CAB Form 31, Schedule T<-1.
I n _-
wig
t
Table 3
U.S. TRUNKS AND PAN AM 'AIRCRAFT
IN SERVICE AS OF DECEMBER 31, 1975
AND ON ORDER AS OF OCTOBER 2Q, 1976
j =+ (Passenger and Cargo Aircraft)
}
Numberi
of
Aircraft
in	 Aircraft On Order' for Delivery in
Aircraft " Service-	 1976	 1977	 1978 Beyond 1978
(1) (2)	 (3)	 (4)	 (5) (6)747 95	 6
tt 707-320 B/C 179	 -	 -	 - - -
.. 707-120 B 89
707-320 10	 -	 -	 - -
720 B 23
727-200 379	 38	 45 	 32 14
727-100 380	 2
737 84	 -
DC-10 121	 1	 -	 - -
DC--8-61/62 59	 -	 3	 -
DC-8-20/50 85
DC-9-50 -	 -	 9
6 A	 i -DC-9-30 134
-	 -D	 0C 9 1 7 `
L-1011 78	 71	
3	 6 5-
L-188 15
Total 1,758	 54	 61	 38 19
Two sold to Saudi Arabia by TWA in 1976. } F
SOURCE:	 CAB.	 Form 41, Schedules `B--2 and -B-43n L
}
a
1:
^ ^
Y
_
3
3
n	
,
ll ^'
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order for delivery during the 1976-78 period represent less
than 9-percent of current capacity, but probable retirements
will nearly eliminate any net gain in capacity over the three-
' year period.
It is evident that in the next few years the airlines
are planning to increase productivity (1) by increazingthe
number of seats on individual aircraft,	 (2) by boos,+:'ing average
daily utilization hours, and ('3) by increasing load factors.
3 It is also evident that the industry contemplates various measures
k
to extend the service lives of their existing fleets. 	 These
I
measures will sustain the industry through 1978, but new orders
will have to be placed for 1979 delivery to absorb traffic
increases from that year forward.
t
5.	 Retirements
Another reason industry is about to enter a major
.^
equipment replacement, cycle derives from the significant
number of aircraft acquired in the early 1960's which are
` approaching economic obsolescence. 	 The normal attrition, rate
`attributable	 the	 aircraft	 be	 inj to	 aging of	 may	 accelerated
this cycle by the operating diseconomies caused by the tripling
of jet fuel prices.
	 Furthermore, prospective government
-imposition of noise standards will be likely to require re-
placement of ,JT3D-power aircraft (i.e., Boeing 707's and
McDonnel-Douglas DC-8 1 s), and ;possibly will require the
retrofit or replacement of older JT8D engines powering 727,
s 737,; and DC-9 aircraft over the next six- to ten-year period..
Also, many aircraft under, leases which expire during the period
will be condidates for retirement, as airlines may be unable
or unwilling to assume the financial burden of ownership after
^k'•S
sl, lease termination.
U 12
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I Table 4 contains a summary of the average age of the
fleet by age group as of year-end 1975.-	 Few aircraftare
prime candidates to be retired in the next two to three years,
but by the early 1980's over half of the present fleet will
be in the age range when retirement is a high probability_.
_ The breakdown by carrier and aircraft types gives a definitive'
picture (see Table 4a). 	 Eastern still carriers 15Electras
(average age of 16.8 years) ; these aircraft will be retired
I in the near future. 	 Trans World has ten 707-320's in its
fleet which are an average 15.5 years old; and there are
old DC,8 fleets held by Braniff 	 (13.5 years) , United (13.2 years) ,
3
and Delta
	 (12.5 years).
Table 4
AIRCRAFT AGE BY AGE GROUP
AS OF DECEMBER 31, 1975.
i" Years
	
Number
in	 of	 Group	 Cumulative
f Service	 Aircraft	 Percent	 Percent
16+	 15	 1	 1
t 13-15	 74	 4	 5	 i
10-12	 217	 12	 17R
s -7-9	 832	 47	 -64
4-6	 291	 17	 81
1-3	 329	 19	 100
Because of the advanced age of this equipment, retrofits
to new noise regulations would be uneconomical, even if the
implementation of these long`.-delayed requirements were to
	 3'
become effective immediately; therefore, replacement, rather
than retrofit, is the probable course of action.
	 Additional
candidates for replacement will be the 720B's, DC9-10's and
30's, '727-100's and most likely some or all of the 707 fleets.
These aircraft not only fail to meet FAR Part 36 standards,
i ' but their fuel consumption on an ASM`basis is relatively
uneconomical.
13
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Table 4a
U.S. TRUNKS AND PAN AM AVERAGE AGE OF FLEET
a
f
AS OF DECEMBER 31, 1975
(Passenger and Cargo Aircraft)
No. of Average No. of	 Average
Carrier Aircraft Type Aircraft Age Carrier- Aircraft Type Aircraft	 Age
(1) (2) (3) (4)
_ 
(1) (2) (3)	 (4)
-r- AA 727-100 58 9.9 NW 727-100 32	 9.7
727-200 48 6.3 727-200 31	 5.0
707-100B 49 11.8 707=300B/C 10	 7.5
707-30OB/C 41 8.0 747 18	 4.3 !
747 11 5.0 DC-10-40 22	 2.2
„
DC-10-10 25 3.6
( Total 113	 6.3
r Total 232 8,3
TW 727-100 35	 9.9
BN 727-100/QC 29 8.4 727-200 -39
	 6.1
727-200 _ 40 2.6 707-100B 40	 11.0p 747 1 5.0 707-300 10	 15.5
DC-8-50 4 13.5 707-30OB/C 50	 9.2
DC-8-62 7 7.6 747 10	 54
Total 81 5.7
DC-9-10 18	 91
L-1011 30	 2.0
CO 727-100 2 8.5 Total 232	 8.3727-200 36 4.4
720B 5 11.5
DC-10-10 16 2.3 UA 737 59	 7.0 ,.
'
t
- 727-100 122	 9.8
s
Total 59 4.6  727-200
747
28	 7,1
18	 4.4
DL 727-100 5 9.6 DC-8-20/50 60	 13.2
727-200
747
69
3
2.,6
4.5
DC-8-61/62
DC-10-10
39	 7.3
37	 2`.6
DC-9-30 62 7.0
DC-8-50 21 12.5 Total 363	 8.4
DC-8-61 13 7.3
WA 737 25	 7.1L-1011 18 1.5
- 727-200 21	 3.2
`
Total 191 5,6 720E
707-3000
18	 11.1
5	 7.4 a
DC-10-10 6	 2.4 1EA 727.-100 71 10.0
727-200
DC-9-10
42
9
4.5
8.6
Total 75	 6.6 n
' DC-9-30 72 7.8 PA 727-100 13	 9.0
L-188 15 16.8 707-30OB/C 73	 9.2
i L-1011 30' 2.3 747 32	 5.3
Total 239 7.8 Total 118	 8.1
NA	 - 727-100 13` 10.5
727-200 25 7.8
747 2 5.3
DC-10-10/30 15 2.6
Total 55 6.9
E Sources CAB.	 Form 41. _.
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A further replacement need is indicated by the expiration of
aircraft leases.
	 While some of the carriers will purchaseEF
r aircraft coming off lease from lessors, others will prefer to
buynew equipment rather than purchase obsolete aircraft --
especially those not qualifying under FAR Part 36.
	 As is
shown in Table 5, 228 aircraft, representing 13 percent of
S
Lill the fleet, have leases expiring between 1976 and 1984.	 Theselease expirations will affect some carriers more severely than
others, as is indicated b
	 the variance iny	 percent o.f fleet
leased.	 Since the majority of all aircraft coming off lease
f do not meet-requirements under FAR Part 36, it is reasonable
,s to assume that most of those aircraft will not be purchased
by airlines'.
	 Table 6 details the lease situation by aircraft
type and year and portrays the picture that the heavy concen-
tration is in the 1980's and is for aircraft which do not
t
meet FAR Part 36 noise standards.
We project retirement of 585 aircraft during the period
k i 1976-1984 out of a fleet of 1,758 -operating in 12/31/75_ (see
r , Table ,7).	 This represents a retirement of _27.2 percent ofif
the trunklines' ASM capacity.	 This retirement schedule is
.' reflected in our final estimates of aircraft purchase require- r
t.
merits. t'
Projected aircraft retirements by, carrier are shown on
y^ Table 8. 	 These projections are in the midrangeof the rather
wide band of pos,.'Abilities.
	 A lower rate of retirement for
many airlines could result from continued poor earnings per-
formance; on the other hand, the rate will nearly double if
federal regulation requires all aircraft to meet FAR Part 36'
-noise levels by the end of 1984.
f
It should be noted that the equipment retirements projected
in Table 7 leave '
 503 aircraft ' in the operating fleet on
3f
12/31/84 which do not meet the requirements of FAR Part 36
(all` 747's, DC-10 1 s, L-1011's, DC-9-50's and 727-200's are
assumed to meet Part 36 requirements either through delivery
.
in qualified condition or retrofit).
	 Should governmental
e
n
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Table 'S
I
U.S. TRUNKS AND PAN AM LEASED
I
AIRCRAFT
(Passenger and Cargo Aircraft)
Total
Operating Aircraft Off Lease
Fleet by 12/31/84
as of Percent
Carrier 12/31/75 Number_ of Fleet
(1) (2) (_3) (4)
^ American 2 23 27 11.6
Braniff 81 18 22.2	 Ij Continental 59 -
Delta 191 18 9.4
Eastern 239 39 16.3
National 55 - -
Northwest
-	
113
' Trans World 232 37 25.8
United 363' 75 20.7
Ll
Western 75 6 8.0
Pan Am 118 8 6.9
Total 1,758 228 13.0
Source:	 CAB. Form 41.
i
I
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`U.5.	 TRUNK, AND PAN AM NUM11I:k 1)1 	 IxASf:D AIRCRAFT
1985j
,i
IN FIXKT AS UP 12/3:1/7;1,	 WITI1
	
I,1,A&L:, 11XPIRINO 111 i'URI.
`	 I
Carrier
1rpirati.on	 Type. of Number. of
Pu rchaso Opt ialtYear 	 Aa)<;raf.t _Aircraft.
m Atn^)ricruil^ 1979	 707-1.2011
1.940
	
727-100
3
1
Yes
Not	
;, rt 1982	 727-200 1 Yes
.
l 1983	 707-3000 10 Yo=
1984	 707-200 2 Ye
1.984
	 707-300n 10 Yes
To t • n l 27
Braniff 1279	 DC4-62 5 Yt q
i F - 1981	 727-.100 1 No i I 1981.	 Pc f;-62 2 Yos
1982	 1!7•-100 ' 4 No 1 Yes
1902	 727--?.00 2 Yes
I 1904	 727-200 3 Yes
Total 1.4E
Delta 19782/	 777-100
1979 /	777-100
2 Yes
3 Yes
191,'0•,
	
211-200 5 Ye
721-200 1 Yes
1982	 727-200 7 Yes
Total 18
1976	 DC9-10 9, tJo
( 1978	 DC9-30 2 7Jo
LO 1,981	 1)(19-30 4 Yes1.983	 1)t:9-30 21 20 Yes 1 No
1983	 727-100 3 Yes
R iI'ot r^.l 39
gj Tr.antl World 1983	 1.^.7100 2 Yes
I! 1983	 727-200 13 Yes 1.
4 ) 1983. 	 707-100B 2 Yes1983	 707-300n/C 6 Yes1i
1981
	 727-200 9 Yes
198.1	 707-300B 5 Yes
Total 37
i
t Unitod .19764/	 DC8-50 6 Yes^
1978	 127-100 23 No ij 1980	 727-.100 2 No
I
(t
1081.	 727-100
1982	 727-100
2G
4
No
No
y
1983 1)C8-61
1984	 I)C8-G.1 15 NoYes
1984	 DC8-62 5 es;
1984	 727-200 3 Yes t
I Western
Total
1984
	
727-200 6
75„
No1
1'1111	 Am 1976	 707•-3000 2 No )
1943	 707-30011 5 No
1984	 707-30011 1 1•lo
Total 8
Does not inulu(le 1, I)C8 -P0 nonoperatind.
noltza	 11r:r., Wught Lhe colnit:ny wh i r h lrattorl Lh	 sr, aircr^{fl to cllrrlar,
` 3/	 Does, not ^	 .,
1
..ncludt,	 ^	 I)08-G1	 .,	 ukale r:sc;d	 .u111
's
?. Tr1011 ., an seasonal lease,'< ^^
fl, 4/^	 Purchafwd froal Ia.IGOr.
^I
4 ^'Ipp;' ;ournos:	 CAB. form 41,	 F,chadnlc 11-14;	 C)cmipmty Roports.'
_.
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Table 7
	
-
L U.S. TRUNKS AND PAN AN'.
PROJECTED AIRCRAFT RETIREMIENTS 1976-1984*.
(Passenger Aircraft Only)
ri
l^
Percent
Number	 of 1975
of	 ASM s
Carrier 	 Aircraft	 Generated
1.
Braniff	 40	 43.2% -
Delta	 92	 41.0
( Western	 36	 40.7
Pan Am	 65	 36.8
American	 70	 29.2
National	 21	 28.7
Continental	 20	 25.5
Northwest	 60	 24,.5
Eastern	 68	 21.6
United	 77	 16.9
f Trans World	 36	 15.2 I
Total	 585	 27.2%-	 4
T
i i
f
*Includes Aircraft Sales and Lease Exirations.
it
1
t^
r
:i
#f
3j
{
t
a<
Ik
4
ri
f 18
l
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aTable 8
U.S. TRUNKS AND PAN Ali
PROJECTED AIRCRAFT RETIREMENTS 1976-1984
(Passenger Aircraft Only)
E,
Percent
i
Percent
Number of 1975 Nurser of 1975
Aircraft of ASb's Aircraft of ASM's
Carrier Tvoe Aircraft Generated	 Carrier Tyoe Aircraft Generated
	 S
. A- 727-100 21 5.5%	 Nw 727-100 32 10.7$
707-120B 49 23.7 727-200 18 9.1
y{{ 707-300E/C 10 4.7Total 70 29.2%
€f Total 60 24.5%3N 727-100/QC
DC8-6_
32
4
29.10
4.8	 TIN 727QC 2 0.5%
DC3-62 4 9.3 707-1203 15 5.8
i-' Total 40 43.2 707-320 10 4.2	 t"707-320-3/C 9 4.7
+ CO 7233 5 5.3% Total 36 15.2%	 1
727-NCO 15 20.2
f
" Tot_1 20 UA5' 737 2 0.2€727 -100 30 5.3
` DL 727-100 5 2.1€ DC3-20 29 7.3
747 3 2.6 DC8-50' 1^6 4.1 r
r D-9-30 50 15.6 Total 77 16.93
DCa-6'l 13 10.4	 S;A 737 13 9.8$
Total 92 41.0$ 720B 18 23.1707-3000 5 7.8
EA 727-100/QC 39 16.3£ Total 36 40.78
DC9-10 9 2.0 a
DC9-30 3 0,9	 PA 707-30OB/C 65 36.8
L-188 15 0•' Total 65 36.8$L-1011 2 1.7 ;	 i
c Total 68 21.6$
DNA 727-100 13 12.6
^- 727-200 6 8.1C 747 2 8.0
Q Total, 21 28.7€
/IM
1
:.Y3V.	 I#et{ba...._. d. Y	 M.saMw.ec .
.	 .rsltaa.'+vre..t..
	 -	 .....	 .,.®_ aus.`3aLtd.-+,xaa.r^^rc........3vJ.^....dtssruruaiL#^.a:s_ 	 _ _ _	 r_ 6uwex	 ..u..yvx..,. ty 	a....sn t ,..	 S .	 _..	 _..
action be taken such that all aircraft must meet Part 36
`requirements by 1984, additional new aircraft purchases of
203 aircraft would have to be made at a cost of $6.2 billion
to replace the capacity lost (see Table 9).
r
f
6.	 Aircraft Productivity
Translation of an airline traffic forecast into aircraft
fleet requirements necessitates assumptions with respect to -
H the elements of aircraft productivity, namely, seats per air-
plane, average block ,speed, block 'hours flown per day, and
load factor.	 In this study different productivity factors
were applied to each airline depending upon the characteristics	 \,
of the individual airline.
	
In general, the assumptions are
derived from our knowledge that many airlines are now planning
to take actions which will increase productivity, and on our4
confidence in the premise that severe cost pressures will
j cause airline management to continue to strive aggressively
for productivity improvements over the 'long term.
Our assumptions follow:
C-J
r •	 Seats per airplane will increase 	 by 1984, 747's
' will go from 9 across to 10; DC-10's and L-1011's
from 8 to 9; narrow-body first-class sections will
a be reduced and coach seat densitywill be increased;
I. a higher percentage of aircraft will be in high--
density all coach charter configurations.i ,
•	 Block speeds will :remain constant -- block speed is
primarily a function of hop length ' governed by route
structure, which is not projected to change signifi-
cantly unless there is a major change in the regula-
tory environment.
t
•	 Daily utilization (block hours flown per day) will
U increase -- the high capital cost of new aircraftY
will 'cause pressure for more intensive use.'
r.yiys
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Tab le 9
U.S. TRUNKS
PASSENGER AIRCRAFT
AND PAN
NOT MEETING
AM
FAR	 361/PARTi-
No. of
Aircraft	 SH&E Percent No. of 2/in	 Projected of Aircraft Replacement
12/31/75	 Retirements Aircraft Remaining No. of Cost
Carrier Fleet	 (No. of Aircraft) Retired 12/31/84 Aircraft (Millions)
(1) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
AA 137	 70 51.1% 67 30 $	 999
BN 43	 40 93.0 3 3 106
CO 7	 5 71.4 2 2 53
N	 DL 101	 89 88.1 12 6 160
~	 EA 161	 66 39.5 101 47 1,250
NA 13	 13 100.0 - - -
NW 42	 42 100.0 - - -
TTh7 141	 36 25.5 105 38 1,321
UA 265	 77 29.1 188 68 2,119
WA 48	 36 75.0 12 5 13.3
PA 78	 65 83.3 13 4 106
Total 1,042	 539 51:9 503 203 $6,247
l/	 All aircraft except 727-200, DC-10, L-1011 and 747;
2/	 Includes replacement of additional
F
purchases:
CO _- two 727-100's
BN -- one DC-8-62
UA =- two DC'-8-61' s
Arthur D Little, Inc
F ^;
i
I
•	 Load factors will rise from an average of about
P „ 55 percent in 1975 to about 60 percent in 1984 --
L
.cost and regulatory pressures will force load
factors up
Iy
y.. A comparison of the 1984 productivity elements with those
of 1975 is shown in Table 10 for selected aircraft types by j
R_I carrier. 1{
t
7.	 Aircraft Purchase Forecast
i
r
I
r The study indicates that between 1976 and 1984 the trunk-
t lines will purchase a total of _744 passenger aircraft at a cost is
of about $18.5 billion (see Table 11).
	
If noise regulation is ^.
f such that all aircraft must comply with FAR Part 36 by 12/31/84,
' an additional $6.2 billion would have to be spent for replace- N( ment aircraft. !<i
Our projections indicate that purchases will be concen-
trated in narrow-bodied aircraft types as replacements for #'	 I
the first generation jets with 522 narrow-bodied aircraft
purchased, compared with 221 wide-body aircraft purchases. N
8.	 Capital Requirements
With aircraft purchase expenditures of $18.5 billion, l
k
, tt total capital requirements for the trunklines during the ;x
I 1976-1984 period will be$29.6 billion.
	 Our company earnings ?F
forecasts results in internally generated funds which can
provide $18.3 billion of the total requirements.
	 That level
of internal cash generation` would make the financing 'of this
reequipment cycle feasible for the industry -- of course,
i dependent upon the realization of the forecasted earnings
Levels.
-	 The internal cash generation forecasted is based on a t
projection of as.harply improved earnings trend such that all
.airlines average at
	 7 percent return on investment during, least
1:A
22
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rTable 10
t ^^ U.S. TRUNKS AND PAN AM
AIRCRAFT PRODUCTIVITY FACTORS
`
Actual 19751
747 DC-10/L-1011 727-200
Number Daily Number	 Daily Number Daily
of Utilization of	 Utilization of Utilizatin,,
Carrier Seats (Hours) Seats	 (Hours) Seats (Hours)
ww
American 356 6.0 240	 8,5 120 9.3 r
Braniff 346 14.2 -	 - 128 9.7
Continental - - 209	 11.2 124 9.7
Delta 370 4.6 250
	 9.4 134> 10.3 
i
:-
1-jt Eastern - - 257	 8.4 132 9.4
s
National 362 * 249
	 11.0 135 9.8
-^ Northwest 364 1'	 11. 3	 82 6	 .2 12 8 7.4
Trans World 362 9.1 227	 6.4 119 91
T` United 339 9.4 239	 8.4 126 7.6 LH Western - - 239	 - 11.3 121 9.0
Pan Am 375 11.5 -	 - - -
►" ; Projected 1984
f
American 400 9.0 268	 10.5 137 10.5 !	 s
'w'z Braniff 400 14.5 268	 12.0 128 10.0 1
Continental - - 240	 11.5 137 10.5 ^.
Delta - - 268	 11.0 1.37 11.0
Eastern - - 268	 10.0 137 10.2 i(1G
National - - 268	 _11.0 137 9.5
Northwest 400 12.0 268	 9.5 137 8.0 is
Trans World 400
400
11.0 268	 9.0 137
137
10.0
9.0 aUnited
Western -
11.0
-
268	 9.5
268	 12.5- 137 9.5
'41" Pan Am 400 12.5 -	 - - -
, * Data not meaningful because of strike.
E
CAB Form 31, Schedule T-1.
T
f ;
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Table	 11
U.S. TRUNKS AND PAN AM
AIRCRAFT PURCHASES 1976-1984
(Passenger Aircraft Only)
Number of Aircraft
1801 200
. 727
	 DC9	 Seat	 DC10 Seat2/
aCrrier 200	 50	 M/R	 10/30/40	 L-1011	 747 747SP L/R Other3/ 
American 39	 -	 37	 35
Braniff 28	 lb	 _ 8 - 1
Continental 8	 -	 13	 6	 -	 - - - 2
Delta 31	 -	 48	 -	 20	 - - - -
Li Eastern 10	 31	 41	 -	 20-	 - - - -
National 8	 -	 15	 4
" Northwest 17	 -	 18	 8	 -	 6'
} Trans; World 14	 -	 26	 -	 12	 17, - - -
r United 28	 -	 47	 23	 -	 10 - - 2
Western 10	 -	 12	 12
Pan Am -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 13 22 26
-
4 Total 193	 31	 273	 88	 60	 46 22 26 5
' Cost
r (;pillions)	 $2,123	 $350 $7,487	 $2,841	 $1,855	 $2,203 $778 $816 $19
r
^r
11	 t Total Number of Aircraft	 744
Total; Cost 4/	 $18,472 million
;i
a
l/ 180 Seat
—
Medium Range Aircraft.
t
2/ 200 Seat Long Range Intercontinental Aircraft.
3/ BN--one used DC-8-62; CO--two used 727-100 1 s •
 UA-=two used.<
DC-8-61's.
4/ Cost Escalation at 5 1/2% per year.
}
I
4
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the crucial years beginning with 1980. Net  earnings under
this forecast average over $600 million annually for the 11
, F	carriers during the nine-year period. That level of earning
} appears achievable when compared with the 1965-1968 period
when earnings averaged about $350 ;million annually, but the
risks are clear when viewed in the context of the 1970.-1975
period, when earnings averaged only $76 million per year.
The airline industry's current financial condition is
j	 such that many carriers would not now be able to obtain long-
E!
term loan or lease commitments sufficient to finance a major
equipment program. An example of this deterioratedsituation F
is the airlines' status with respect to the New York State
Insurance Law Fixed Charge Coverage Test. 1/ In past years
insurance companies have been a major source of borrowing
for the airlines. However, as of year end 1975, the nation's
L
	
	
largest airlines do not meet this important financial test --
TWA, Eastern, Pan Am, United and American. Although the
New York law applies only to certain insurance companies and
to unsecured loans, it is widely used as a basic criterion 	 y
of credit worthiness, regardless of whether the law is
i
!	
applicable.
It
L
Airline earnings must improve soon and show a steady
upward trend to provide the financing capability necessary
to support the equipment purchases projected in this study.
4
^	 1
Earnings for the last two years and on average over the last
five years must be 1.5 times all debt charges.
i
2 5
-
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Table 12
=i
' U.S. TRUNKS AND PAN AM
"I CAPITAL NEEDS AND SOURCES
E	 I 1976-1984
I,
^I
Percent of Total
i Amount
Needs (billions) Needs
E; Flight Equipment-Payments $20.2 68%
Ground Property and Equipment 2.9 10
Debt ;Retirement 5.0 17
E(
Dividend and Other 1.5 5
tj Total Needs $29.6 100%
Internal Sources' Sources
,!II
Net Earnings $	 5.7 19%$' Depreciation 9.9 33'
Property Sale/Other 2.7 9
Total Internal $18.3 62
i Outside Financing, Financing
t^ Sr. Debt--Banks $ 3.6 12 32%
Sr. Debt--Insco and Other 0.8 3 7
"	 ( Subordinated Debt 1.0 3 9
`,
U
Flight Equipment Leases` 4.5 15 40
Deposits Returnable 1.2 4 10
Stock Sales 0.2 l- 2
Total Financing $11.3 38-
}
100%
I Total Sources $29.6 100%
{ Note:
	
'Additional purchases required to replace all aircraft
not meeting FAR Part 36 requirements are $6`.2 billion.
3
,
s
i
i
a 26 z	 s
If
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iB.	 MAJOR DETERMINANTS OF AIRLINE CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS
i
1.	 Introduction
L
This section contains an examination of the elements upon
I which the typical aircraft equipment demand forecast is based
with special attention to identifying those factors for which
It] forecasting errors have the most impact and those for which
current observers have the greatest difference of opinion.
Forecasts of aircraft demand often vary widely. 	 For example,
} two respected experts in this field -- one an airplane manu-
facturer and the other a financial institution -- forecast
a market of $47 billion and $21 billion respectively.
2.	 Traffic Forecasts
Airline traffic growth over long-range periods (more than
10 years) has a consistent secular trend moderately greater
P` than GNP reflecting improved service levels -- speed, frequency,
comfort -- gains in the population's disposable income, and
a declining price relative to other goods and services. 	 However,
over shorter periods of time(up to six or seven years), there
have been dramatic differences in growth rates due in part to
rf changes in the overall economic conditions,, but also resulting
from zigzags in airline price trends.
a. Long-range Traffic Forecasts
I` There is considerable commonality in the basic factors,
used by various long-range forecasters of airline traffic.
Recent forecasts of airline traffic growth to 1985 are -fairly
tightly grouped with the ATA and United at 5 percent, Boeing
and Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette at 6 percent, ` the FAA at
6.7 percent and Simat, Helliesen and Eichner, Inc. 	 (SH.&E)	 at
7.3 percent.	 The basic elements used by the forecasters tend
to cluster around the following factors:
t
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Population
	 r centp	 growth will amount. to about 1 peI per year_.
`I •	 Population over 18,..years'of age will grow at about
twice the rate of population under 18 years.
p
i •	 Growth in real GNP will exceed historical rates.
?^I
0	 Airline prices will rise more slowly than those of
other goods and services.
1{ •	 Family `income will increase in real terms.
f These .relationships ,have shown a high degree of con-
sistency when measured over long periods of time -- at least
ten years.
	 Long-range forecasts of these casual factors are aIf
regarded as reliable, and traffic forecasts can be made with
	 $
considerable confidence if the time period is sufficient to
;. dampen the short-term swings.
b. Medium-range Traffic Forecasts
	
a
The forecasting of airline traffic for periods of less
;+ M than ten years is difficult.
	 The potential difference in
i
growth rates over shorter time frames is well illustrated by
a the record for two recent six-year periods, 1962 to 1968 and
1969 to 1975.
	 The 1962-1968 period was characterized by
declining prices accompanied by a rapid traffic growth rate;
E
the 1969-1975 period produced sharply rising prices and low
i
a
growth rates.
Domestic U.S. Airline Industry
	 1962-1968
	 1969-1975
Change in,Passenger Yield
	 (13.0%)	 32.6%
` =	 Average Annual Traffic Increase
	 17.3%	 4.2
L Total Change in Traffic
	 160.3%	 28.2
While economic conditions played a role in the variance
in airline traffic growth rates, it is clear that the price
situation was the key factor affectingthe traffic ;growth rate.
{
2 3
t
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Trends in airline pricing are a derivative of unit costs
{ which change in response to various factors
i
;t •
Prices paid by airlines for labor and materials.
ofAircraft operating costs 	 newly purchased aircraft.
r	 ,
•
•	 Corporate operating efficiencies.
•	 Load productivity of aircraft in terms of seating
it
density, load factor, and aircraft utilization.
The first three types of cost are reasonably easy to
forecast (other than the exceptional case,'` such as thepast
fuel situation)_, and there is usually no great diversity of
R opinion among the forecasters, although frequently the role
is	 in	 forecasts.of price	 not adequately recoginzed	 traffic
However, load productivity, controllable by airline manage-
ment, has immense potential for divergent-trends; and leads
us to a discussion of the interaction between its impact on
unit cost, prices, and traffic growth, particularly the im-
plications of this interaction on aircraft purchase needs.
UThe load productivity of an aircraft has a wide potential.
Seating density of aircraft in scheduled service has swung up
and down over the years within about a 20 percent differential.
i The same aircraft in charter, service versus schedule operates
Y with about 3 percent more seats.	 Also, over the years there
in	 factorshas been about a 20 percent swing	 load	 on scheduled
_,	
_	 .	 sservices; charters operate in the 90 per cent plu  load	 f actor
U
;
range.	 Comparing the extremes, a charter aircraft operating
in high-density seating at 90 percent load factors has more
than twice the load productivity of the same aircraft in
scheduled service with low-density seating in a period of
the low range of load factors.
f
The critical observation to be made is the tendency for
	 #'
EN
these interacting factors to be offsetting in terms of _aircraft
purchase requirements.
	
A period characterized by favorable
x
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.	 x
airline price trends and high traffic growth rates will
typically occur concurrently with trends towards higher
!! density, higher load factors and, therefore, lower unit costs.
ax
Conversely, a,period of rising airline prices and Tow traffic
growth rates will be accompanied by trends toward lower density
a. and lower load factors.
E between	 factorsThe casual relationships	 thesea e not
;I clearcut; but the importance of their existence for fleet
- acquisition is that above-average traffic growth rates tend
{ to become "soaked up" by increases in load productivity
(recognizing that a trend to higher load productivity result-
ing in lower unit costs and thereforelower prices may, in
fact, be a casual factor in the traffic growth trend).	 On
i
.,. ethe other hand, low growth p riods are characterized bg	 p_	 Y
declines in load productivity (lounge wars, etc.); capacity
'offsettingand traffic tend to "fit" because of	 factors.
a Thus, despite the observation of ;greatly divergent traffic`
-raodgrowth trends in the recent past, a middle-of-thetraffic
forecast combined with mid-range estimates on load productivity
should produce -a fairly accurate forecast of aircraft need if
economic forces alone are the principal determinants of the
airline equipment market.
The forecasting problem is before us now due to the
' E evolving status of charter operations under the recent 'changes
liberalizing charter regulations.	 There probably will be af
' rapid expansion in charter activity under the new regulations.
It is not inconceivable that by the mid-1980's a 25 percent-
50  percent of airline travel could be charter. 	 In looking at
'athe implications of such	 potential trend to charter for air-
+I ,.) craft equipment purchase, attention must be paid to both sides
the equation.	 event	 shiftof	 In the	 there is a substantial
from scheduled service to charter, there will be large increases
in load productivity; as aircraft are converted into high-density
charter configurations and operated at high load factors.
a 30
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In and of itself, this action would indicate a reduced'':need
' for aircraft purchase.
	
However, charter prices, much, lower;.i,
than scheduled prices due to lower unit costs, would s^tima- 	 ti
late more rapid traffic growth.
These relationships indicate that an industry trend,
toward low-price/high-density charter service versus high-
price/low-density scheduled service will have little impact
on new equipment requirements. 	 Revenue potential, not RPM'S
per se, is the driving force for aircraft purchase; and
r revenue growth has been more constant than RPM growth.'`
1962-1968
	
1969-1975
RPM Growth	 160%	 28%
Revenue Growth
	 127%
	
70%
3.	 Aircraft Service Life
j The service life assumption is critical in an equipment
purchase forecast.	 Predicting service life is subject to a
considerable range, of error because any of the several factors
from which it is derived can have a significant impact, the 	
,
	 P	 Y
' can reinforce each other-, and they can be difficult to pre-
dict.	 Service life can be heavily influenced by external
factors -- most notably regulatory and environmental._ Both
of these defy forecasting precision, since by definition
decisions in these areas are judgmental arising out of our
I	 " pluralistic society.
The following illustrates the error potential of
differing assumptions for service live of the present
j airline fleet.
Service' Life Assumption
	 16 yrs.
	
17 yrs.	 18 yrs.	 19 yrs.
	 20 yrs.
F
Aircraft Retiredl/	1,225	 1,138	 793	 712	 341
I'
Based on average fleet age, by aircraft type by airline;
Source:
	 CAB Form 41, DOT United States Civil Aircraft
Register, Volume 1, July 1, 1973.
I	 ^^
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sL3 Most of the recent long-range aircraft requirement
k
forecasts utilize an "assumption" on aircraft service life.
{ Differences in this assumption is a major cause of variance
in the forecasts. 	 For instance, the recent studies of
Boeing and Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette (DL&J) both use the
same traffic growth rate, but Boeing forecasts capital need
=
of $47 billion for the Domestic Trunks plus Pan Am during the
1976-1985 period as compared with $21 billion forecast by
U
DL&J; a major cause for the difference lies in different
L assumptions on aircraft service life (see Table 13) .
The major factors governing the service life of air-
craft are:
•	 competition -- obsolescence due to lack of market
k
appeal,
•	 productivity -- obsolescence due to high operating
costs;
^^ •' environment -- aircraft service life terminated by
` environmental regulation.
A lesser and diminishing factor is airline route
F structure.
{ a. Competition
i! Competition has usually played a major role in equipment
purchase decisions.	 The history of aircraft manufacture has
been one of new generations of aircraft whose market appeal
drove out the old in major competitive markets.
	
Major strides
were made, such as pressurized DC`-6's replacing unpressurized
DC-4 1 s, DC-7 1 s speed advantage over DC-6 1 s and the jets' vastly
superior speed and comfort versus piston aircraft. 	 Not only
did the new generation offer superior; speed and comfort, but
	 a
they also brought reductions in operating cost (the DC-7 being
the only major exception).
e,
 i
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r TABLE 13
j COMPARISON OF-RECENT AIRCRAFT
?i' _	 INVESTMENT FORECASTS
ATA	 DL&J	 Bo— eing SH&E
t
.>f U.S.	 Trunk	 Trunk Trunk
Group Forecast
	 Airlines
	 & PA	 & PA & PA
Years Forecast 1976
through	 1985
	 1985
	 1985 1984
Aircraft Service Life3 1(Narrow Body)	 18	 18	 16 117
Inflation Rate	 5%	 6% 5.5$
l
Seating Density
	 CAB	 CAR	 CAB CAB
.' Traffic Growth	 5%	 6%	 6% 7.3%
i Load Factor	 60%	 62%2	 580 60%
If	 r
Add on for Spares andif
Ground. Equipment
	 20%	 20%	 20%` 25$
Capital Expenditures
($Bil.)	 Forecast	 $26
	 _ $21
	 _$47 $23
I
v
^;4
1Retirements based on individual airline analysis of needs
and financing capability, whereas other forecasts are based s
on retirement at given elapsed year regardless of individual
rt . ^ airline situation.
2
a
domestic,62%	 57% international.
3Wide body aircraft will not be retired over forecast period
except for occasional' fleet simplification actions,
w
t
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In the most recent transition, wide bodies were thought
to be a competitive necessity and many were bought on that
basis alone, unlike most previous new generation aircraft,
wide-body operating costs were not substantially improved
over those existing aircraft.
In contrast to past eras, there are no_iiejv aircraft in
production or on the drawing boards which will induce air-
i
craft purchases because of market appeal to the traveler.
-' (We rule out the Concorde because of extremely high operating
costs and prohibitive noise problems in domestic flying,)
t. What has normally been a major inducement to aircraft pur-
chase is not a factor in the `current situation. 	 The only
possibility which occurs to us would be the potential attrac-
tiveness of extremely low cabin noise levels.
It appears that other factors must provide the major
,
' motivating force for aircraft replacement.
b. Productivity-t.
{ In addition to market appeal, a major factor underlying FF
5
almost all previous aircraft purchase decisions was the,pro-
duction of seat miles at a lower cost than previously pur- z
chased aircraft, in some `cases dramatically so. 	 For instance,
J
CAB Aircraft Operating Cost and Performance Report for the year'•
a 1965 shows the cost per seat mile of the most efficient piston,
aircraft, the DC-6B at 2.35	 per seat mile compared with 1.24
s - per seat mile for the DC-8-50.	 This kind of a productivity'
(.1 -..  rpotentialroduces	 a id obsolescence and fast replacement-_P	 P	 P r,
of existing aircraft.
	 This advantage, too, has been waning.
1
1'tt
The
	 high invest-wide-body aircraft, due principally to their
ment cost per seat, 'do not have a significant seat mile cost
LI
Nadvantage over narrow-bodied aircraft if an adequate rate of #.
return is included in the cost equation.	 For 'instance, the x°
CAB Aircraft Operating and Performance-Report l/ records all
1/CAB Aircraft Operating Cost and Performance Report, Vol. VII,;'
July 19 73.. f
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domestic carriers'direct operating cost per available seat
mile for the year 1972 for 747's at 1.264 	 vs.	 1.297	 for
the DC-8-61, the most efficient narrow-body aircraft. 	 The
DC-8-61 performance was achieved despite a lesser stage length
t (942 miles vs. 1962 miles for the 747) and a lower daily
utilization (8.22 hrs. vs.	 8.62 hrs.); both factors tending
higher	 the	 operatingtoward	 costs.	 In addition,	 aircraft
l costs do not show the full "cost of ownership' impact; in
.
f
^ addition to depreciation (which is reflected in the, aircraft
operating costs:), the higher investment per seat of the 747
aircraft has an additional "cost" in the form of return which
must be earned to cover the higher investment.
rf Airlines are now looking to a large extent at narrow-
body aircraft for replacement of the existing fleet in the
kearly 1980 1 s.	 These aircraft have an extremely high invest-
s ' ment cost per seat, nearly $100,000 -- more than double the
`r investment per seat of the aircraft under consideration for
replacement.	 It is evident that it will be very difficult
to produce operating economies sufficient to offset the high
++
z
capital expenditure.
Airline management will be deterred from replacing
existing narrow-body	 ircraft with new narrow body `aircrafty	 _
• ,^, because the e : impact on net income will be adverse, due to the
E large investment cost per seat, even though the investment
might be warranted on a long-term basis. 	 To illustrate, it
can be observed that the lease cost of a $12 million 727-200
! aircraft on a 15-year lease at 10 percent interest would be
$530 per hour flown. 	 The new airplane must generate operating
cost savings of that amount or the impact of replacement on
` net income will', be negative. 	 But the cash operating costs
(direct operating costs excludina l depreciation) of an aircraft
' to be replaced, a B-707 for example, are currently only about
$1,100 per hour flown. Thus, the hourly operating cost of the
k 35
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new aircraft must be less than $570	 [$1,100 - $5301 before
it begins to become economically attractive. 	 The breakdown 
of the 707 operating costs for the year 1975 were as follows:/ it
Cost per
Item	 Block Hour*
._ Flight Crew	 $	 273.64 4.
Fuel and Oil	 447.06
Sk	 ^I
u Maintenance, Flight Equipment 	 317.36
Other	 5.63
Total Cash Operating Expense 	 $ 1,043.69
Y: Depreciation and Rentals	 123.77
Total Aircraft Operating
r	 ;:	 I Expense_	 $ 1,167.46 1
Domestic Trunk Carriers, _B-707-100B, 12 Months ,i
t	 `i s Ended 12 31/	 /75.
Note that one major component, flight crew cost, is not k»
a^ susceptible to reduction through new technolo gy.P	 g	 gY•
r
c. Environment
-Environmental issues have played virtually no role in the s
i past airline reequipment cycles.	 Small concessions were made lr
to reduce noise in the early jet engines, with somewhat more
i attention paid to the issue with the first wide bodies;, but
costs were minimal and had no effect on aircraft purchase
c^
_decisions.	 At present, however, with new aircraft available
or in design showing little in the way of market appeal or
s
overall cost economies as compared with aircraft under con-
j sideration for replacement; aircraft sound regulation has
become the primary governing factor in all aircraft - replace-
ment considerations.
	 Of the 1,..758 .aircraft owned as of :1.2/31/75
by the Domestic Trunks and Pan Am, over 1,200 must be replaced
! or else retrofitted at substantial cost to meet FAR Part -36
requirements.
1 CAB Aircraft Operating Cost and Performance Report, Vol. X,
July,	 1976.
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It appears that for the next ten years airline replace-
ment planning will be almost totally defined by the ;noise
regulation timetable. 	 Effort will be concentrated on de-
s
cis bas for replacement versus 'retrofit for various aircraft
types.
	
Advancement of the timetable for qualifications under
FAR Part 36 will of course intensify the implementation of
the programs chosen.
It is apparent that some other major environmental concern
' could have a major impact on the aircraft purchase cycle in
some future period.	 Although we do not see one on the horizon
at this time, we would hope that such a development could be
U identified early and fixed on the aircraft manufacturer draw--
ing boards rather than after production or delivery of air-
craft, as has been the case with the noise problem.
d. Route Structure
r
An airline's' route structure influences the type and
numbers of aircraft which it will need to service its markets.
However, the selection of specialized aircraft to serve different_t m, types of markets within an airline's route structure has become
w	 {; a lesser factor in recent: years as airlines have opted for
^ fleet simplification.
#	 i
There has been a growing recognition that all aircraft
in an airline's fleet tend to perform a wide variety of
L4 missions in order to achieve -routing patterns that accomplish
other goals such as good market timing, through service,
high utilization, efficient crew usage, etc.	 More attention
is being ;paid to the efficiencies arising out ofhaving a
minimum number of aircraft types in a fleet.	 These efficiencies
include better crew utilization, lower parts inventories, better
aircraft routing potential, and so on.
Some airlines have sold relatively new aircraft and pur-
chased replacements for the express purpose of meeting a;goal
of reducing the type and number of different aircraft in their
y
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Ifleet.	 Indeed, commonality and interchangeability of parts'
^ is becoming amore important weapon in the sales arsenal of
the equipment suppliers as the capital costs of spares increases.
iN
We do not foresee any airline route structure developments
which would have any important influence on aircraft purchase
requirements.
4.,	 Other Determinants
In this section we discuss two factors which will pro-
x
bably remain stable and therefore have limited impact on
aircraft equipment need, but which aiave a high potential# to disrupt the industry in the event of major changes.}
These factors are:
•	 Alternative transportation modes
•	 Energy'
I,.
a. Alternative Trans oration Modes
The emergence of a successful competitive transportation r
<< mode would divert demand '
 for air travel and have an impact
k on airline capacity requirements.'
Approximately one-half of all air passengers travel is
less than ;500 miles and twenty city-pairs account for about
one-third of all short-haul passengers.
	
Under these conditions 1
the development of a viable alternate short-haul transportation
r system could penetrate a sizable portion of the short-haul
^;' airline market. T
Other possibilities- include high speed ocean vehicle
the Sea- flight operation of hydrofoil ships between the Hawaiian
Islands has shown that this concept is possible when special
market conditions exist.
Our best estimate is that no broadly'successful alter-`
natives to air travel will appear on the scene within the
Arthur D Little, Inc.
.^
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F
E next twenty years.
	
However, it must be recognized that the
potential exists. 	 In particular, heavy government subsidize-
tion of an expanded rail network could create a transporation
. alternative which would divert traffic from the airlines.
b. Energy
Another "energ y shock" would again cause changes in the
airline industry'. 	 The most probable occurrence would be a
t second large-step increase in fuel proces. 	 We have seen that
f the effect on the industry's capital requirements takes two
 basic forms:
:. •	 Price increases instituted to cover the`.increased
costs stifle demand growth. 	 We have seen how the
32 percent increase in airline yields from 1969 to
1975 was coincident with a reduction in traffic
growth to 4 percent annually as compared with
t
growth of 17 percent during the previous six years.
^ i
0	 There is an increased inducement to P urchase new,
more efficient aircraft to replace older aircraft.d
These two pressures are offsetting to each other in
their influence on aircraft equipment requirements, and the I
net resultis presently unclear.
Of course, much more dramatic changes in energy avail- X
;t ability are possible.
	
They could cause drastic changes in
the airline industry because fuel is such a heavy cost com-
ponent (about 20 percent) and traffic volumes are sensitive
to price.
Arthur D Little, Inc.
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iCHAPTER, III
IMPLICATIONS OF CHANGES IN AIRLINE INDUSTRY STRUCTURE
^ FOR THE AIRLINE .EQUIPMENT MARKET-
The previous chapter addressed the major determinants of
airline capital requirements that are reasonably quantifiable
and measurable.	 This chapter addresses the equally important 	 r
r
qualitative portion which also shapes future equipment needs.
1.	 Introduction	 j
I`
main attributes
	 airline	 structureThree	 of	 industry	 have
particular significance for the airline equipment market.,
These are	
^
 competition, specialization 	 and consolidation.P
Competition is a driving force for re-equipment -- more than
f_
any other singlefactor generating the interest in new equip-
ment holding the promise of more attractive and more efficient
and economical service.	 Specialization is a shaping force,
providing definition to equipment needs.
	 Consolidation is
..
an enabling force, inasmuch as the scale and density of car-
z[r, r'ier operations are material not only to the ability of the
..
carrier to	 economically	 fleet ofutilize	 a	 aircraft and re-
f
lated;equipment, but also to the availability of the carrier
FU to finance equipment purchases.
.f
.; The evolving structure of the airline industry has
profoundly influenced past equipment programs for better
	 l
x 141
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rand for worse.
	
Increased layering of competition in the
' airline system has accelerated the reequipment cycle in
the past and has produced a repeated pattern of surge
buying which rivals the economic cycle as a cause of
periodic deterioration in airline earnings. Increased
specialization has had the desirable effect of stimulating
.,^.. the development and use of new aircraft types.	 But,' special-
' izati'on has also resulted in fragmentation of the equipment
market to a degree that has limited the ability of the
specialized sector of the industry to optimize equipment
programs.	 Consolidation, while affording a foundation for
:
P
y^^ the financing of equipment purchases, also has dampened
7t experimentation with new equipment types.
Looking ahead, the shape and magnitude of the equip-,'
,
ment market inevitably will reflect developments within
the structure of the industry. 	 These developments, in
turn, will be responsive both to the changing economics
'
''^,`
of air transport operations and to changes in the regula-
tory environment.	 Whether the foreseeable
	 in
a
changes
industry structure will produce a satisfactory climate
for the growth of the private U.S. equipment market, in
1 _^ line with national goals and object ives,, is a matter of
serious concern.
	 If the evolving industry structure
impairs the performance of the equipment market, inhibit-
'
r
ing the development and production of new and improved
j 42
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aircraft affording substantial economic and operational
G benefits,, by suppliers and the absorption of new and improved
"equipment by the airline industry, government assistance in
therocess may bep	 y	 justifiable and, indeed., necessary. 	 This
assistance might take many forms such as intensified research
and development programs, subsidies, loan guarantees, and
I J
investment tax credits. 	 The potential for, and far-reaching
consequences of, a breakdown of the private process is
F sufficiently important to require a continuing review of the
changing airline industry structure and its impact on the-
timely transfer of new and improved technological capabilities
Li
into the realities of air transportation services.
2.	 The Role of Competition
i	 `k The Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, and successive
amendments to date, have emphasized continuously the
obligation of the Civil Aeronautics Board to foster compe-
tition in the airline industry. 	 While from time to time
J
there has been much debate over how much competition is
i
1 needed, or desirable, to satisfy the mandates of the Act,
no serious challenge has been raised to the fundamental
proposition that competition has a beneficial role in
bringing about and assuring a`higher quality of air se.r-
vices and greater efficiency among airlines in supplying
l
the air services.
^
b3
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It is abundantly clear that both the legislators who
j
!+
,
L«
f have enacted the laws and the administrative and regulatory
ii agencies charged with their application have regarded
i
I4 airline equipment as a prime instrument for effectuating the
purposes of the act.
	
The legislation builds a wall be-
!if,
{
4
	 " tween aircraft suppliers and airline users of commercial
aircraft. to assureboth a hands-off relationship between the
j two groups and'the free play of competitive forces.
	
The
Federal Aviation Act of 1958, as amended, and preceding
legislation prohibit the control of an air carrier by an	 "?
TO
aircraft or an engine manufacturer. 	 This prohibition was
intended to prevent the suppliers from exercising control€
a
over their markets or, by preference in channeling the
flow of new-aircraft to captive carriers, to deny to
f other airlines new equipment advantages that would assist
t
{
them in competing, effectively.	 a
The legislation also formally denies to the Civil'
I
Aeronautics Board effective control over the airline's
choice of equipment and the manner in which aircraft se-
lected by the airlines are used in commercial services.
r
It is again clear that the intent of the legislation is
iF
It
to encourage the airline industry to compete for market
,	 f share and for operating efficiency by free choice of suit-
able aircraft.
s9
19
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The airline industry, in turn, has perceived its best
interests	 lie in	 cultivation	 competitionto	 the	 of virgorous
among its suppliers. 	 Thus, apart, from the prohibitions ;im-
posed by the applicable antitrust statutes which inhibit
( cooperative activities among suppliers, the airlines have
actively and deliberately encouraged competition by seeking
and supporting multiple sources of supply.	 With notably
r few exceptions, each successive generation of transport air-
craft has been characterized by the intense sales rivalry of
at least two major airframe and engine manufacturers.
..
Competition within the airline industry has increased
r
as a result of CAB route certification policies that have
' E reduced the number of large monopoly air transport markets
in the U.S. to a mere handful.
	 In addition, there has been
" a substantial increase in the average number of carriers ft
providing services in competitive markets.	 Competition is
p a
so pervasive throughout the airline route system that the
selection of aircraft, without major consideration of_com-k m
petitive impact, is possibly only in the short-haul, light-
density sectory of the airline market spectrum. 	 Among the
aircraft operated by certificated U.S. domestic' airlines,
I ^
only the choice of twin-engine propeller aircraft can be
said to be unaffected by competitive factors; among the air-
craft operated by U.S. certificated airlines there are no
i
t
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aircraft types currently in use whose selection was not
...E dominated or affected in a major way by competitive consid-
erations.
In, the most competitive segment  of the airline Indus-
r !tf try -- domestic trunkline carriers -- the most effective
service Lives of first line aircraft have been shortened
considerably by market pressures.
	 The average age of air-
craft _sold or retired from trunkline fleets is typically
j far less than average useful life of the same aircraft
,I
established for depreciation purposes; which, in turn, is
substantially shorter than the physical operating life of
the aircraft.	 In 1975, when aircraft in the fleets of U.S.
F domestic airlines had useful lives in the range of 12 to 16
i years, the average age of aircraft retired or sold was nine
1	 :;years.
Local service air carriers, as a`class, are subject to
less head-to-head competition than are trunkline carriers,
j since a	 rime function of the local servicep	 segments of the
'	 k industry is the provision of services to smaller communities
that do not develop sufficient traffic to support economi-
! cally the services of one certificated' air carrier, let
^E
1
alone two or more.
	 As a result, a greater proportion of
' a
f+
1
The average age of aircraft disposed by trunkline carriers
represented approximately 66 percent of the useful life'of
	 -
fi the aircraft retired or sold..
f
i
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local service than of trunkline traffic is transported in
markets served only by a single air carrier.
	 The generally
lesser exposure to competitive forces has permitted local
service carriers to match more closely the effective ser-
vice life of aircraft operated with the useful .wife estab-
lished for depreciation 	 1	 However, as local }purposes.
rt
4 service carriers have become more competitive with trunk-
lines and with each other, effective service lives of air- j
craft have been reduced.t
r
The life cycle of aircraft used by specialized segments
of the industry has tended to parallel the experience of
a those segments of the certificated industry with which the
	
-.
specialized segments compete.
	 All-cargo carriers have
I	 . replaced first line aircraft before the expiration of the }
useful life of the aircraft in line with the replacement E
experience of the large trunkline carriers.
	 Similarly, 1
intrastate carriers, specializing in the provision of
high-density, short-haul services have replaced equipment
and shortened the effective service lives of their first
1
4 ^	 •
,
f
r
The average age of aircraft retired from the fleets of -
local service carriers in 1975 was 8.6 years, representing '.
83 percentof the average useful life of the aircraft re-
T, tired or sold. -
I
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line aircraft in line with the experience of their certifi-
cated competitors.
	 On the other hand, essentially non-
r,
competitive air commuter carriers, operating under the
exemptions from certificate requirements of Part 298 of
I
the CAB's Regulations, have been generally free from the
pressures that have induced early equipment replacement
.; and premature obsolescence elsewhere in the air transport
^f
industry.	 s
Competition plays a significant role in forcing the
s
I J
! retirement of aircraft before the end of their useful
=i- service life.
	 The potential magnitude of this influenceLI
has been observed in Chapter II where there was a differ-
ence offorecast investment in aircraft during the 1976-
` 985 time period of $47 million on the high side compared
with $21 million on the low.
	 A large amount of the differ--
ence in these forecasts is traceable to different assump-
tions regarding aircraft service life.
I ,
The key ingredients of aircraft equipment purchase fore-
casts are 1) inflation rate, 2) rate of traffic growth,
j 3) expected load factor, and 4j aircraft service life. Since
J U forecasters appear to have reached a large measure of concur-
!I rence with respect to the rate of traffic growth (5 percent`-
7 percent) inflation rates (6 percent) and load factor (60 per-`
cent), the principal sources of difference in the projections 
4
y
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is
is service life.'
	 Estimates of service life hinge mostly on
judgments as to when airlines will, for competitive reasons,
_
choose to replace aircraft before the end of their potential
operating life.
Ti^ Load factors also are generally considered to be
n^ strongly influenced by the competitive environment. 	 In
markets where services are exclusively or predominantly
i^
{
IT supplied by one carrier and where traffic volume is in
.. I
excess of the minimal levels for a daily service, load
.
factors are usually hi gher than in markets of .similar or
greater traffic volume competitively served by two or more
Q `carriers.	 Some aviation analysts further maintain that, as
the number of competing carriers in individual markets in-
f
creases, the average load factors experienced by the compet-
ing load factors decrease.
	 However, this conclusion is
„ disputed by other aviation analysts who contend that the
n-` evidence fails to establish a clear-cut and significant
ii
relationship between the number of effective carriers and I<
load factors when appropriate adjustments are made for
differences in distance and traffic among markets. a
In any event, it is now apparent that the role of
k
competition in setting indust ry
	factors has been4	 Y }`',.
superseded by the regulatory policies applied in the de-
termination of rates •and charges for airline services.
! The CAB, since 1971, has imposed load factor standards
i	 a
49
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ion domestic air carriers,-1 / as a practical matter requir-
ing the airlines to adjust fleet capacity and investment
to the established standards in order to achieve and
' maintain satisfactory profits.	 The load factor standard 	 j
has been refired to distinguish and establish higher load 	 r
- factor standards for certain of the principal off-shore
markets.	 Fares to San Juan are based on a load factor	 4
standard of 62 percent, in contrast to the 55 percent stanJar3
	 j
2/
laid down on an industry-wide basis.
	 The CAB also has
announced and applied a higher load factor standard in	 !_;
reviewing the reasonableness of fare levels in the Main-
3/
land-Hawaii markets. 	 Furthermore, the CAB has initiated
a proceeding to consider the amendment of the domestic loadb
I " factor
	 obviously looking tostandards,	 the possibility of
increasing substantially the 55% standard set in the DPFI.
	 .'.
Testimony and exhibits presented by the CAB Staff in the
Load Factor Case appear_ to support an industry-wide load
factor standard in excess of 60 percent.`/ Recent 'literature
	 j
4
l/	 CAB. Domestic Passenger Fare Investigation, Docket 21866-6B.
Order 71-4-54, April 9	 1971.	 See also PS-63	 (Amendment
" No.	 42 to Part 399).
2/	 CAB. Mainland U.S.-Puerto Rico/Virgin Islands Fares, Docket
24353, Order 74-10-78, October 15, 	 1974.	 Also Order 76-8-100,
August 18	 1976.
3/	 CAB. Hawaii Fares Investigation, Docket 25474, Order 76-10--37,
October 20,
	
1976.•
4/	 CAB. Load Factor Standards Case, Docket 27417, Exhibit
BE-D-1005.	 4;.
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recounting the results of studies to develop optimal load
^t factor standards, based on considerations of cost and fuel
i
2 economies and public service requirements, place optimum
load factors for the domestic trunkline industry in the
7',a; range of 65 percent to 70 percent.— /
If current regulatory policies are altered to base
3t; approved fare levels on load factors as high as 70 percent,_ the
f precise consequences of the impact of higher load factors
.* on rates, services, and market volume cannot be projected.
The higher load factors will reduce unit operating costs
,
as the fixed costs of operation are spread over a greater
( density of traffic.	 The higher load factors also will
reduce the number of flights performed and the possibilities
TT
i of finding available space on preferred flights. 	 The stim-
ulus of lower costs and prices to be user balanced against
the depressing effects of reduction in service quality
}{F` clouds the outlook for both total service levels and total
z, traffic`.	 The questions of market behavior inherent in the ^.
l/	 Douglas, G.W. and James C. Miller III.-
	
Economic
Regulation of Domestic Air Transport:
	 Theor	 d Policy'. #F
?.; The Brookings Institution, Washington,,; D.C. ,
	 1974, P. 91.
Also:	 CAB.	 Capacity Agreements Case, Docket 22908,
' Exhibit DOT-T-5.
	 Also:	 Mehring, Joyce.
	 Toward Optimal;
t Airline Fare/Schedule Combinations:Benefits and Costs
Ci of Alternative Fare Schedule-Combinations' in the U.S. 1
Transcontinental Airline Markets.
	 Ph.D. Dissertation,
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Civil
Engineering, October '1974.
s
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balancing	 lower	 lowerof	 costs and	 quality of service
are far from resolved in the available literature.
	
It
U
is not even clear that a balancing will be necessary,
f since lower charges to the user ma y stimulate sufficient
l
new demand to provide the inundation for more services
and overcome the depressing effects of greater seat in-
1 accessibility.
Even more dimly foreseeable are the consequences of
'r
a dramatic change in the regulatory environment to pro-
vide for a freer operation of the competitive process.
t
Certain of the °stronger proponents of deregulation have
suggested that the elimination of entry and exit barriers j
t4'
r will weed out inefficient air services and bring more
x effective price competition into the industry.
	
This view
is disputed by proponents of regulation who argue that
deregulation will result ultimately in greater concentra-
tion of air services, more wasteful deployment of capacity,
' and higher costs.
Unfortunately, the literature produces more heat than
light in the resolution of the controversy surrounding de-
.regulation.	 Consequently, a firm basis for forward planning
and programming in a deregulated environment does not exist.^-
5
In these circumstances, simple prudency dictates that watchful
waiting and a heuristic approach are the best course to beki
followed through these uncharted areas. r^ r
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3.	 The Role of Specialization
the greater part of air transport services
f
While
i is performed by trunkline carriers authorized to engage
a
' in virtually the entire gamut of commercial air transport
activities, an increasing role has been earmarked by the
CAB for carriers whose activities_ are limited to various
circumscribed and specialized services.	 The CAB, for
4I
example, has designated the local service class of car-
riers to engage primarily in short-haul services. 	 The
distinction between local and trunkline service has
blurred as the route systems of the local service has
expanded, but the initial and remaining differences in
the principal functions of local service and trunkline
a2
carriers are still reflected in differences in fleet
' composition.
	
Similarly, the Board has certificated all-
cargo carriers, supplemental carriers limited to plane-
i
! load services and, by exemption, commuter carriers.
JLUI Recent revenue data for those specialized sectors of the
air transport industry show that they compare as follows
in size characteristics:
LI t
t
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1FY 6/30/76
Operating
	
% of Trunklines
l Category of Carrier	 Revenues	 FY 1976-	 FY 1950
(Millions)
Trunklines	 $14,173	 100.0	 100.0-
.^ Local Service	 1,511
	
10.7	 3.3
1I All Cargo
	 378	 2.7	 1.3
jE Suppleii►ental
(Passenger and Freight)
	 419	 3.0	 4.3
{ Commuters	 250 e	 1.8
Helicopter	 11
IL e	 Estimated.	 *	 Negligible.
Sources:; Airline Industry Economic Report, CAB, June 1976.
t Handbook of Airline Statistics, CAB.
f	 ,;
! A further area of carrier specialization has resulted
from the initiation and development of intrastate commercial
.	 i.r air services in high-density travel markets lying entirely
within state borders.
	 The California services are the most
^i
notable and entrenched of the intrastate operations, followed
x s in chronological and size order by the Texas intrastate `
services.
	 The intrastate operations, which have spread
to Florida, Pennsylvania, and other states to a lesser degree,
+	 1 are not totally deregulated since varying types and amounts
of regulatory controls are imposed by the states.
	 However,
intrastate operations are not subject to federal certifica-
tion requirements and intrastate carriers are not bound by
the limitations of aircraft size established by Part 298..
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Intrastate operations rank in total magnitude of
revenues with other specialized segments of the industry.
Revenues in 1975 amounted to approximately $213 riillion.1/
Functionally, intrastate operations fall in a grey area
between trunkline and local service carriers. Their
i	 access to high density markets and their latitude to con-
E	 fine services to high,-density markets is more akin to the
a	
situation of the trunkline carrier. However, they are
;r
obviously limited by the geographic boundaries of the
Lit
states in which they operate to relatively short-haul
markets and, in this respect, their services are more
similar to those of regional air carriers. Typically,
intrastate carriers have provided services at rates and
fares below the comparable interstate levels and have
i
	
	
operated aircraft in high-density configurations. Their
operations are, as a rule, geared for highly productive
turnaround services at lower unit costs.
Several regulatory objectives may be discerned in the
Ll
specialization of air carriers`. The main objective is ap- 	 sh
parently`equipment specialization--delineation of functions
so as to effect the choice of distinctly different aircraft
fleets for each specialized category of carrier. This is 	 1
clearly the intention in the authorization of helicopter
services. It is also the intention in the provisions made 	 r^
, for the exempted 'services of commuter carriers. Originally	 I`
1/ Moody s Transportation Planual,-1976 edition (includes revenues
	 #:
for PSA, Air California and Southwest Airlines only)
v. 55	 i
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1
limited to aircraft under 12,500	 the exemptionpounds,
now covers aircraft under 30 seats and 7 , 500 pounds of
payload.	 Aircraft specialization apparently underlies
fl the role that the CAB has earmarked for the local service 1
segment of the industry.	 The Board, for instance, has
resisted the transition to two-engine jet aircraft and
l
currently limits subsidy compensation to actual or nominal
propeller aircraft services. 	 It has 	 use of
" three-engine jet aircraft by local service carriers, R
recommending against Government guarantees of loans for
the purchase of B-727 aircraft- / and suggesting that
losses incurred in B-727 be entirely excluded in deter-
mining the needs of local service carriers for subs
Ir By its 'policies the CAB would confine the fleets of local
Yservice carriers to aircraft most suitableto medium-
density traffic and ,relatively short distances.
.I
j A second regulatory objective in the authorization
of specialized services is to supplement and to exert
competitive pressure on trunkline carriers in secondary <<
E
I
h^i
areas of interests, the development of which might be
^-
expected to be subordinated to the predominant focus of
trunkline management.	 Patently, the all-cargo carriers 4
the 'function 'ofand supplemental carriers perform 	 stimu-
lating the development of cargo and charter services and, y
c
l/	 e.g., the Board iecently'recommended the denial of Hughes
Airwest's application for guaranteed loans to purchase l
B-727 aircraft.
2/	 Investigation of the Local Service Class Subsidy Rate, CAB
Docket 29160.	 See	 so:	 Phoenix-DesMoines/Milwaukee Route
2 Proceeding, Docket 28800, Statement of Position of the Bureau
'r of Operating Righ%'-s .
f ^
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4as a`by-product of this stimulation, to expand the equip- 	 <1
_^	
r
ment market.
	 In the case of all-cargo carriers, a further
p	 consideration in their authorization, although not a primary
consideration„ also was the possible development and use of
"	 aircraft especially designed for the exclusive handling and
I	^^
transportation of cargo.
The aims of the CAB's; specialization program have
9 been met with moderate and varying degrees of success.
t1	 The evidence is abundant that the development of activi-
ties peripheral to the main thrust of the trunkline
mission has been substantial as a result of the authoriza-
tion of specialized services. 	 Short-haul services and
-,;	 traffic are far in excess of the levels that could reason-
ably be expected if the short-haul, medium- and `light-
density services were authorized exclusively to -trunklines.
V	 Similarly, cargo and charter traffic and service develop-
ments have been spurred by the specialized authorities
granted by the CAB to all-cargo and supplemental air car-
riers.
The stimulation of traffic and services also has pro-
duced a concomitant overall stimulation of the equipment
market.	 However, the success of the specialization program
in producing aircraft which are optimized for the functions
^.«	 performed by specialized segments of the industry has been	 ,1
mixed.	 There have been few new aircraft designs developed	 ^
I„	 for or used exclusively by specialized carriers. These have been - 	 LF[ 	 j
i	
t
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limited to all-cargo operations primarily, two-engine propeller
aircraft such as the F-27 used principally by local ser-
vice carriers, and the Beech 99 and Twin Otter aircraft
designed to meet the earlier Part 298 Limitations. 	 Sig-
. nificantly, although the Part 298 limitation has been
liberalized, the new ceiling has not yet resulted in a
major program by U. S. manufacturers to develop and 'sell
an aircraft which will take full advantage of the higher
ceilings on aircraft size.
The fact that the Board's specialization program has
produced few notable benefits in the form of new special-t
l
ized aircraft designs undoubtedly is due to the limited size
r: of equipment markets afforded by specialized carriers.
However, as the specialized segments of the industry have
groan in size and importance, the opportunities for the
{ development of a specialised equipment market has grown lY
co. Liensurately.
14
Another countervailing force which has inhibited the
development of the specialized aircraft market is the
apparent lack of total acceptance by specialized carriers
" of their designated roles.	 All-cargo carriers aspire to
f.
become combination carriers and participate in the -move-
ment of passengers.	 Regional carriers are reducing and r$'`
eliminating services to small communities, phasing out
F
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;J small propeller aircraft, and seeking long-haul routes
{.; traditionally considered the exclusive preserve of trunk-
lines. 	 Charter carriers, competing.principally with
trunklines 	 have perceived no need for specialized equip-
` ment, except in military contract services, and have
pressed for more liberal operating rights whichwould
permit the transportation of small groups of passengers
y} on a basis not materially different from the group and'
tour basing arrangements of combination carriers. Thus,
there has been a reluctance to commit investment to
equipment which would have little or no utility in the
performance of an expanded role.
4.	 The Role of Consolidation
A review of the Annual Reports of the CAB shows that
the number of operating carriers holding certificates of
public convenience and necessity from the CAB compares as
' follows for 1950 and 1974:
r 9/30/50	 6/30/74
• Trunklines	 17	 11
Local Service Carriers	 20
F
All-Cargo Carriers	 4	 3
^l/Supplemental Carriers	 85
I
Source:	 Annual Report of the Civil Aeronautics Board,`
1950 and 1974.
1/	 An additional three (Purdue, Standard, and Universal)
held certificates hit were not operat in g 	^,, 	 in	 1.7 ,
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At the same time, the volume of services performed
by each speciklized group and the revenues derived from
those services have increased substantially. 	 As a result,
the average carrier is a larger, more stable, and more
t financially secure entity.	 In short, the trend of consoli-
dation has produced a dramatic improvement in the quality,
^If
as well as the quantity, of the equipment market represented
s, by the specialized segments of the industry. 	 The local ser-
vice carriers, for instance, patently now have the size and
I
K
financiali characteristics to provide an attractive market{
for a specialized aircraft optimized for use in relatively
H'
short-haul	 (under 750 miles) and medium-density (less than
r 300 passengers daily) markets.	 At least two foreign sup-
L
pliers have perceived the local service market to be
sufficiently sizable and attractive to provide the prime, x
if not the entire focus, of U.S. sales campaigns.1/
The effects of the forces of consolidation are also
' manifest in the commuter and intrastate sesegments of theg
airline industry.	 The patterns of development are strik-
k .ngly similar to those among carriers holding certificates t
I
j from theCAB as each segment of the industry has gone
g
h through an early proliferation phase, followed by a slower,
k but inexorable, phase of market and carrier consolidation
1
r,71 l/	 Fokker has promote	 VFW-614 an	 F-27 aircra t mainly among
ij local service carriers; the aborted HS-146 sales campaign
was similarly directed to the local service industry.
x
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in which market experimentation has given way to market
selection and weaker carriers are absorbed by other carriers.
In the process of consolidation the number of operating
L+ entities is reduced; the number of markets served by the
remaining operating entities is reduced; the average volume
of services per carrier is increased; and the average number
1 of aircraft and average size of aircraft in the fleets of
the operating carriers both increase.
Y(
tj The trend of consolidation in the commuter and local
service airline segments of the industry, insofar as it can
yy;
be traced from available data, illuminates the process that
;; E has occurred typically in other specialized segments_ of the
industry.	 Table 1 shows data respecting the size of aircraft
I
` fleets in use and the seat capacity of aircraft comprising
{
the commuter .and local service airline fleets, demonstrating
how the consolidation process led to greater fleet size and
•
much larger aircraft.
y
IJI
The California experience of intrastate air carriers
also illuminates the processes of proliferation and consoli-
dation which occur when the forces of the marketplace are
free to operate in the airline industry.
	 In a period of
ix
15 years the number of intrastate carriers operating_ entirely
1 `^ 4
Yt j
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TABLE 1
TRENDS IN ,AIRCRAFT FLEET CHARACTERISTICS
1967-1975
Commuter Airlines Local Service Airlines
No. of No. of
Data for Aircraft No. of Fleet Seats Aircraft
	 No. of Fleet Seats
Calendar Per Per	 Per Per	 Per Per
Year Ended Operator Operator	 Aircraft Operator
	 Operator Aircraft
i
9/30/67 4.15 31.0	 7.46 32.3	 1,438.8 44.5
9/30/69 5.65 57.6	 10.20 43.8	 2,547.3 58.2 E
9/30/71 5.85' 64.3	 10.99 43.9	 2,824.1 64.3
N
9/30/73 4.91 57.0
	 11.60 51.0	 3,352.9 65.7
9/30/75 5.55 73.9	 13.32 43.1	 3,071.8 71.3
SOURCES:	 Scheduled Air Taxi Operators	 FAA 1967-1968 Incl.
Commuter Air Carrier Operators
	 CAB 1969--1975 Incl.
Flight Magazine, June 1968-1976 issues,.
CAB, Aircraft Operating Cost and Performance Report, 1968-1976 issues. iF
F
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within the State of California increased to a peak of 16
a
carriers and, then, by the process of consolidation, de-
creased to three--the number of carriers presently engaging
in schedule intrastate passenger services (see Table 2).
?s The experience of the California intrastate carriers'
is further instructive with respect to the role of consoli-
dation in shaping the equipment market.	 Out of the weak,
fragemented intrastate services, almost entirely equipped
with small two-engine propeller aircraft, two relatively l
large entities have emerged, each capable of operating a i5
I
fleet of jet aircraft.	 One carrier, perhaps overreaching,
actually entered into an arrangement to purchase wide-bodied'
L-1011 aircraft	 (which the carrier subsequently sold at a loss) . !	 a
.. ;_.k	 t
Y	 j 5.	 Looking Ahead {
The airline industry appears to be on the threshold of
} major changes in the regulatory and economic environment --
changes which hold the potential for fundame r -al and far-
' reaching shifts in the trends of comp,etit,,' .,Z, 	 specializa-
tion, and consolidation that will impact significantly on
the equipment market.	 There is indication of an altera-
tion of regulatory policies to relax the barriers to entryg	 Y 	 r ^.
and e; i:t in the now intensely regulated sectors of the . I'1
LL
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` Table 2
r CALIFORNIA INTRASTATE CARRIERSf
jT 1946-1976
i± Date of Period of
Carrier Entry Operation
1. Pacific Air Line 3/06/46 15 months ;I
l 2. California Central Airlines 1/02/49 6 years
3, Robin Airways 3/16/49 6 months {
4. California Sky Coach 4/26/49 1 month
5. Pacific Southwest Airlines 5/06/49 Still Operating
6. California Arrow 5/23/49 6 months
7. Channel Airways 5/27/49 3 months r`
y 8. Western Air Lines of California 8/19/49 9 months
9. California Pacific Airlines 1/21/50 19 days
10. California Coastal_ Airlines 3/15/55 22 years
11. Paradise Airlines 5/14/62 22 months
12. Futura Airlines 6/15/62 3 months !:
Y
-13. Trans California: Airlines 8/15/62 2 years
f 14. Blatz Airlines 7/05/63 6 months
15. Mercer Enterprises* 4/18/64 Still Operating
16. California Time Airlines 9/19/65 42 months
17. Air California 1/16/67 Still Operating
18. Holiday Airlines 8/01/67 7 2 years
Note:	 Includes only intrastate carriers operating scheduled
` services with DC-3 or larger aircraft.
* Name changed to Pacific American Airlines in April 1976. Al
ITL Sources: 	 William A. Jordan. Airline Regulation in America,
,
1970, Appendix 1;
Simat, Hellesen & Eichner, Inc.	 An Analysis of th e
T Intrastate Air Carrier Regulatory Forum, Vol.II,
` i Technical Report, pp. II-25 to-II-35.
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industry.	 The result may be expected to be a triggering of
l a further process of proliferation and consolidation which 	 ?
1 has characterized the evolution of services in each special-
{
ized sector of the industry when opened. 	 Opinion is divided
on where the industry would be left when the forces of con-
,; a
solidation are spent.	 It is the view of the more avid
proponents of deregulation that more effective competition
in the areas of both services and prices will produce more
'r efficient operating units, and services more responsive to
e,
' the demands of users.	 The strongest op ponents of dere ula-
_ g	 PP	 g
tion agree that the forces of consolidation, given free
play, will produce a greater degree of concentration in an
industry already characterized by oligopolistic behavior.
of
' The financial community has signaled grave concern
s
^
{	 r that deregulation will destroy the investment standing of
the airlines by creating instability and uncertainty in
the industry outlook.	 The accuracy of the judgments of the
j f financial community may be debatable, but the consequences
of the judgments are outside the pale of doubt. 	 If the
	
i
i^ financial community, actin 	 on the basis of its judgment,Y	 g. 3
withholds financial support from `_the industry, the effect
on the airline equipment market will be traumatic.
	 Indeed,
t, F
the judgment of the financial community is likely to be
a'self-fulfilling prophecy, bringing about the very Balkan-
ization and fragmentation of the market which is feared.
s'
{
f
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The effect of legislative deregulation may be matched
I
by administrative deregulation if there is a large change
in the direction and emphasis of ` regulatory policies to
replicate the essential conditions of a deregulated environ-
ment.
	 The 'CAB, _under the broad mandc-ites of the Act of 1958,
may relax entry and exit requirements, reduce or eliminate
t
financial support in the form of subsidy, guaranteed loans
and permissible rate of return levels built into the rate
i i structure.	 Recent policy pronouncements of the CAB indicate
that the agency is moving in the direction of deregulation
?'
by administrative fiat. 	 In this regard, the unanimous`
t
endorsement of the CAB of the statement of the Chairman to
} i the Congress appears to signify that theCAB is about to
embark on policies that, in fact, deregulate large sectors #
of the industry.
The statement includes the following observations about
deregulation:
"l.	 Economic regulation should be redirected so domes-- J
tic air transport is, in time', essentially governed by com-
petitive market forces. 	 In the long run, we belive this 1
ri
can re:alt in'a more efficient, lower'-cost system which will
F^
successfully respond to public needs for air gravel.
2.	 The transition to a system emphasizing free-marketq
forces should be gradual and carefully monitored.
	 Transi-T ^
tion plans must take into account the potential need for {
LL ' regulator: actions to prevent or mitigate special problems
F
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which could arise during transition and couldadversely af-
fect the 'traveling and shipping public or other national
z
interests.'
3. It must be recognized that there are uncertainties
and risks involved both in movement toward and in operation i
under a regime relying essentially on market forces. Speci-
fically, these risks and uncertainties include possible	 H
idisruptions of service and the possible failure of less 	 i
	
_ T 	efficient carriers These are natural concomitants of a
free competitive environment. But we believe there also	 i=
will be significant risks and uncertainties, and fewer
potential future benefits if the present regulatory regime
is continued." {
Lij The Chairman also went on to state:F
"•	 [a] fundamental long-term regulatory path which 	 ^}
can be pursued is one which moves in the direction of 'rely-
ing fundamentall y on competition and the , operation of natural
j	 market forces -- a system which minimizes Governmental inter-:
ference to the greatest extent possible and emphasizes	 !! q
greater management freedoms in entry, exit and pricing.
	
k	 ;f
As we have previously stated, it is the Board's judgment
that this is the preferable; course. 	 f
Vi If future changes in airline industry structure are,
	
U	 }
r in the light of uncertainties as to the regulatory and
economic environment, matters of speculation and conjec-
ture, the implications of potential changes for the airline
equipment market are even more difficult to chart. Develop-
ments to date have fostered successive generations of larger,
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faster, and longer range aircraft of each distinct
specialized segment of the industry.
	 The process has
been assisted by growth in the primary demand for airline
{
services and a rapidly advancing technology.
	 Now the
<<fi
rate of growth in demand has diminished; the foreseeable
economic and quality gains from technological advances
also have diminished. 	 The impact of a slowing of growth
and of the rate of technological obsolescence are,rein-
forced by a high rate of inflation which increases the
cost of new aircraft and erodes the purchasing power of
ii cash reserves accumulated through depreciation. 	 Adding
the possibilities for significant changes in trends of	 -
7	 I competition, specialization, and consolidation multiplies
the uncertainties that the processes will produce' an
equipment market that will satisfy national objectives
and goals.
f
i
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IMPLICATIONS OF CHANGES IN AEROSPACE INDUSTRY STRUCTURE
ON THE AIRLINE EQUIPMENT MARKET
^j
I 1.	 Introduction
The airline re-equipment process in terms of the magni -
tude and timing of new aircraft purchases is not determined
!I	 entirely by the airlines. The aircraft manufacturers also
;f
	
	 play a crucial role. It is they who design the new aircraft
and decide when to commit to a production decision. If a
r (	 new design offers substantial improvements in productivity
y
over existing aircraft, the airline re-equipment cycle will
a	
3	 be accelerated as carriers rush in with orders to get a
°	 hoped-for priority in the delivery line. Being the first
carrier on a route with anew aircraft is viewed as a dis-
tinct competitive sales advantage, quite in addition to the
1	 !	 economic benefits derived from reduced costs per available
seat mile.
Predicting the size and timing of the next re-equipment
cycle involves considering what the manufacturers will be
offering and when,. Part of the answer requires a forecast
of new technology (or the application of existing technology
in new ways). Another part depends upon the structure, re-
sources, and financial health of the manufacturing industry.
I	 Technology and the role played by NASA in furthering
{	 the state of the art is a critical element in shaping the
size and timing of the next re-equipment cycle. In thisEll
study no attempt has been made to evaluate what the impact
of new technical developments might have on the re-equipment
cycle. These developments include on-going R&D by NASA in
f	 70	
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such areas as laminar flow devices, improved engines, turbo-
t prop advances and others.. 	 The success of these efforts will
hinge upon how well these new technologies meet the emerging
j challenges of the future in such areas as:r
tr without
	
of•	 Quieter aircraft 	 unacceptable loss	 oper-
ating economy and performance.
L •	 Lower unit operating costs in an environment ofi
escalating fuel prices without sacrificing service
:i	 J quality. ^.
•	 Relief from airport and airway congestion without'
the loss of economy and performance.
•	 Improved reliability of service without loss of
operating economy or the imposition of unacceptable j
i. capital burdens.
" The remainder of this section discusses the structure
i
and current posture of the aircraft manufacturing industry 1.
and identifies  those factors which are most important i.n-p
shaping its future.K j
2.	 Industry Structure and Revenue Composition
. UH The commercial aircraft industry is a subset of the
r
lf
aerospace industry and is composed of airframe manufacturers,
engine manufacturers and a host of suppliers of avionics and
C myriad parts and equipment. 	 The aircraft/engine' manufacturers
without exception are also in the defense and space business
as well as the non-aerospace-commercial market.	 As a conse-
quence the fortunes of these companies are tied to more than
^.: just commercial aircraft sales.	 Furthermore, one's ability
( to get a clear picture of their strengths and weaknesses in
commercial aircraft business using such measures as 1 ifthe
. scientists and engineers employed, finances, return-on-
^
investment, debt structure, etc. is complicated by the het-
sr
r.
erogeneity of their customers and their product lines.
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Although government contracting regulations are explicit
i{ about separating commercial costs from government reimbur-
sable costs, there,^i„e the inevitable "joint costs,” transfers
of personnel between jobs on an hour-by-hour basis and tech-
f !; nology transfer from military. to civilian aircraft.	 The
degree of cross-subsidy of civilian aircraft devel opmentg	 y 	 andp
production by military contracts has long been the subject
of study and, not infrequently, acrimonious debate'..	 We take
no position on this subject for purposes of this study except
to note that aerospace industry data upon which we mast rely
j to gauge the health of the industry often inextricably com-
bine commercial.,aircraft, military and space informaton to-
rf
gether.
The following ten year history from 1966 through 1975 (see
E Table 1) shows the relative importance of aircraft to the aero-
space industry (over 50 percent of industry sales since 1967).
Aircraft sales can be further divided into government
data 'sourceand commercial sales.- 	 Because a different
	
must
r be used, total sales from this source which bases its statis-
tics on 55 aerospace companies who report to the Bureau of
Census are less than estimated for the entire industry in
^f Table 1 below.	 A 10-year :history . of sales of complete air-
craft, aircraft engines and parts is shown in total and for
sales to the U.S. Government expressed in both absolute
dollars and as a percentage of annual industry sales.
{^ ? As will be seen from the data in Table 2 below, the
I importance of the United States Government as a customer for
r' aircraft has been declining on average over the last decade
t °' dropping from 62.5 percent of industry sales in 1966 to 46.3
	 ip	 g '
percent in 1975.	 U.S. Government purchases are overwhel-
mingly military aircraft and parts, although sales to all
government agencies are included in the data. 	 It is`antici-
pated that military aircraft sales will remain at or near
I
r ^
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TABLE 1
y^ AEROSPACE INDUSTRY SALES BY PRODUCT GROUP
<< (billions of dollars) 1
Product Group
Subtotal
Aerospace Air- Non- j
Year Sales	 Sales craft Missiles Space Aerospace
I 1966 24.6	 22.02
I
11.9 4.0 6.0 2.6
1967 27.3	 24.7 15.0 4.4 5.3 2.6
1968 29.0	 26.52 -16.6 4.7 _5.1 2.5
1969 26.1	 23.4 14.1 5.0 4.3 2.7I
'970 24.9	 22.3 13.3 5.4 3.6 2.6
a-
1971 2.2.2'	 19.72 11.4 5.0 3.2 2.5 }^
1972 22.8	 20.2 11.9 5.2 3.1 2.6"
1973 24.8	 21.5 13.3 5.2 3.0 3.3
1974 25.4	 22.3 14.0 5.2 3.1 4.1
;# 1 1975 28.0	 23.3 15.2 4.8 3.3 4.7 z
SOURCE:	 Aerospace Facts and Figures, 1976/1977, Aerospace a
Industries Associati.on of America, Inc.(AIA).
1Rounded to nearest 100 million
2Does not sum ` due to rounding.
yS
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,i TABLE 2
( AIRCRAFT, ENGINES AND PARTS
(Sales in Millions of Dollars)
Percentage	 •.
Year	 Total	 U.S. Govt.
	
Govt:. to total
1966	 8,725	 5,458	 62.5
1967	 11,894	 7,141	 59.7
y 1968	 13,850	 7,411	 53.5
1969	 12,764	 7,161	 56.1
1970	 13,466	 7.,586	 _56.3
i " 1971	 11,392	 6,313	 55. 4
1972	 10,153	 4,954	 48.8
##
C
r z 19773`	 12,278	 5,539	 45.3
li 2	 31	 4	 13,542	 5,98	 44.29.	 ,ft
.
1975	 14,323	 6,633	 46.3
1 SOURCE:	 Bureau of Census .
 Current Industry Reports,	 Series
^t
`i
MQ37D	 (Quarterly)	 as reported by AIA,. op. cit.
current levels of between $5 to $7 billion annually.
	 Thus	 =!
IF
further growth in the aircraft segment of the aerospace
industry is expected to come from commercial sales.
The following table contains a 10-year history of civil
	
7
aircraft shipments in absolute numbers and dollar values.
Especially noteworthy is the increase since 1971 in revenues
: to the general aviation manufacturing industry.
	 The indus-
try remains,'` however,' dominated by commercial transport
aircraft sales which accounted for less than 3_percent of
the total.number of aircraft shipped but 74 percent of the
value of shipments.
	 The 'number of aircraft involved is so
small that a'handful of orders won or lost can make a big
difference in company results
,
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TABLE 3
CIVILIAN AIRCRAFT SHIPMENTS
(Number and Value in Millions of Dollars)
Total
	
Transports	 Helicopters Genl. Aviation
-! Year _	 No.	 $
	
No.
	 $
	
No.	 $ No. $
• 1966 16,674	 2,183	 344	 1,699	 583	 40	
-
15,747 444
1967 14,512	 2,861	 480	 2,458	 455	 43 13,577 360
1968 14,922	 4,267	 702	 3,789	 522	 57 13,698 421
1969 13,505	 3,598	 514	 2,939	 534	 75 12,457 584
( 1970 8,076	 3,546	 311	 3,158	 482	 49 7,283- 339
j 1971 8,158
	 2,984	 233	 -2,594	 469	 69 7`,466 321
1972 10,576	 3,308	 227	 2,660	 575	 90 9,774 558
1973 14,709
	
4,665	 294	 3,718	 770	 121 13,645 826
1974 15,325
	
5,090	 332	 3,993	 828	 189 14,-165 908
1975 15,236	 5,086	 315	 ;3,779	 864	 274 14,057	 1,033
SOURCE:	 Transport Aircraft and Helicopters:P	 P AerospaceP Indus- ^•	 .
tries Association; General Aviation: General Avia-
tion Manufacturers Association: -a
a ^
By simple division using the above table it can be seen
that the average value of a transport aircraft shipped in
r u^.
1966 was $4.9 million versus approximately $12.0 million in
1975. Thus the capital requirements for both manufacturer
and buyer have more than doubled on a per unit basis in 10^
rim years.
Table 4 below contains a five-year sales history of U.S. $,
i manufactured transport aircraft by type and company.
^3 r
r
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TABLE 4
TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT PRODUCTION AND ON ORDER
-n 1971 through ,197
t
1971	 1972	 1973	 1974	 1975	 Total
^
Total - X11 types-	 223	 227	 294	 332	 315	 1,391
Boeing - all types	 141	 96	 148	 174	 169	 728 {{
B-707	 10	 3	 11	 21	 7	 52
1=j B-727
	 33	 41	 92	 91	 91	 348
B-737	 29	 22	 17	 41	 51	 160
B-747	 69	 30	 28	 21	 20	 68%
Lockheed - total	 13	 51	 68	 64	 68	 264`
L-1011	 -	 17	 39	 41	 25	 122
L-100-30/C-130	 13	 34_	 29	 23	 43	 144
McDonnell Douglas - iY
.. total	 69	 80	 78	 94	 78	 399
DC-8	 13	 4	 -	 -	 -	 17 f.
DC-9	 43	 24	 21	 48	 35	 171
DC-10	 13	 52	 57	 46	 43	 211
( SOURCE:	 Aerospace Industries Association, company reports.
It will be seen that Boeing leads the market in total !
a s
units sold.
	
If the market is segmented by aircraft stage j
length, it appears that the DC-9 of McDonnell Douglas leads 5
I
t in the short haul, although there obviously is serious com- ,
petition with the mid-range 727- which has been the most
^i I IT successful aircraft in airline history in terms of units
sold.	 In the long-haul marked over the past five years,
r McDonnell Douglas just nosed out Boeing (228 versus 220)
while Lockheed was a distant third with sales of 122 aircraft. s
r U.S.' exports of aerospace products are dominated by
civilian	 in
s'k:i aircraft, engines and equipment accounting 	 1975
1Includes B-707, B-747, DC-8, DC-10 and L-1011.
-
76
Arthur U L ittic (nc.
for $5,350 million out of total aerospace exports of $7,821
}€ million or 68.4 percent.
	 The aerospace industry is an impor-
tant and consistent positive contributor to our nation's
t
a^
trade balance with imports relatively insignificant ranging
xr
from approximately 8 to 15 percent of exports.
	 Table 5-be-
low contains a five-year history of military and civilian
jaerospace exports.
	 The civilian shipments are comprised of
complete aircraft, engines and equipment (and spares) while
I
the military shipments include, missiles in addition to air-
if
11
( TABLE 5
EXPORTS OF U.S. AEROSPACE PRODUCTS
(Millions of dollars)
Ij
Year	 Military	 Civilian	 Total
1.971	 1,123	 3,080	 4,203
1972	 841	 2,954	 3,,795
1973	 1,354	 3,788	 5,142
1974	 1,822	 5,273	 7,095
1975	 2,470	 5,351	 7,821
SOURCE:	 Bureau of the Census,	 "U.S. Exports, Schedule B,
Commodity and Country, Report FT410 (Monthly) as
reported in Aerospace Facts and Figures, op. cit.
The importance of U.S. manufacturers in the world air-
craft market is illustrated by the following table.
	 The 'fi.
market is dominated by the U.S. and as the table demonstrates,
i U.S. built aircraft have been increasing their share over
the past decade.
	 With the exception of the Airbus (A-300)
and the Concorde there has been no new-trunkline equipment!.
de-eloped outside the U.S. during this period.
	 This would
appear to establish clearly that access to the U.S. equipment i<y
77
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is the key access to the world market.
TABLE 6
U.S. MANUFACTURED TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT IN
OPERATION IN WORLD* CIVIL AIRLINES
Total in	 U.S..	 U.S. Percentage
Year	 Operation	 Manufactured	 of Total in Service
1966-	 3,541	 2,556 	 72.2
1967	 3,725	 2,735	 73.4
1968	 3,902	 2,890
	 74.0
1969	 3,999	 3,030	 75.8
1970
	 3,983	 3,042	 76.4 ;;	 w
1971	 3,973	 3,094	 77.9
^.^. 1972	 4,09'7	 3,247	 79.3
1973	 4,225
	 3,310
	
78.3 -:f
1974	 4,133	 3,311	 80.1
SOURCE:	 International Air Transport Association, "World Wide
p Transport Statistics."
M
*Excludes USSR and Red China and non-IATA members.
9
4	 .
A few additional data points will underscore U.S. domi-
nance oi Lhe world commercial aircraft market now and over
the immediate future.
	 It is estimated that approximately
H,
, 2,659 aircraft are in service with U.S. air carriers or about Y
65 percent of the total world fleet;.
	 As of December 31, 1975 j
foreign air carriers had 258 U.S. aircraft on order in the
U.S. which accounted for around two-thirds of the U.S. back-
1log.
ZAerospace Facts and Figures 19 `76/77, AIA, pg.	 36. 
k
'^Y F
78
u	 ,
Arthur l) Little, Inc
Thus foreign carriers are ordering proportionately more equip-
ment in the U.S` than our own airlines. 	 While the recent
recession can explain some of this phenomena it bodes well
i
for at least the near term for U.S, manufacturers.
Sales and market share data along with shipments of
units and exports do not give the whole picture of the U.S.
aerospace industry.	 As with the U.S. airline industry, there
is considerable concern expressed by industry spokesmen con-
cerning the ability of the industry to generate and attract
U the capital it needs.	 In brief, this industry is also a
victim of recent high inflation rates. 	 Its plant and equip-
ment is depreciated at its purchase value (book value), while
its replacementvalue continues to skyrocket. 	 When the asset
' reaches the end of its physical or economic life (if
more efficient equipment is developed), the company simply
has not generated enough cash through depreciation to replace
' it.	 This industry is not unique in having this problem.	 It
a is faced to varying degrees by all of U.S. .industry.	 That it
; E is widespread	 however, does n
	
diminish	 e^	 of    th., seriousness of
H111, the problem.P
Ability to generate capital either internally or through
borrowing is obviously a function of a company's earning power ,°
both historic and projected.	 Profits in this industry are
•I
U
considerably below the rates experienced by U.S. industry as
a whole.
	 This is shown in Table 7 below.
This data includes operating results for defense opera-'
r
tions and commercial business 	 Profits	 defense contracts
{. in the aggregate are usually lower than experienced on com-
mercial work.
	 Nevertheless, it is not possible to tell from
this data what the commercial aircraft "side" of the business
4
earns and thus provide some indication of the capital it i.
might be capable of attracting.	 Furthermore, the employment` j
of "profits as a percentage of sales" as being indicative of
r_r
r
j
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TABLE 7
MANUFACTURING PROFIT
a (after tax profits as a percent of sales)
All Manu-	 Non-durable	 Durable
t^
Year	 facturers	 Goods	 Goods	 `Aerospace
r 1966	 5.6%	 5.5%	 5.6%	 3.0%
1967	 5.0	 5.3	 4.9
	
2.7 ;
x^
1968	 5.1	 5.3	 4.9	 3.2 i.
1969	 4.8	 5.0	 4.6
	
3.0 is
1970	 4.0	 4.5	 3.6	 2.0
1971	 4.1	 4.5	 3.8	 1.8
k. 1972	 4.4	 4.6	 4.3	 2.4
t	 : 1973	 4.7	 5.0	 4.5	 2.9 r:
:p 1974	 5.5	 6.4	 4.7	 2.9
1975.
	 4.6	 5.1	 4.1	 2.9
:''_	 s
" SOURCE:	 Federal Trade. Commission,"Quarterly Financial Report
for Manufacturing Corporations," as reported by AIA,
! op.	 cit.
the investment attractiveness of an industry can be misleading
^.
and perhaps even irrelevant.
	 The fact that supermarkets earn t
only one or two percent on sales does-not make them an undesir-
able business.	 Earnings data are more meaningful when expressed
_- as-a percentage of the investment required to generate these
profits.
-Thus these data when cast as a percentage return on stock-
holders equity give a somewhat different perspectiveas illus-
trated in Table 8 below.
t,
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F TABLE 8
AFTER TAX RETURN ON EQUITY
After 	 Profit as
Year	 Equity	 Tax Profit	 o of Equity
f
197'1	 7,317	 423	 5.8
1972	 7,816	 609	 7.8
1973	 8,475	 855	 10.1
1974,
	
8,279	 866	 10.5
I	 ii 1975'	 8,663	 925	 10.7
SOURCE:'	 Federal Trade Commission,, 	 "Quarterly Financial
Report for Manufacturing Corporations" as reported
by AIA,	 op.	 y_it,.
I
i The above returns on investment (stockholder equity)
especially over the last four years give a somewhat brighter
picture of the aerospace industry.	 Before tax returns are
over 20 percent [and interest payments on debts are paid with
pre-tax money], which is a reasonably but hardly an outstand-
' ing return.	 The most recentl' Business Weeks' Survey of Cor-
porate Performance which is based on 380 companies reports a
return on stockholders equity (after tax) of 16.1 percent
for 12 months ending September 30, 1976 for aerospace indus-
try.	 This compares with 3.6 percent for the airlines, 	 11.5	 b
percent for banks, 15.9 percent for the chemical industry,
and 19.1 percent for the drug industry.
	 For all industries"
including service industries the return on' equity 'was 13.7
percent.
It should be recalled, however, 'that 'aerospace industry
11l' t data include military sales.	 Cost overruns of the magnitude
1= encountered by Lockheed on the C-5A contract and Grumman on
- v 1
As reported in Business Week, November 15, 1976.
1 I
81
i	- ArthurD Little, Inc
'I
' -
it
	 industry." '
 With the decline in NASA funded spaceI
R&D and a DOD budget that has failed to keep pace with infla-
tion, employment of scientists and engineers in research and
development by industry has declined steadily since 1968.
The table below contains a 10-year employment history.
TABLE 9
EMPLOYMENT OF SCIENTISTS AND ENGINEERS`
FOR RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
(Total and Aerospace)
t Aerospace as a
Year	 Total	 Aerospace	 Percent of Total
,	 ,
	 %
.1 1967	 367200	 100400	 27.3
e
1968	 _376,000	 101,100	 26.8
lE i)69	 387,100 	 99 , 900	 25.8
I	 a 1970	 384,100	 92,600	 24.1	 l
rF 1971	 366,800	 78,300	 21.3
i
1
1972	 349,900	 71,200	 20.3	 {t
s
1973	 356,-600	 72, 300	 20.3	 v
I
i
.z 1974	 358,200	 70,800	 19.8
I , 1975	 375,500	 66,800	 18.7
SOURCE:	 National Science Foundation as reported by AIA,
r`-
rr
I
While it is impossible todraw any firm conclusions	
i
from the 'above statistics the data nevertheless is suggestive
of a possible decline in the depth of technical capabilities
in industry.	 Speculating further, when there is a reduction
in R&D employment in industry the research tends to be hit
$...^ harder than the development:	 Industry, by necessity, operates
_,
over a shorter planning horizon than government.
(y{	
'	
4
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3.	 Ability of Manufacturers to Meet Future Needs
From the preceding review of the commercial aircraft
manufacturing industry, a few observations about its current
strength can be made.	 Despite cutbacks in industry employ-E
ment and great uncertainty about the ability of airlines to
^ finance new aircraft purchases, the U.S. industry is in
relatively good shape. 	 Its preeminence as a supplier to {
the world's airlines continues with order backlogs from
foreign carriers continuing to grow.	 Profits are being re- ;=
^ corded by the major manufacturers and despite the credit
squeeze on the U.S. airlines orders are being placed each
month (United Airlines, for example, recently ordered 28 rt. q
^	 t
Boeing 727-200's) . i
As has been observed, the health of the industry clearly
1 is tied to the U.S. airline market. 	 The level of aircraft
orders placed by the U.S. airlines has in the past and will
' continue over the foreseeable future to spell the difference
between an industry which is a strong force for the achieve-
f ment of national goals and one where national opportunities s.,
are lost.	 Recent forecasts of new aircraft needs are based
IT 4
on what may prove to be very conservative forecasts of
passenger growth of around 6'percent annually. 	 Parentheti-
.
cally, it is interesting to note that forecasters are inordi-
nattily influenced by very recent experience. 	 Thus if in a
recession or low growth period forecasters will extrapolate
these low growth rates over a decade or even longer. 	 A simi-
lar phenomena is observed during periods of high traffic }
growth.	 Indeed, 'much of the over-capacity experienced as a i
result of the wide-body buying spree of the airlines was I
attributed to optimistic forecasts. 1
,,	 e
•= The aircraft manufacturer is not simply a reactive party
,, to the re-equipment cycle which through its market intelli- l:
gence decides when to offer a new aircraft in response to
l
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airline requests'. 	 Although working very closely with the
airlines, manufacturers also work independently to develop
new or improved aircraft.	 In the past what might be termed
great leaps forward in productivity were found with pressur-
ized aircraft, turbo-prop aircraft and turbine powered air-
craft.	 Many industry observers and technical expertsbelieve
that the next generation of aircraft while being superior to
existing aircraft will not produce savings as large,propor-
tionately as in past re-equipment cycles. 	 The next genera-
tion of aircraft will probably be the product of consolidation
rt of the best features of the various state-of-the-art systems i;.
and equipment improvements developed over the past decade.
A number of innovations developed through NASA R&D such as y
laminar flow devices, bonded materials, etc. will probably 4
be incorporated into the new designs. 	 While no single devel-
opment in itself offers dramatic improvements in productivity
when taken in combination the savings are very significant.
At the present time one senses uncertainty and caution
on the part of manufacturers about when, if at all, they
r should announce a decision to go ahead on a new aircraft 	 -
p
`program -- a 7X7, 1 DC-X-200 or whatever.	 Parts of the un-
certainty probably stems from having recently watched their
customers almost choke to death in trying to digest the Jumbo
jets.	 Another may stem from doubts about whether or not
they have something on the drawing boards that is really
.
that superior to possible modification to existing aircraft.p	 P	 g i
Overlaying the entire scene is, of course, the uncertainty
about the ability of the airlines to finance aircraft pur-
chases	 (see Chapter II).
A problem internal to the manufacturers is the huge
investment required to produce a new aircraft, which can
cost in the one billion dollar range or over for development,;`
x. 1Just as this report was going to printing, Boeing announced
j a go-ahead on the 7X7.
d.	 s
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tooling and production, and testing and certification.
	
Be-
} fore a manufacturer will commit to that magnitude of an
{	 #`' investment it must have a sufficient number of airline cus-
tomers signed up (with deposits).
	 Furthermore, the financing {
requirements, long payback period and market uncertainty may z
be too 'great and risky for any one manufacturer to be able
or willing to undertake the venture alone.
	 Development and
manufacturing consortia may be formed with an eye both to
- spreading the risk and reducing the competition.
4..	 Major Uncertainties:	 Selected Issues with Potential to-
Alter ,Significantly Future Aeronautical Supply and Demand
There are a number of issues and/or uncertainties about'
si the future, the outcome of which could significantly affect ^.
the demand for new aircraft and how the demand might be met. I_
i
Mutti-national Ainena6t and Engine Manu6actuain:g Consottia
The table below lists some recent multi-national devel-
opment and manufacturing consortia that are currentlypro-
ducing equipment or have reached agreements to proceed. 	 The
' table contains only civil aircraft and engine products. ?''
Other consortia exist for the development and production of i-l
z military aircraft especially among the Europeans.
s
Two overriding forces are responsible for theformation (,
of international' joint ventures: 	 skyrocketing development
and production costs and rising nationalism. 3.it
Development costs for new programs are huge.
	 For ex-
ample, the Boeing 7X7 is expected to cost around 1.0 billion
dollars.	 The JT10D engine development will be in the 500 i
million dollar range.	 Along with the problems any single <<
company would have in raising such huge amounts of capital,
r
the risks , are equally large. 	 Pro ram failure would -allmostq	 y	 g	 g s^-,
certainly end up; in company bankruptcy.
	 Thus, the risk
must be spread. x:
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The lead time from the decision to proceed with a program
until the first aircraft or engines are produced for sale is
three to five years or longer.	 During this period many
changes in the economy, the market and the competitive pic-
ture can occur, thus further increasing the uncertainties
and thus the risk of such ventures.
` TABLE 10
I
PRODUCT CONSORTIA MEMBERS
f
JT10D engine Pratt & Whitney	 (U.S.),	 Rolls-Royce	 (U.K.),
M.T.U.	 (F.R.G.)	 and FIAT	 (Italy)
Gi.
CFM56 engine General Electric
	 (U.S.)	 and SNECMA	 (Fr.)
Mercure Aerospatiale (Fr.), McDonnell Douglas
(U.S..)	 and Dassault-Breguet
	 (Fr.)
Boeing 7Xr7 1 Boeing	 (U.S.), Aeritalia 	 (Italy),	 (Japan?)
^. Concorde British Aerospace Corp. 	 (U.K.), Aero-
spatiale	 (Fr.)
A-300B` Aerospatiale (Fr.), Deutsche Airbos
} (F.R.G.), VFW-Fokker
	 (Holland) , Hawker
Siddley
	 (U.K.)
1Consortium still under discussion with no firm agreements
either as to partners or program
r
p
Lj
t.
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There is a "hand in glove" relationship between European
IN (and Japanese), governments and their aerospace and airline
companies.
	
In some instances they are nationalized and in
others heavily subsidized. 	 Since in most instances their-
airlines are government-owned, these_ nations can offer the
promise of aircraft orders in exchange for consortium member-
rt:
ship.	 For example, McDonnell-Douglas is expected to get
orders for up to 76 DC-9's and 8 DC--10's from Air France in
'.
i
exchange for joining with the French as a partner in the
Mercure aircraft program.	 McDonnell-Douglas` role will be
If primarily that of sales` _agent for the French since virtually
all the production work will be performed in France.
The trend toward multi-national consortia will continue
and strengthen as it becomes more apparent that the costs
if
and risks in this industry are so great that the ideal solu-
tion for manufacturers might be the creation of an interna-
tional  aircraft and engine cartel-.	 We are not suggesting
this could or even should happen.	 National defense require-
., meats'and the Sherman Act (among a long list of other laws)
could prohibit U.S. involvement which would of course be
essential to its success. 	 Nevertheless, moves towardthis
ideal" will characterize this industry in the future.
A possible future scenario could be the domination of
new aircraft and engine ;sales by say a joint U.S.-French
aircraft and a joint U.S.-B:r_itish engine. 	 Under these cir-
cumstances a number of important impacts might be felt in
the United States which raise policy issues as to what the
stance of the federal government should be to such arrange-
` ments , in the future.
•	 Up to one half or even more of the 'total production
' force might be overseas in the nations of one or
more U.S. partners.	 There would be a roughly pro-
portionate outflight of gross national ,product,
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trade surpluses and U.S. subcontractor revenues.
Ll On the other hand, one might argue that had the
U.S. not joined the consortium then it would not
have retained even one half of the sales and jobs.
Technology transfer from the U.S. to overseas
m ight take place.	 Thus to the extent that NASA,.
sponsored R&D was utilized in the new development,
overseas companies and/or governments would become
direct beneficiaries of the U.S. taxpayer,supported
In light of the above-hypothesized impacts the role of
NASA aeronautical aviation activity would have to be ke-
examined.	 on one extreme some might argue that federal sup,
port of R&D should cease because it directly or indirectly
tj subsidizes potential U.S. competition.	 on the other extreme
some might argue that stepped up federal R&D expenditures
would be necessary to improve,our technology and thus
strengthen our bargaining position with overseas producers.
It would.not be difficult to imagine some support for direct
U.S. government subsidy on either an outright grant or loan
basis to U.S. industry to help finance its share of new air-
craft/engine development.	 In short, the practices of foreign
governments might be adopted by the U.S. to place our compa-
nies on a parity with their -foreign partners.
At the close of World War Il the United States had a
formidable aviation manufacturing industry in terms of faci-
lities, employees and numbers of companies in the business.
There were,-of course, too many companies to survive on
peace-time military and civil aviation sales.
	
Post-war
competitors for the trunk airline market were Boeing, Douglas,
Lockheed, Martin and Convair.
	 Martin bowed out before the
Afthff
`
jet age while Convair suffered the largest loss in corporate
history (to that date) on their 880 and 990 program and thus
4,1 withdrew from the civil aviation field as a prime contractor
(they now build the body of the DC-10 for McDonnell Douglas).
E111 The recent wide body jet re-equipment cycle of the air-
' lines pitted the three surviving manufacturers against each
other.	 Lockheed's disastrous cost overruns in producing the
Air Force C5-A would have put them into bankruptcy and thus
" narrowed the field to two manufacturers had not the U.S.
government bailed them out with guaranteed loans.
t ; Because the aerospace industry is the top exporter among
U.S. manufacturers, because it has a'strong political-consti-
tuency and because it is essential to national defense, the
U.S. government is, of course, reluctant to let it flounder.
r
i t When the next re-equipment cycle begins, it is a near cer-
tainty that it cannot support three U.S. manufacturers and j
possibly one or two European entrants.
	 The question then i
becomes, which one or possible two, if anP	 y, of the U.S. big
three will back away?
	 All aircraft manufacturers will be
under pressure by the airlines to enter with a new aircraft
.,..
so the airlines have at least one alternate source of supply !t<
,r
'E and can reap the benefits of common parts inventories when.:.
they are already flying the aircraft of a reluctant entrant.
, 7417 An alternative to the heads on competition of airplane,:
L
manufacturers has been suggested by various persons in the
industry.	 This would be for the airlines to band together lea11^
(with government approval) to develop specifications for
a new aircraft which could then be subject to bid by the "Big FS{
x+
3" much in the fashion of a military procurement.
	 Assuming= }.
.,, that the manufacturers had sufficient information to cost
the new aircraft, a reasonable ra ge of return would be
i
nearly guaranteed with booked sales exceeding the break-even
point before a decision to go-ahead was made.`
f
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Assuming government approval, the implementation of this
}I scheme would require carrier agreement on aircraft specifi-
cations. While certainly this is possible, one can foresee
difficulties with each carrier considering his needs unique
l	 b4--ause of route structure, cabin service requirements, etc.
-	 An alternative to the airlines themselves agreeing to
aircraft specifications would be for the U.S._ government with
airline input to arrive at the design specs. This could be
very risky business since the airlines would be free to pur-
chase foreign built aircraft if they did not like the govern-
ment's design selection.
r	 Without making a judgment on the relative merits of a
€
	
	 U.S. airline industry-wide banning together to select a
single aircraft design and manufacturer, it is a possibility
which could have a substantial impact on the structure of
the industry. There might be only one U.S. manufacturer for
	
 
i	 I
each class of airline equipment - short, medium and long-
.e
	^	 ^•	 haul,... On the other hand, one manufacturer could provide all
I	 a
three classes of aircraft, thus gaining some economies from
	
9
balancing the work force among' different production lines.
A,Lktine DeAegu.tation
About the only thing upon which proponents, opponents
and students of deregulation have in common is that each one
defines what is meant by deregulation differently. It is
not surprising, therefore, that there is little unanimity on
the subject. There are an almost infinite rangeof possibil-
ities between regulation by the CAB, as practiced today
and complete dissolution of the CAB with nothing to take
its place. The airlines are vehemently opposed to deregula-
tion as are the highway common carriers in relation to pro
i posals to dismantle the ICC. It appears that the airline
	 r
industry, prefers the protection of the CAB--despite its
j
t	 s
Y
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occasional pronouncements concerning its desire to really
	
"r	 compete without CAB interference. Uncertainty as to what
might happen to any given carrier if free-for-all competition
were permitted is so great that the industry would rather
exist under CAB jurisdiction.- 	 i
}
From the point of view of the magnitude and timing of
future re-equipment cycles, deL7,-:!gulation (as variously 	 I
	
n_	 defined) can be described with equal validity as either d 	
,Y
beneficial stimulus or a retarding influence on new aircraft
sales. The subject invites endless speculation with few, if J.
any, final conclusions. For example, one can argue that
many new companies will enter the business, thus creating a
huge over-capacity problem. This would be good nevus to
manufacturers whose market will have expanded. One couldr
alternatively argue that there will be only a few new
entrants into the industry and that the aircraft they pur-
chase will not compensate for the aircraft sales lost 	 i;
when service or unprofitable low densitry routes is
dropped.	 s
The mere discussion of deregulation has produced a 	 3i
	
r "?!	 tangible impact. It introduces an uncertainty into the
industry; uncertainty about if it will happen and if so, in
	
^..	 what form. There is equally great confusion about what its	 =.
impact might be. This has resulted in hesitancy in the 	 r`
financial community about investing in this industry which
	
`	 could result in some slippage in airline re-equipment plans.
! `	 As with most issues of any significance one can take an
	
;	 entirely different view of what deregulation could mean to
..
the NASA aviation R&D program.- Those who are opposed to
deregulation argue that a period of chaos would follow with
overcapacity initially and then bankruptcies. The industry 	 ^
would be brought to its knees for a number of years until
	 X
 t	
t
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the survivors sorted themselves out into a more rational
structure.	 During this period the aircraft manufacturers
would also be in chaos.	 Very little R&D would be performed
by industry and therefore NASA would be the only , organization
available to insure that the vital work continues so U.S.
leadership would be maintained.
g
Proponents of deregulation would argue that aircraft
purchasing would follow a more rational process which could
reduce if not eliminate periods of excel:; capacity followed
by reduced profits and losses by the air carriers.
	
Convinc-
.F€ ing research into this phenomena abounds. 	 The thesis (which
is probably corrects says that under CAB regulation the pri-
mary competitive weapon is capacity, that is, the number of
F' flights and seats per flight offered in each market. 	 On a
' x route (city pair) served by say two carriers the relationship
" of capacity offered to market share seems to work as follows:
4{ n a carrier offering 70 percent of the seat miles would capture
around 80 percent of the passenger miles, while the other`
i n carrier offering 30 percent of the available seat miles, for
example, would get only 20 percent of the traffic. - These
numbers are illustrative and will, of course, vary, but ''the
central tendency seems to have been validated. 1' To competes
one must put on more -capacity.
Market share is not the only motivation for buying more
aircraft_.	 The return on investment (ROI) permitted by the
CAB for carriers is limited to 12 percent.
	 Under these rare
but happy situations when air carrier earnings are this high
r
`. i^ . or look as thought they might be that high, the carrier can
I, avoid the ROI ceiling by increasing its investment base.
	 The 1'
j
l
simplest way; to do this is buying a few more aircraft.
1 1"	 e Fight for Competitive Advantage:
	
A Study of theSee " Th
[united ;States Domestic Trunk Air Carriers," by William E.
F'ruhan, Harvard University, 1972.-
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Foneign Competition
	
1 '<
x
This refers to competitir,n in aviation technology not
4	 `
airline competition. The U.S. has been the leader in world	 I
civil aviation since its infancy. No other nation comes in
t	 even as a close second. Nevertheless, in Congress and else-	 j
where fear is sometimes expressed that our leadership could 	 j
be imperiled in the future if we fail to advance the state
of the art anti do not have the monetary and human resources
necessary to produce new aircraft. How realistic are these
fears and what is the prospect that U.S._aviation preeminence
. r may be lost?	 .
IT Significant inroads by foreign competition have been
made into the Commuter Air Carriers (Part 298) with the
	 ;'t
Canadair DHC-6 and the Nord 262 of France. Local service
	 }r
and regional carriers operate some British BAC-111's, the
F-27 built in the U.S. under license to Fokker and even a
few Japanese YS-11 1 s. In the business jet fields there is
stiff foreign competition with Dassault (the Falcon sold by's
Pan American) of France and Hawker-Sidley of Great Britian,
European manufacturersIn the piston and turbo-prop'market all 	
!4
.:^	 P 	 P
a
are represented as well as Japan. This contrasts with the
=#,	 trunk, airlines and Pan Am which own approximately 1,800 air-
craft all of which were built by U.S'. manufacturers.
i .;
`
	
	 British and French manufacturers singly and in combina -
tion have made attempts to penetrate the U.S. trunkline
x
	
	
market. The Viscount in the 1950`s and the BAC-111 and French
Caravelle in the 1960's are examples. None of them, however,
made permanent inroads in the sense that the European manu-
facturers gained a lasting foothold with any U.S. carrier.
W.	
is
in other words, the carriers did not look to them for their
next generation of aircraft. In the future, the Anglo-French
A-300 airbus and the Mercure transport could offer some compe-
tition in the medium range category.
93
Arthur 1) f .ittic° Inc
11 11 11 AM
^i
i
i.
t
Foreign manufacturers are at a-tremendous disadvantage
vis-a-vis U.S. manufacturers for a variety of reasons.
	
First,
t
I-^
( the U.S. airline fleet accounts for around two thirds of the
f
it
^( total world airline fleet and there is a very - understandable4
1"4 bias of U.S. air carriers toward U.S,. manufacturers.
	
As long
4	
..:
as the U.S. is its own best customer, it is difficult to
imagine any serious erosion in U. S. civil aviation leadership. ^,
The aircraft market in Europe is not as important as in the
U.S. because of the very short distances involved; in travel i
within countries and even between countries. I
A second reason for U.S. aviationreeminence is trace-P 4	 -.
able to a variant in the old adage of success breeds success. ;I
1
The fact that the majority of free world scheduled air carrier 4i
ff
aircraft are U.S. built means that many overseascarriers gain k
^ I
advantages in spares inventories and training by continuing to fi
uuy U.S. Ea,
Lasts but certainly not least, is the fact that U.S. tech-`
SL:	 ^- nology, engineering and production have created the best and [
most cost effective aircraft in the world. 	 What is rather']
'?€ difficult to sort out is how much of U.S. success is;attribut-
able to superior technology versus its ability to get to the
r,market place first with firm orders from U.S. airlines in its
' pocket.
	 Under these circumstances any foreign competitor (,
,F
N
would have to have either a significantly superior aircraft j
or offer very attractive financial terms to expect to compete i1
in any substantial way.
	 One has the impression that the pro-
"' duction of a superior aircraft in terms of operating perform- i!
ance and economics alone can no longer explain the success of jX
U.S. manufacturers over their overseas competition.
	 Success
I,
Ls also tied to product planning, financial capabilities,
.pare parts availability and market timing, and it is in these
^F
areas that U.S. manufacturers have been very effective.
If the
	 interpretation
	
the factors
' Al
above	 of	 responsible
il
194
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i
.^-
for U.S. aviation leadership are correct, then what role can
and should R&D play in the future?
	 Clearly, continuing tech--
nical"leadership is a necessary condition for continuing U.S.
aviation preeminence and this must be maintained througha
strong and stable R&D investment program.
	 Technical excel- j
lence alone however, will not assure U.S. preeminence.
	
There
t are a number of distinct trends underway which promise to in-
-a I
crease the competition the U.S. can expect from overseas. s
Nevertheless, in 1976 it is difficult to imagine the U.S. be-
ing displaced as the world's number one supplier of civil
i,
aircraft.
	 Yet not too many years ago it would have been dif-
ficult to imagine Japanese steel and electric products driving i
^-. out U.S. manufacturers in their home market . If	 3
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1976-1984
..GRC"
Labor (System) (Avg Compens/Empl) 7.99
Fuel	 (	 "	 ). (4/gal) 6.29
Other (	 } (Industrial Prices) 4.49
Yields - Dom (0/RPM) 3.7%
"	 - Intl -	 (	 '	 ) 4.3%
To maintain seat mile range distribution and to allow down-ranging
of older type equipment, new buys concentrate on 727-200s, 'DC-10s
and 180 seat medium range type aircraft.
Ditto
Reliance on bank credit line, some manufacturers' participation and
leasing of aircraft essential due to mediocre earnings and cash
generation. No requalification under NY State Insurance Law during
study period.
Ditto
:
AERO AD: PARAMETERS 1976-1984
-A M E R 2 r A N
:_'A
f.,
P	 A	 R	 A	 M	 E	 T E	 R	 S
- - -	 - - -	
- - - - - - - - U.S. TRUNKS & PAA	
- - - - - - - -	 - - - - - -
- -	 -	 -	 - - - -	
--- -
- A.MEPSCAN	
- - -	 - - - - - - - -
ECONOMY	 USA Strong growth into 1977: 	 Thereafter resumption of secular GNP real Ditto
F
1
growth at 3-49 rate.	 Inflation rate to be ,about 59 per year in
1,976 and 1977.
	 Thereafter inflation to drop to 3 11-49 per year.
Unemployment rate to continue slot; drop; consumer income and
confidence to continue to advance.
p
k' World Turnaround from recession levels slower than U.S. with inflation Ditto
rates to continue above USA's.
tit 1975-1980
	 1980-1984 1975-1980 1980-1984
' Growth Rate Compounded "GRC" Growth ,Rate Com_ounded "GRC"
TRAFFIC Dom RPMs (All Services) 	 7.5%	 6.19 Dom RPMs (All Services) 7.69 6.19'( Int'l RPMs	 ('	 )	 9.39	 7.49 Int'1 RPMs ("	 "	 ) 11.29 7.59
CAPACITY ASMs ad hoc by carrier, but to generally increase at lower rate h
than RPMs.	 1976-1977 and part of 1978's increase mostly due to System ASMs (All Services) 6.59 6.29
seating changes and maximum utilization.
5 LOAD FACTOR Ad hoc by carrier; generally increasing between 3 and 4 percentage LOAD FACTOR System (All Services)to increase from 58.09 in 1975points. to 62.5	 by 1984.
1976-1984
"GRC"'
COST Labor (System)
	
(Avg'Compens/Empl)
	 7.79
k.
INCREMENT Fuel	 (	 °	 )	 ( C/gal)	 5.39
RATE Other-(
	
)	 (Industrial Prices)	 4.29
YIELDS Carriers' need to stay at least even with general inflationary
trends, necessitates annual yield increases between 3-59 minimum.
EQUIPMENT Buys to concentrate on presently available aircraft through 1980.
` By 1981-1982 new technology aircraft parametered in are:
180 seat medium range type
200 seat long range type
to help with pressing need for 'fuel economies and to meet the
environmental imperative of the late 1970's and early 1980's.
MONEYABZLITY Cost of-Capital - Ad hoc by carrier. 	 Prime lending rate at 8-8.59
with carriers paying between § to 19 above prime.
Availability of Capital - very restricted until deregulation
debate is settled.	 Funds to come from banks, manufacturers and
through leasing.
	 Loans from insurance companies restricted to
a very few carriers, due to constrained cash generation'and
F earnings outlook.
i CAB Proposals under Aviation Act of 1975 not parametered into study.
AERO ADVANCED will be re-done, when and if the various proposals
have been enacted and a time frame is established.
C 0 'M .M E N 	 A R Y
"EARNINGS"
Amecan Airlines' profit ,picture has brightened considerably after a dismal 1975
performance.	 RPM growth is expected to exceed the industry's average of 100 thanks to
a strong first quarter at UAL's expense, and combined with a 4% increase in yields
should produce revenue gains of about 16% over 1975. 	 The expense side of the P/L form-
ula is aided tremendously by the fuel contracts that AAL still has in force.
	 It's
April 1976 cost per gallon for domestic fuel was 25.9
	 versus 30.3
	
for TWA and 31.3
for UAL.	 (If American had had to pay UAL's price for fuel, its fuel expense would have
increased $4.8 million for April alone.)	 Even with unit labor costs up 12% and other
costs up 9% on an ASM basis, the fuel contracts keep total operating expenses from
increasing more than 13%.
AAL's outlook for 1977 is clouded by the fact that its favorable fuel contracts y
expire and the carrier will have to pay the then current market price.
	 1978-1980 look
like good years for AAL as earnings increase fourfold, but it should be noted that net
earnings reported to stockholders is never more than 2.5% of sales
	 (it was 7.4% in 1966)
and the
	 carrier's ROI'peaks in 1980 at only 7.5%. 	 Gross interest for the carrier,
while declining from 1975-1978, shoots.up dramatically starting in 1979 as AAL is forced
to finance its new aircraft with much more ,costly dollars than the cheap long-term
insurance money it borrowed in the 1950s and 1960s.
Overall, American's earnings prospects are not that good, especially in light of
the 4.5 percentage point gain in load factor that S.'H.&E. has parametered into the fore-
cast
	
Over the period under study revenues grow at 'a 11.3% growth rate compounded j
( "GRC")	 (RPMs 7.3% and yields 3.8%) while operating expenses increase at a 10.9% "GRC"
which produces a nine year operating ratio of 97.4%.
	 In order to do better than S.H.&E.
has forecast American must accomplish either one or both of the following:
1) increase RPMs at a significantly faster rate than the industry. However, it has
been 'losing RPM market share steadily over the last few years.
2) increase employee productivity more than the 3.2% "GRC" projected in this study.
American's productivity improved at a 4.4% "GRC" in the 1966-1975 period, but since 1970
it has averaged 1.7% "GRC" versus the industry's 3.2%.
N.B.	 Discount fare changes effective June '76 and a possible additional fare increase of 7
about 2% in September '76, may result in higher domestic yields than parametered
into study, increasing net earnings for 1976 by up to $20 million.
l
ae.....
E A R N I N G S
_ calendar years
-
1976-
Unit 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1984
Actual
- - - - -	 - - - - --- -
- - - P R O J E C T E D - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - -
Re enues
Passenger $Mil 1534 1779 1991 2228 2470 2747 3035 3350 3682 4037 25319
Freight 132 153 171 191 212 234 257 283 310 341 2152
Total Revenues 1795 2078 2332 2610 2893 3215 3550 3920 4310 4730 29638
Cash Oper Exp
j
.	 ' Labor 744 828 914 1016 1113 1241 1389 1549 1729 1924 11703 I
`	 1 Fuel " 306 341 426 471 517 571 621 677 735 796 5155
Other " 668 781 870 956 1054 1172 1295 1428 1569 1716 10841
Total'COE 1718 1950 2210 2443 2664 2984 3305 3654 4033 4436 27699
Depr/Amort 106 108 107 105 115 125 133 143 158 173 1167
F? Total Oper Exp < 1824,- 2058 2317 2548 2799 3109 _3438 3797 4191 4609 28866
Oper. Earnings - 20 -ZS-- Lub 11 -r3- 1113 I- -T72r
Gross Interest 26 22 21 20 23 30 40 50 59 64 329
Pre-Tax Earnings (54) (2) (6) 42 71 76 72 73 60 57 443
Inc. Tx $Mil (5) (2)" (2) 10 18 19 18 18 15 14 108
Eff. Rate % cr cr cr 25% 25% 25% 25% 25% 25% 25% 25#
Net Earnings
Airline Operations (49) -0- (4) 32 53 57 54 55 45 43 335
"Nettings" 28 21 24 18 17 23 26 25 25 27 206
Reptd to Stockholders (21) 21 20 50 70 80 80 80 70 70 541
(
RATIOS
6
Traffic (All Services)' Bil/%Chg
RP.%s - DOM " / 19.4/ 2 21.4/11 23-.0/ 7 24.6; 7 26.2/ 7 28.0/ 7 29.7/ 6 31.6/ 6 33.6/ 6 35.5,/	 6 16.1/6.9 GRC
RPMs - System " /	 " 22.1/ 3 24.7/12 26.6/ 8 28.5/ 7 30.5/ 7 32.6/ 7 34.7/ 6 37.0/ 6 39.3/ 6 41.6/6 19.5/7.3 GRC
?{ ASMs - System / 38.1/ 5 41.1/ 8 43.5/ 6 46.2/ 6 4B.8/ 6 52.3/ 7 55.6/ 6 59.2/ 6 62.9/ 6 66.6/ 6 28.V 6.4_GRC
Load Factor - System % 58.0 60.1 61.2 61.7 62.4 62.3 62.4 62.4 62.4 62.5 4.5
Yield -'Dom MPM/%Chg 7.05/ 1 7.30/4 7.60/4 7.92/ 4 8.22/ 4 8.55/ 4 8.87/ 4 9.17/ 4 9.48/ 3 9.81/ 4 2.76/3.7 GRC
Yield - System - / 6.94/	 2: 7.17/ 4 7.49/ 5' 7.821 4 8.11/ 4 8.43/ 4 8.75/'4 9.06/ 4 9.37/ 3 9.70/ 4 2.76/3.8 GRC
COST INCREMENT (COE)
Labor (Non-Add) $Mil/	 $ 57/ 8 90/12 74/ 9 76/ 8 74/:7 77/ 7 93/ 7 102/ 7 114/ 7 124/ 7 824
- Fuel " /	 " 60/25 22/ 7 66/18 27/ -6 25/ S 22/ 4 23/ 4 26/ 4 29/ 4 3d 4 270
- Other " /	 " 19/	 3-- 62/ 9 43/ 5 32/ 4 44/ 4 42/ 4 50/ 4 49/ 3 .5V 4 58/ 3 433
- Total
	 " / 136/11 174/ 9 183/11 135/ '6' 143/ 6 1411 5 166/ 5 177/ 5 196/ 5 212	 5 1527
Weighted Index _(1967=100) No /%Chg 195/11 2,13/ 9 237/11 252/ 6 266/ 6 279/ 5 294/ 5 310/ y `y 326/ 5 344/ 5 149/6.5 GRC
AERO AD:	 Earnings 1976-1984
A M E R I C A N
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I"FLIGHT EQUIPMENT°"
'
By increasing seating and utilization on its existing fleet and with the addition
of the 15 727-200s already on firm order, American will not have to start its massive
I
fleet revamping until 1979.
.l
The 18 additional 727-200s are bought for 1979 and 1980 delivery so that American
can start down-rang.^ng some of its older 200s to replace the smaller 727-100s. 	 The
DC-1Os are needed for '_American to preserve its ASM/range balance, to replace some 707s,
and as a partial solution tothe airport congestion problem which could well occur by
k the early 1980s. s.
S.H.&E. believes that by 1981 there will be a new 180 seat medium range aircraft
which will possess such excellent operating efficiencies that the carriers will buy it
even though it has a seat cost of $100,000 in 1976 dollars.
	 American will use this new
` plane on routes which have outgrown the 727-200s but are not yet ready for wide-body
service, and on routes formerly served by the 707-12OBs.
f Some random notes: AAL may not sell as many 707-12OBs by 1980 as S.H.&E. has
projected depending upon a resolution of the retrofit question, the prices offered for
r ' the planes, and the cost of life improvement work.	 American could be a definite
customer for the Airbus.	 AAL will probably not buy or lease any used aircraft. 	 Only
32% of AAL's_1976 ASMs are generated by aircraft which meet the environmental standards .
of FAR part 36. 
Even with the $2.5 billion expenditure for the 105 aircraft that is parametered
into this study, 280 of AAL's 1984 AEMs will still be flown by unacceptable aircraft.
To replace these aircraft would require approximately another $1.7 billion.
f:.sF	 ' 	 ..3x..,	 ^	 ». 	 w..:	 ^	 v.n	
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FLIGHT EQUIPMENT - PURCHASE / REMOVALS / PAYMENTS / LEASES,
GROUND PROPERTY & EQUIP;IENT (projected _costs)
1976-
Unit	 1975	 1976	 1977 1978	 1979	 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1984
PURCHASES/LEASES(L) 	 Actual	 ----------- -PR0JE'CTED--------------- --- --- ----- --- y
Additions
	
No. A/C
727-200
	 6L	 10*L	 5*L -	 8	 10 - - - - 33
DC10-10	
-	 -	 - -	 5	 6 8 6 6 4 35
180 seat M/R	
-	 r	 - -	
-	
- 3 12 12 10 37'
Total Additions
	
6	 10	 5 -	 13	 16 11 18 18 14 105
Total Cost A/C Type1/	$ Mill:
727-200
	 49	 99	 52 -	 92	 120 - -
- 363
DCIO-10
	
-	 -	 - -	 140	 176 247 195 205 143 1106
180 seat M/R
	
-	 -	 - -	 -	 - 79 318 334 293 1024
Total Cost Aircraft	 49-	 -93-"	 - -	 232—	 - i - SI3— 339 36 4
,-	 Removals	 No A/C'
747Pax-1975 747F-1975&6
	
2	 1 1
707-30OF	 2 _ 4
727-100
	 1 1L	 r 5 7 7 21
707-120B	 1	 3	 6 4	 2/31,
	 5 6 6 7 7 49
'dotal Remwals
	 5_	 5_	 _`^
_F	 — — 4	
5	 6
_Si_ 11 14__ I4_ _21_
o
3P A Y M E N T S 4/
— a
Flight Ea_ Payments	 S Mill
Advance Deposits 	 28	 11	 35 87 	 121	 140 154 115 90 70 820 s
Delivery	 1.-
	 -	 - -	 93	 118 131 205 215 174 940
tSpares, Modifs etc	 17	 39	 1 S_ _31	 1 A_
	 —12 _ 1 ; in _L5_ _16_ 120—
Total Flt Eq Payments	 45	 50	 0 120	 210	 970 _ AM) IM 'On 260 19-la-
Total Flt Eq Leases 2/ 	 49	 100	 50 -	 70	 90 100 150 160 130 850
Total Flight Equipment 	 "	 94	 150	 100 120	 300	 360 400 480 480 390 2780
GRD, PROF, 6 EQUIP 3/ 	 28	 30	 30 30	 30	 40 40 40 _40 50 (L
NOTES: (L-Leased, all others 70% purchased)
Cos*_ oer Aircraft Tyne - number x cost per aircraftinclbase price + CFE/MC/spares. SH&E derived.
2/ Leases -'3 30% of total aircraft cost per year (1979-1984). AFRO AD; Flt EQUIP/GPE' 1976-1984
3/'Grd. Prop & Ecuip. - Subject to management reprogramming.
Par°=,nts -(SHEE derived; reflect escalation)
Advance Deposits - pre-delivery @ 30% of unit price. A M 	 R I C A N
Delivery - balance remaining @ aircraft acceptance
43
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"CAPITAL NEEDS AND SOURCES"
t	
-1
American is facing a financial dilemma starting in 1979. Because its cash gener-
ation is not up to the 5 mills norm, AAL will be forced to get more than 50% of its
financing from outside sources. Management does not like to use short-term money (bank)
to finance aircraft, but due to its inability to qualify under the N.Y. State Insurance
Law, AAL will be forced to borrow from the banks. AAL might be able to lease more than'
the 30% of incoming flight equipment that S.H.&E. has projected from 1979 on, but the
recent Treasury Department ruling extending the depreciable lives of aircraft may dampen
the enthusiasm of lessors.
'	 1
S.H.&E. has not projected any equity sales; however if in a strong market with
AAL's shares selling at least near book value (at the end of 1975 the shares were at
more than a 50% discount from book) then AAL would probably sell stock.. The manufacturers
of the new 180 seat plane that S.H.&E has parametered in (see Flight Equipment Schedule)
will supply a good deal of the $140 million in subordinated debt.
American, like all other airlines, faces the problem of under-depreciation of their
	
y
aircraft. AAL is currently depreciating aircraft whose average cost is less than $7
million while its replacement costs are much higher. As a result, the depreciation
source is only 42% of total flight equipment
 needs. Proposals to change the Investment
Tax Credit so that airlines could use the credit even if they didn't earn it would
benefit AAL which has $75 million in unused ITCs, but there is very little chance of
this bill passing Congress.
American decided to lease the 10 727-200s delivered this year and will probably
lease the 5 planes due next year because management wants to remain as liquid as possible.'
With the possibility of "deregulation" hanging over the industry AAL believes it prudent
to build up as big a cash position as it can, because they believe that the "rich
carriers 'would best survive in any deregulated environment. As a result of this policy,
AAL will have excess working capital for the next few years. Some of this extra capital
may be invested in Howard Corp., a natural resource company with whom AAL is holding
preliminary talks. {
t^
a
IF
_
	
	 S.H.&E. has projected capital ex penditures of $3.1 billion for American over
the 1976-1984 period. If these outlays are discounted back to the present at a 5%
rate, the present value of these expenses is $2.45 billion. In the 1967-i99`75 period
AAL's capital expenditures were $2.13 billion. So, whereas the $3.1 billion seems
like an outra eousl large number, when it isi
	
	 g	 y	 g	 put in perspective, AAL' s capital needs
are more reasonable. If American does have trouble financing its needs it can 1)
cut the parametered dividend and save $70 million - as it is not meeting the 5 mills
cash generation norm, stockholders should not expect a dividend and/or 2) cut into
working capital that has been kept at 3 weeks of annual cash operating expenses
It should be noted that AAL's debt retirement schedule is extremely light and
well managed compared to some of the other Big 5 carriers.
Recap: 1976-1984
Needs:	 $3.70 billion (76% flight equipment, 9% GPE 6% debt retirement).
Sources: $1.85 billion or 50% from operations (14% earnings, 32% depreciation)$1.74 billion or 47% new financing ($1,.61 billion, or 44% to be
arranged).
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r^ CAPITAL NEEDS AND SOURCES ($ MILL)
1 - calendar years - 1976-
1975 1976 1977 1978 1 979 198 Q_ 198-1 1982 1983 _ 984 2984
CAPITAL NEEDS ACTUAL - •- - - - - - - 
_ -
---
 
y
R 0 J E C T E D - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Flight Equi,a ent Payments
?i - Advance Deposits 28 11 35 87 121 140 154 115 90 70 820
- Delivery - - - 93 118 131 205 215 174 940
g - Spares, W)dit..'etc_ 17 39 15 33 16 12 15 10 15 16 170
Total Flt Bgtip Payments 45 50 50 120 230 270 300 330 320 260 1930
Add: Flt Equip,Ieas^s 49 100 50 - 70 90 100 150 160 130 850
Total Flight Equipment 94 150 100 120 300 360 400 480 460 390 2780
Ground Prop	 & Eq/Other
Grd Prop & Equip 28 30 30 30 30 40 40 40 40 50 330
Debt Re-tirement - 28 23 23 23 19 24 24 26 31 51 240
Dividends - - - - 12 12 12 12 12 12 70
Other 26 17 17 7 9 4 4 2 (3) (3) 60
Total GPE & Other' 82 70 70 60 70 80 60 80 80 110 700
w^ End Wkg Cap (3wks COE prof) 109 160 180 160 160 170 190 210 220 220 220
f TOTAL CAPITAL NEEDS 285 380 350 340 530 610 670 770 780 720 3700'
CAPITAL SOURCES
- Beginning Working Capital 48 109 160 180 160 160 170 190 210 220 110
Ooerations
- Net Earnings (Rept'd) (21) 21 20 50 70 80 80 80 70 70 540
- Depreciation/Amort 106 108 107 105 115 125 133 143 158 173 1170
- Property Sale/Other 60 25 13 9 5 10 12 10 9 9 100
- , other (1) (13) (10) (4) - 5 15 17 13 18 40
t Total Operations 144 _ 141 130 160 190 220 240 250 250 270 1850
Financing arrangements
90 70 80 BO 80 - 400
- Senior Debt-Banks 60 90
-Insco/Others - - - - - - 30
Subord Debt - 40 50 50 _ - 140
- Leases (Cap @ AC Costi 49 100 50 - 70 90 100 150 160" 130 850
- Deposits returnable 44 30 10 - 20 30 30 50 50 40 260
- Stock Sales
Tot Financing Arrangements 93 130 60 - 180 230 260 330 320 _ 230
1740	 t
TOTAL CAPITAL SOURCES- 285 380 350 340 530 610 670 770 780 720
3700
PLUNGING TO BE ARRANGED - - 60' - 180 230 260 330 320 230 1610
f
AERD AD: CAPITAL NEEDS & SOURCES_1976- 984
A M E R I C -AN
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1	 "Moneyability"
This schedule clearly reflects the mediocre performance that S .H. &E. has fore-
cast for American.	 The crucial cash generation ratio is never above 5 mills which
means that AAL must rely heavily on outside financing sources as the carrier does
not produce enough cash from its operations,
The two debt/equity ratios don't change very much over the 9 year period as AAL
is forced to bring on debt at a 3 to l ratio to its earnings. 	 American never meets
the N.Y. State Insurance Law fixed charge coverage ratio of 1.5 x far unsecured loans,
which reduces its financ ,ng options. 	 (see. Capital Needs' and Sources	 -chedule) . i
As a result of AAL's operating ratio never falling below 970, the ROI for the j
carrier is newer higher than 7.5% which is considerably below the CAB's 12% standard.
AAL's revenue per dollar of invested capital rises smartly in the 1976-1978 period
I,	 but then flattens out as the massive investment in new aircraft swells the investment
i^	 base.
American's $200 million bank credit expires early in 1977.
	 Taking into account
r	 the failure of AAL toualif	 for insurance money,q	 y	 y, its acceptable D/E ratios, and its a
rather unspectacular earnings outlook, S.H. &E. .believes that AAL will arrange for a
larger credit butthat it will have to accept the costlier terms asked for by the
banks.
r
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M 6 N E Y A B I L I T 	 -	 I N V E S T E D	 C A P I T A L
i
(System -,All Services)
1976-
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1992 1983 1984 1984
INVESTED CAPITAL UNIT Actual	 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -,- - -P R 0 J E C T E D - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - {
Debt S	 .il
_9 for Debt - Banks - - 90 160 240 320- 400 380 380
" Senior Debt-Insco/Other " 302 279 256 234 215 199 183 166 183 229 (73)
Senior Debt-Leases'Cap'd " 431 486 490 441 458 490 526 608 689 736 305
Senior Total --Reptd " 302 279 256 234 305 ^359- 423 466 583 609 307
Senior Total + Cap Lses 733 765 746 675 763 849 949 1094 1272 1345 612
Subordinated " 172 172 172 172 172 204 246 287 269 252 80
Total Debt - Reptd " 474 452 429 406 477 -C3 669 773 - 852 861 387
Total Debt + Cap Lses " 905 937 918 847 935 1053 1195 1381 1541 1597 692
Equity
Stock 542 563 583 633 691 759 827 895 953 1011 469
f ., Stock + Sub Debt #' 714 735 755 805 863 963 1073 1182 1222 1263 549
I !- Tot Inv Capital-Reptd " 1016 1015 1012- 1039 1168 1322 1496 1668 1805 1872 856
a;
Tot Inv Capital + Cap Lses 1447 1500 1501 14BO 1626 1812 2022 2276 2494 2608 1161
FLIGHT EQUIPMENT ^
' Depr Cost 739 664 590 539 613 721 844 1090 1340 1505 766
'• Depr Cost + Mfr Deposit 766 673 618 654 779 938 1117 1325 1503 1607 641
Depr Cost +	 " + Cap Lses ` 1197 1159' 1108 - 1095 1237 1428 1643 1933 2192 2343 1146
MPTING CAPITAL
Incl , Cur Debt /Equiv Wks COE $Mill/Wks 1OW 3 16q' 4 180/ 4 160/ 3 160/ 3 170/ 3 190/ 3 210/ 3 220 / 3 220/ 3 111
RATIO A_7ALYSIS1/	(G) UNIT/NORM
Sr Debt-
Eanity (Stk + Sub) a-150% 103 104 99' 84- 8B 88 88 93 104 106 3pts.
Sr Debt
Fl Eq'("at + Dep + Lse) a- 80% 61 66 67 62 62 59 58 57 58 57 (4)pts.
Cap Lses share F1t,Eq $- 33% 36 42 44 40 37 34 32 31 31 31 (5)pts.
Total' Debt a
Stock Equity %-175% 167 166 157 134 135 139 145 154 162 158 (9)pts.
. v State Ins Law
s
G' Fix Chg Cov - 12 :'.os ::-1.5 C.6 1.0 1.0 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.3 1.2 1.2 0.6x
Fix Chg Cov - 5 yr Avg x-1.5 0.8 0.8 0.8 1.0 1.0 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.3 0.5x
Oper Ratio (Airline) i 102 99 99 98 97 97 97 97 97 97 (5)pts.
Return On Inv (Corp) 2 1.6 4.2 4-2 6.3 7.2 7.5 7.4 7.2 6.7• 6.7 5.1pts.
Rev 1 Tot Inv Cap $, 1.24 1.39 1.56 1.77 1_79 1.78 1.76 1.73 1.73 1,82 0.58
:het Can ComtS $Mil 186 280 480 73G 840 960 1040 960 880 800 -
Fin Argd / a Argd "/$ 200/108 200/71 -/- -/- -/- -/- -/- -	 -/- -/- -/- -/-
Cash Generation
Flow per $ Equity C/% Chg-30 8/(56) 15/88 .14/ (7) 17/21 20/18 19/(5) 18/(5) 17/(6) 17/- 17/- 9/113
Rev Less COE
	 Mills/9 Chg-5.00
per ASM 2.02/(55) 3.11/54 2.80/(10) 3.61/29 4.28/19 4.42/ 3 4.41/- 4.49/'2 4.40/(2) 4.41/- 2.39/118
Moneyability
Note	 (G)	 See Glossary. HERO: Inv. Capital-1976-1984
l/	 12 months basis.	 % Changes are from end of prior year. A M E R I C A N
)
^-
ePARAMETERS.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - U.S. TRUNKS & PAA - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -' - - -'- - - - - BRANIFF - - - - - - - - - - -
ECOIgOl4Y USA Strong growth into 1977. 	 Thereafter resumption of secular. Ditto 
GNP real growth at 3-4% rate. 	 Inflation rate to be about
5% per year in 1976 and 1977.	 Thereafter inflatiun to drop
to 3^-4% per year.	 Unemployment rate to continue slow drop;
consumer income and confidence to continue to advance.
World' Turnaround from recession levels slower than U.S. with Ditto
inflation rates to continue above USA's.
1975-1980'	 1980-1984 1975-1980	 1980-1984
Growth Rate Compounded "GRC" Growth Rate Compounded "GRC" 	 y {"{
TRAFFIC Dom RPMs (All Sf.'rvices)	 7.5%	 6.1% Dom RPMs (All Services)	 7.58	 5.9% 1
Int'l RPMs {"	 )	 9.3%	 7.4% Intl RPMs C'	 o	 8.68	 7.7i
CAPACITY ASMs ad hoc by carrier, but to gene_zll.y increase at a
System ASMs (All Services)	 5.88	 5.4%lower rate than RPMs. 	 1976-1977 and part of 1978's
increase " mostly due to seating changes and maximum
utilization.
LOAD 'FACTOR Ad hoc by carrier; generally increasing between 3 and 4 LOAD FACTOR System (All Services) to increase from 50.11 in 1975
percentage points to 57.0% by 1984. -'
1976-1984 1976-1984
-	
"GRC" "GRC"
COST Labor (System) 	 (Avg Compens/Empl)	 7.7% Labor (System) (Avg Compens/Empl)	 8.18
INCREl T Fuel	 (	 )	 (4^ gal)	 5..3% Fuel	 (	 )	 (4 gal)	 7.1%
RATE ether (	 "	 )	 (Industrial Prices) 	 4.2% Other (	 "	 )	 (Industrial Prices) 	 4.2$` j
YIELDS Carriers' need to' stay 'at least even with general Yields - Dom (fi/RPM)	 4.1$
inflationary trends, necessitates annual yield increases - Int'1
	 ("	 )	 4.0$ [	 ;,
between 3-5% minimum.
EQUIPMENT	 : Buys to concentrate on presently available aircraft through Buys concentrate on 727-200s and 180 seat M/R type to allow for
1980.	 By 1981-1982 new technology aircraft parametered in continued phase-out of 727-100s and management's very successful
are:	 180 seat medium range type flight frequency philosophy.	 Widebody type DC-10/L-1011 long -range
200 seat long ,range type aircraft parametered in from 1978 on for growth in Hawaiian and
to help with pressing need for fuel economies and to meet- South American markets. i
the environmental imperative of the late 1970's and early
1980's.
MONEYABILITY Cost of Capital -"Ad hoc by carrier.	 Prime lending rate Ditto i
at 8-8.5% with carriers paying ,between 1i and 1 percent above
prime.
Availability of Capital - very restricted until deregulation With consistently improving earnings, Braniff will have no problems
debate is settled.	 Funds-to come from banks, manufacturers financing its needs.	 Carrier qualifies for loans under NYS insurance
and through leasing.	 Loans from insurance companies law in all the years under 'study.	 No flight, equipment leases para- j
restricted to a very few carriers, due to constrained cash metered in - but this option is open to Braniff as an additional route
generation and earnings outlook. to financing, especially if carrier has to re-equip at faster rate to
meet environmental requirements of the early 1980'x.
CAB Proposals under Aviation Act of 1975 not parametered into Ditto
study.	 AFRO ADVANCED will be re-done, when and if the
various proposals have been enacted and a time frame is
established.
y
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C O M M E N T A R Y
"EARNINGS"
Braniff is doing a good job of combating the 17% rise in unit costs that it faces in
1976 Operating income was down slightly for the first six months, but should end the year
slightly above 1975's figure.
r
	
	 The major culprit for the large cost hike is fuel, with labor coming in a distant
second. Braniff's fuel contracts, which helped make 1975s earnings look very good compared
to the rest of the industry's dismal performance, expired at the end of last year. This
year BIA is expected to pay an average of 3'2.3/gal which is 28% higher than 1975's cost.'
Earlier this year Braniff settled most of its labor contracts which will result in a 13%
increase in unit labor costs for 1976. Overall, higher unit costs account for $64 million
of the projected $76 million rise in cash operating expenses for this year.
1	 Strong traffic growth combined with modest capacity increases will raise the airline's
{
	
	
1976 load factor 2.1 pts. over last year's 50.1%. So, whereas Braniff's break-even load
factor will be up considerably this year,_ the 'profit spread (actual load factor vs break-
even load factor)' will remain one of the highest in the industry.
Last year BIA experienced negative "Nettings" as the carrier took a $4.3 million
charge for an accounting change, and suffered large foreign currency losses in South
America. With the charge being a one-time -item,
 the currency problem abating ($22 M
gain. -.n,20 76 vs _$644 M loss in 2Q 75), and capital gains increased due to more aircraft
sales, BIA should end the year with positive "Nettings".
The longer term earnings outlook is good but not spectacular. Braniff's RPM growth
l	 should outpace the industry's because of the airline's flight frequency philosophy and its
'	 position in the growing Sun Belt. The projected 1.5% spread between the RPM and ASM
compound growth rates will increase BIA's load factor up to 57% by 1984. Hindering Braniff's
longer-term performance is its reliance on narrow-bodied aircraft. In 1975 BIA used .0301
gallons of fuel per ASM and in 1984 it will still be using .0274 according to our projections.
This 9% improvement is considerably less than most of the other carriers will experience.
BIA will also not be 'getting the same productivity improvements that its competitors will
be receiving,
Nonetheless, Braniff will be earning 4.5% on its revenues between 1976 and 1984, which
is way above the industry norm. It should be noted, however, that BIA's profit margin peaks
at 5.0% in 1983 (vs. 9.2% in 1966) and the carrier never earns the CAB's 12% standard
as it did in 1974.
"EARNINGS„
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E A R N I N G S'
-,calendar years
1976-
' Unit 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 ` 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1984
wActual
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - P r o j e c t e d - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Revenues
Passenger $Mil 522 601 679- 760 847 941 1043 1148 1264 1387 8670
i Freight 31 35 40 45 50 55 61 67 73 81 507
C
-
Total Revenues " 595 677 770 861 954 1060 1170 1290 1415 1550 9747
	
rr
Cash Oper Exp =
Labor " 198 219 253 283 314 352 392 437 481 541 3272t Fuel 102 136 156 172 186 202 219 236 254 279 1840 I
?. Other: 216 236 268 297 324 357 392 428 465 508 3275
5	 - Total:COE " 515 591 677 752 824 911 - 1003 1101 1200 -	 1328 8387
Depr/Amort ° 34 36 40 44 49 54 61 71 79 89 523
T
Total Oper Exp " 549 627 717 796 873 965 1064 1172 1279 1417 8910
Oper. Earnings 45 _'- -65` "8I_ '`35- 6^ STS" _I36- X33 33T
µ Gross Interest 18 20 22 25 29 33 37 40 45 47 298
Pre-Tax Earnings " 27 30 31 40 52 62 69 78 91 86 539
i Inc-'Tex $Mil 6 8 6 8 10 15 17 20 23 21 128
Eff_.,Rate °s 23% 25% 20% 20% 20% 25% 25% 25% 25% 25% 24%
Net Earnings
Airline Operations $Mil 21 22 25 32 42 47 52 58 68 65 411
"Nettings" (5) 3 5 3 3 3" 3 2 2 5 29
Reptd to Stockholders 16 25 30 35 45 50 55 60 70 70 440 !
k 7j
t
i
Ii
RATIOS ' 1
c Traffic (All Services) Bil/%Chg
" RPM`-``DOM "	 /	 ' i 5.0315 5.58/11 5.98/7 6.36/7 6.79/7 7.22/7 7.66/6 8.11/6 8.60/6 9.07/6 4.04/6.8 GRC j
RPMs - System " /
	 " 6.61/2 7.25/10 :7.83/8 8.39/7 9.00/7 9.62/7 10.3/7 10.9/6 11.6/6 12.3/6 5.69/7.1.GRC
AS:ds - System /	 " 13.2/4 1349/5 14.9/7 15.7/5 16.5/5 17.5/6 18.5/6 19,5/5 20.5/ 5 21.6/ 5 8.40/5.6 GRC {'
Load Factor - System a 50.1 52.2 52,6 53.5 54.5 55.0 55.5 56.0 56.5 57.0 6.9 pts.
Yield - Dom ,RPM/%Chg 8.03/5 8.43/5 8.85/5 9.24/4 9.61/4 10.4/4 10.7/3 11.1/4 11.5/4 3.413/4,1 GRC
Yield - System " / 7.89/7 8.29/5 8.68/5 9.05/4 9.41/4
10.0/4
9.78/4 10.2/4 10.5/3 10.9/4 11.3/4 3.39/4.1 GRC
COST INCREMENT (COE)
- Labor (Non-Add) $Mil/	 8 17/10 25/13 23/10 21/8 21/7 22/7 26/1 30/7 31/7= 36/7 235 i
- Fuel' " / 12/13 30/28 10/7 9/6 9/5 8/4 9/4 9/4 9/4 11,/4 104
- other / 18/9 9/4 15/6 14/5 12/4 14/4 15/4 15/3 16/4 18/3 123
- Total	 " " /	 "' 46/10 64/17 48/8, 44/6 42/6 44/5 50/5 54/5 56/5 65/6 467
Weighted Index (1967-100) No /%Chg 192/10 224/17 242/8 258/6 272/6 286/5 301/5 317/5 334/5 353/6 161/7.0 GRC 4
i
$
HERO AD- ', F-_RNINGS 1976 - 1984
B R A N I F F s
a
F
ii
C 0 M M E N T A R Y
"FLIGHT EQUIPMENT"
f Braniff's fleet mix has been one of the major reasons behind the carrier's above
rf average performance during the last few years. 	 The 727, DC8 and 747 are all ideally
suited for Braniff's route structure. 	 On a cost per available seat mile basis, BIA's
fleet is one of the most efficient in the industry. -
The 'airline is now in Phase II of its equipment program. 	 It is replacing its older
727-100/QC aircraft with larger, more economical, 727-200s. 	 Phase III of Braniff's program,
will entail introducing wide-bodied trijets into its fleet.	 The long-range DC-10 or L-1011s
will be used on South American routes which have outgrown the presently flown DC8s, and as
a back-up for the carrier's sole 747. 	 There is the possibility that BIA could buy some
used ` DC8-60s instead of purchasing new trijets, but we consider the ehances of this
happening as fairly remote.
}} We do expect that BIA will purchase,- - the 7 DC8-62s and the 5 727-200s when their
leases expire.
	 Because Braniff is so heavily dependent on the businessman, around 70'
of its traffic, we have kept the 727-200s with 128 seats so the carrier does not have to
remove profitable' first class space.	 If, however, Braniff should increase seating on the
727-200s from the current 128 to 137, fewer additional advanced 727-200s would have to be
bought.
Our study projects that in 1984 Braniff will be flying over ;6 billion ASMs with air-
r craft not meeting FAR Part 36 restrictions.	 The great majority of this total is accounted
for by older 727-200s.
	 To completely replace this capacity with new aircraft would cost
t Braniff about $650 million in 1984 dollars;.
" FLIGHT EQUIPMENT"
R
^-	 "FLTGHT.EQUIPMENT
- PURCHASE / REMOVALS / PAYMENTS / LEASES
- GROUND PROPERTY & EQUIPMENT (projected costs)
1976-
Unit	 1975 1976r 1977	 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1984
r	 PURCHASES/LEASES(L)
	 Actual - - -	 - - - - -	 -P R O J E C T E 
	 - -	 -	 - - - -	 - - - - - -	 -
-
z
	` Additions	 No. A/C
727-200	 7 8* 4*	 4 4 6
- -
28
DC-10/L-:1011 Type L/R 1 2 2 _
_
3 8
180 Seat M/R
	
_
_
_	
_
_
_' 4 5 6 1 16
`	 Total Additions
	
7 8 4	 5 6 8 6 5 6
Total Cost A/C Tyoel/
	$ Mill
727-200	 Sr 6 77 42	 44 46 96
- - - -
305
DC-101L-1011 Type L/R 	 - - -	 29 61 - 67 - - 117 274
'	 180 Seat M/R	 - - -	 - - - 106 133 167 29 435
Total Cost Aircraft
	 56 77 ^ _ Z6T- X36- -273 —Z33 —Ib7 Z46- IUI%
Removals	 No A/c
727-100/QC
	 5 5 15 5 5 4/1L 1/5L - - 32
't	 DC8-62	
- - - -
_
4 4
DCS-51 '	 _ _ _	 2 2 - ! - _ - _ 4
Total Removals	 5
s
5 -1	 7 7
-
r
P A Y M E N T S 4/
-Flight Eq Payments	 $ Mill
Advance Deposits	 "	 13	 14 29	 43 49 56 32 35' 40 40 338
Delivery
	 39	 60 29	 51 75 67 121 93 117 101 714
Spares, Modifs etc
	 2	 6 2	 6 6 7 7 12 13 9 68
Total Flt Eq Payments	 "	 54	 80 60	 100 130 130 160 140 170 150 1120
Total Flt Eq Leases 2/
Total Flight Equipment 	 "	 54	 80 60	 100' 130 130 160 140 170 150 1120
GRD, PROP, "& EQUIP 31
	
11	 15 15	 20 20 20 20 30 30 30 200'
NOTES :(L-Leased, all others 70% purchased)
	 L/R= Long range; M/R - Medium range.
lj Cost per Aircraft Time - number x cost per aircraft iaml'base price + CFE/MC/spares. SH&E-derived.
2/ Leases - None. - AERO AD: FLT. EQ/GPE 1976-1984
3/ Grd. Prop & Equip. _ Subject to management reprogramming.
4/ Pa ments -(SH&E derived; reflect escalation)
Advance Deposits - pre-delivery @ 30'% of unit price. B R A ti Z dF F 3
Delivery - balance remaining @ aircraft acceptance
SDares,Modifs
	 etc -'@ '10% of aircraft cost(or derived) x
*	 Firm order.
n
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C O M M E N T A R 
"CAPITAL NEEDS AND SOURCES"
Braniff should have no problem in meeting its financing needs throughout the study
period.	 A strong earnings and cash flow outlook will allow the airline to take on over
8600 million in new debt between 1976 and 1984. 	 and retire $300 million of old debt.
Earlier this year 'BIA'issued $50 million of senior notes and used the proceeds to re-
duce its 'bank :revolver. 	 However, the carrier will have to borrow again from the bank to
pay for the 727--200s to be delivered later this year. 	 The wash transaction of debt retire-
ment'and new bank debt for 1976 is not shown on the accompanying table. 	 Braniff is able
to meet all of its present 1977 needs with internally generated funds. 	 The $20 million to
be borrowed from the banks is for advance deposits on SH&E parametered aircraft, buys starting
in 1978.
BIA's management has stated that Lt would prefer to buy rather than lease new air-
craft.	 If the carrier is forced to replace its environmentally unacceptable planes at a
faster rate than we have projected, BIA`s resources would be pinched.	 But with the leasing
option available, Braniff wc(uld still be able to meet its expanded capital needs;
When'Braniff's future capital expenditures on flight equipment and GPE of $1.32 billion
are discounted at a 5%' rate, the present value of these outlays is $1.06 billion. 	 This is j
considerably higher than the approximately $770 million Braniff spent during the past nine
years'.	 It is fortunate that BIA is now in such a healthy position and that its outlook
continues to be promising.
Recap:	 1976-1984:
Needs':	 $1.785 billion	 (63% flight equipment, 11% GPE, 17% debt retirement)-
Sources:' $1.085 billion or 61% from operations 	 (25% earnings, 29% depreciation).
$665 million or 37% new financing ($580 million, or 32% to bearranged).
{
"CAPITAL NEEDS & SOURCES"
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CAPITAL';NEEDS A14D SOURCES ($ MILL)
- calendar years -
1976-
{
1975 1976 1977 _ 1978 1979 1980 1981, 1982 1983 1984 1984CAPITA	 N''EDS ACTUAL- -	 - - -- - - 	 - - - - - - -	 P ROJE CTED - - - - - -- 	
- -
-	 - - - - -	
- -
----_
- -	
_
Flight Equipment payments
s - Advance Deposits 13 14 29 43 49 56. 32. 35 40 40 340
- Delivery' , 39 60 29 51 75 67 121 93 117 101 710
- Spares, N.odif. etc. 2 6 2 6 6 7 7
Total Fit Equip Payments : 54 80 60 100 130 130 160 0 —1 15 1f Add- Fit Equip Leases _ _
Total Flight Equipment 54 _ 80 60 100 130 130 160 140 170 150 1120
Ground Prop	 & Eq/Other 3
Grd Prop & Equip 11 15 15 20 20 20 20 30 30 30 200
Debt Retirement 34 20 19 26 41 43 41 15+20 19+15 23+20 300
Dividends 4 4 5 7 9 9 9 10 12 12 80
Other 3 1 1 2 - 3 _ _ _ 4 10
52 40 40 55 70 75 70 75 80 85 590Total GPE &!OtherEnd Wkg Cap (3wks COE prof) 34 40 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75
_
75
TOTAL CAPITAL NEEDS 140 160 140 200 250 260 290 280 320 310 1785
CAPITAL SOURCES
4, ^I
Beginning Working Capital 36 34 40 40 45 50 55 60 65 70
t
35 _•Operations 6
- Net Earnings (Rept'd) 16 25 30 35 45 - 50 55 60 70 70 440
- Depreciation/Amort 34 36_ 40 44 49 54 61 71 79 89 520 '{
-Property Sale/Other 8 15 10 16 16 16 9 9 11 21 125
- Other 5 - _ - _
Total Operations 63 76 80 95 110 120 125> 140 160 180 1085
Financing Arrangements
- Senior Do-, '-Banks - 20 15 35 40 60 60 35 60 325
-Insco/Others 2 50 - 50 - 50 - - 60 - 210
- Subord Debt - 60 20 20 - - 100	 -
- Leases (Cap @ AC Cost)'
- -
_
_
-
_
_
_ _ -
- Deposits returnable _ _ -
- - -
_ _ -
- 
Stock Sales - - _ _ - 30 _ _ ^0
' Tot Financing Arrangements 41 50 20 65 95 90 110 80 95 60 66S
TOTAL CAPITAL SOURCES 140 160 140 200 250 260 290 280 320 310 1785 1 '
FINANCING TO BE ARRANGED 50 95 90 110 80 95 60 S80
AERO AD:' CAPITAL NEEDS & SOURCES 1976-1984
B R A N I F F
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C O M M E N T A R Y
'MONEYABILITY"
Braniff's balance sheet growth should outpace any of the Big Five carriers in the 1976-
1984 period.	 Braniff is the only carrier whose book value of flight equipment will more
than double during the nine year span. 	 BIA is also the only one of the six whose invested
capital base will increase more than 100%.
r
f Braniff's cash flow is the key to the carrier's being able to meet the relatively
large , capital needs it faces.	 With the crucial cash generation ratio well above the 5 mills
norm, BIA will be able to finance from operations almost 60% of its needs.	 Because of its
solid cash flow, BIA will have to bring on only 704 of debt for every additional dollar of
equity earned during the study period.	 This, of course, will lead to a decline in BIA's
"Moneyabi'lity"', ratios which is shown on the accompanying chart.
Braniff's management has expressed a desire not to lease any new aircraft..	 With its
Sr. D/E ratio comfortablybelow the 150% ceiling BIA should have no problem getting all the
senior money it needs from the banks and other senior sources. 	 The airline qualifies
under the N.Y.State Insurance Law this year, and after the deregulation debate is settled,
could borrow some long-term money from the insurance companies.
Braniff's-recent Public issue of $50 million of senior notes
	 (the first such airline
offering 'since 1972) will be used to reduce its bank revolver. 	 However, BIA will
have to draw down from its bank credit later this year to help finance the remaining
f 727-2`00s being added to the fleet.
It should be noted that BIA's operating ratio never falls below 1974's 90%, and the
company's ROI'peaks at 11.2% vs 1974's 12.80.	 The revenue to total invested capital ratio
does not increase that much because of the tremendous increase in Braniff's investment-
base.	
.r
'Because all avenues of financing are available, and its own solid moneyability posture,
Braniff would be able to meet the increased financing requirements which would occur if the
carrier were forced to speed up its fleet revamping to meet tighter environmental restrictions.
l
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M O N E Y A B I L I T Y	 -	 I N V E S T E D	 C A P I T A L
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(System - All Services)
1976-
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 2984
I:PJESTEDCAPITAL WIT Actual - - -- - -  -- - - - - - - - - - - P R0 J EC;'TE D	 - - - - - - - - -	 - - - - - - -, - - - -
D:bt S' Mil
Senior Debt - Banks " 136- 128	 `' 140 142 149 160 189 221 225 265 129
Senior Debt-lnsco/Other 59 102, 95 138 131 174 167 163 224 205 146 i
Senior Debt-Leases Cap'd 66 76 66 56 47 38 29 21 13 5
Senior Total - Reptd 195 230 235 280 280 334 356 384 449 470 275
Senior Total '+ Cap Lses 281 306 301 336 r	 327 372 385 405 462 475 194
Subordinated " 59 55 51 44 98 92 108 125 121 117
Total Debt - Reptd " 254 285 286 324' 378 426 464 509 570 587 333
Total Debt + Cap Lses " 340 361 352 380 425 464 493 53D 583 592
Equity
Stock 167 188 213 241 277 318 364 414 472 530 363
Stock + Sub Debt " 226 243 264 285- 375 410 472 539 593 647 421
Tot Inv Capital-Reptd 421 473 499 565 655 744 828 923 1042 1117 696
Tot Inv Capital + Cap Lses 507 549 565 621 702 782 857 944
'	 FLIGHT' E(WIPMENT
4
Depr Cost 335 362 369 395 454 500 618 691 791 861 526
Depr:Cost + Mfr Deposit 345 369 392 439 515' 591 689 757 847 913 568
Depr Cost +	 " + Cap Lses 431 445 458 495 562 629 718 778 860 918 48
f
I	 A'ORKING CAPITAL
Incl. Cur Debt/Ecluiv Wks COE $Mill/Wks 34/3 40/4 40/3 45/3 50/3 55/3 60 6 65/3 70/3 75/3 41/-
PATIO MIALYSISl/ 	(G) UNIT/:TORN
Sr Debt
Equity'(Stk + Sub) %-150% 124 126 114 lie 87 91 82 75 78 73 (51) pts.
Sr Debt
F1 E;i (Net + Dep + Lse) 80% 65 69 66 68	 - 58 59 54 52 54 52 (13) pts.
Cap Lses Share Flt Eq $- 33% 20 17 14 11 8 6 4 3 2 1 (19) pts.
Total Debt c
Stock Equity 8-175% 204 192 165 158 153 146 135 128 124 111 (93) pts.
N °_ State Ins Law
Fix Chg Cov - 12 1!os, x-1.5 1.5 1.6 1.6 1.7 1.8 2.0 2.0 2.1 2.2 2.2 0.7x
Fix Chg Cov - 5 yr Avg x-1.5 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.7 1.8 1.9 20 2.1 0.7x
Oper Ratio (Airline)' % 92 93 93 93 92 91 91 91 90 91 (1) pt.
Return On Inv (Corp) %, 7.8' 9.1 10.1 10.5 11.2 11.1 11.1 10.8 11.1 10.5 2.7 pts.'
Rev	 Tot Inv Cap $ 1.17 1.23 1.36 1.39 1.36 1.36 1.37 1.37	 - 1.34 1.38 0.214
Met Cap Coarts	 2/ $' Mil 82 195 270 300 330 350 370 380 360 350 -
Fin Argd /	 Argd /$ 17/21' 33/17 13/5
Cash Generation
Flow per $ Equity C/% Chg-30 24/(4) 74/- 25/4 27/8 24/(11) 25/4 24'/(4) 24/- 25/4 24/(4) -/-
Rev Less COE	 Mills/i Chg-5.00
per ASM 6.04/(13)'6.19/2' 6.24/1 6.94/11 7.88/14 8.51/8 9.03 /6 9.69/7 10.49/8 10.28/(2) 4.24/70
Note:	 (G)	 See Glossary, Moneyability
AFRO AD: Inv. 'Capital 1976-1984
l/ 12 months basis.	 % Changes are from end of prior year.
2/ Net Cat) CoMt5 = .*:ext two years projected capital expenditures for flight B R A N I F F
equi^Went and GPE.
,r,	 y^•t3^klA9!^kk^?i^	
, ... , .	 ..	 _	 _. _.	
_ - ^
	
-,+^' =^.e^u	 4 .,attn ... ^:5,,.^(y
	
-	 _	 ...	
..
.mo t I^
	.x.^n;..
	
-..MC+a#^._...-.-	 .....	 __	 •........^^ ^^+
r.
{[	
..
'-	 V	 17-2	 _	
—	
•	
__	
-J„,.	
°mmi`Y
	
...	 +eatt..v {n..
	 _rta.r.ta.	 _	 ub^4	
p^er.+.+^+^
ss.
	
P A RAMETER S
---- 7---------U.S: TRUNKS & PAA - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - -	 - CONTINENTAL - - -	 - - - - - - - - _ - - - _ - - -
ECONOMY USA	 Strong growth into 1977. 	 Thereafter resumption of secular DITTO
GNP real growth at 3-4% rate.	 Inflation rate to be about
52 per year in 1976 and 1977.	 Thereafter inflation to drop r	 i
to A-48 per year.	 Unemployment rate to continue slow drop;
consumer income and confidence to continue to advance.
World	 Turnaround from recession levels slower than U.S. with DITTO
i	 inflation rates to continue above USA's.
3
1975-1980	 1980-1984 1975-1980'	 1980-1984
Growth Rate Compounded "GRC" ":.,_.Growth Rate .Compounded "GRC"
	 t
TRAFFIC	 Dom RPMs (All Services)	 7.5%	 6.1% Dom RPMS (All Services	 a6.8B	 6.0%
'	 Intl RPMs ("	 )	 9.3%	 7.48 Intl RPMs C'	 )	 6 .6%	 7.5%
CAPACITY	 ASMs ad hoc by carrier, but to generally increase at a
lower rate than RPMs. 	 1976-1977 and part of 1978's System ASMs (All Services) 	 4.9%	 5.5%
increase mostly due to seating changes and maximum
utilization, j
WAD FACTOR Ad hoc by carrier; generally increasing between 3 and 4 LOAD FACTOR System (Ali Services) to increase from 53.9% in 1975 *l
percentage points. to 60.0% by 1984.
1976-1984 1976-1984
"GRC" "GRC"
COST	 Labor (System)	 (Avg Compens/Empl) 	 7.7% Labor (System)	 (Avg Compens/Empl) 	 7.8%
INCREMENT
	 Fuel'	 (	 "	 )	 (4 _gal)	 5.3%' Fuel	 (	 ,'	 )	 (4 gal)	 5.58 t	 .
r	 RATE	 Other (	 "	 )	 (Industrial Prices)	 4.2% Other (	 "	 )	 (industrial Prices)	 4.58
YIELDS	 Carriers' need to stay at least even with general Yields - Dom (C/RPM)	 4.0%
inflationary trends, necessitates annual yield increases - Int ' 1	 (")	 3.7$
'	 between 3-5% minimum.
1
EQUIPPXNT
	
Buys to concentrate on presently available aircraft through Having one of the most modern fleets in the industry, buys concen-
1980.	 By 1981-1982 new technology aircraft parametered in trate on 727-200s,_rC-10s and 180 seat M/R type aircraft to allow
are:	 180 seat medium range type for growth and maintenance of ASM range distribution.	 Carrier's
200, seat long range type environmental posture is exceilent.
to help with pressing need for fuel economies and to meet i
the environmental imperative of the late 1970's and early j
1980's.
Al
f	 MONEYABILZTY Cost of Capital- Ad hoc by carrier. 	 Prime lending rate Ditto	
j
fi
b	 at 8-8.5% with carriers paying between ^ and l percent above
prime.
.i
;j	 Availability of Capital - very restricted until deregulation With no aircraft on order and consistently improving earnings,	 i
kt	 debate is settled.	 Funds'to come from banks, manufacturers Continental will be more than able to finance all its needs.
;,	 and ,through leasing.
	 Loans from insurance companies r Carrier qualifies for loans under NYS insurance law from 1979 on.	 ##
j	 restricted to a very few carriers, due to constrained cash No flight equipment leases parametered in - but this option to 	 p
generation and earnings outlook. finance also open to Continental. 	 Rapidly improving moneyability
ratios give clear picture of healthy posture of this carrier. -
CAB	 Proposals under Aviation Act of 1975 not parametered into
w^
Ditto
study.	 AFRO ADVANCED will be re-done, when and if the
various proposals have been enacted and a time frame is.
established'.
October 25, 1L1976	 PILOT STRIKE NOT PARAMETERED INTO STUDY. AERO AD:	 PARAMETERS 1976-1984
C O N T I N`8 N T A L
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wage and employee benefit costs currently being negotiated can be kept within patterns that Cont-
inental can live with, and if the Company receives long overdue and additional fare increases, it
is possible for Continental to make a profit in 1976." With unit fuel and labor costs projected
to rise only 9.7% and 10.3% respectively vs. 10.8% and 34.9% increases in 1975, and with the CAB
granting fare increases totaling 7 in 1976, Continental should return to the black after only
its second loss year in its history in 1.975.
1976 revenues should be up about 12%. RPMs are up close to 11% for the first 9 months, but due
to strikes against competitors,'NAL and UAL, during last year's 4Ln quarter, CAL',s traffic should
actually decline during this year's final quarter. CAL' s yields have been a little weaker than
the industry's average because of the growing popularity of the carrier's -economy class which is
priced at 10% below; coach. Cargo revenues will be up a strong 32% as the carrier continues to push
this growing segment of its business.
On the expense side total operating expenses are 'projected to rise 11%. , TOE were up 16 %.
through the 6 months, but rose only 13% in the 2nd quarter after a;startling,l9% increase in t,''a
lst quarter. These increases should moderate during the second half of the year as unit cost
comparisons improve on a year over year basis. It should be noted that of our $56 million pro-
jected increase in COE, $45 'million, or 80 	 is accounted for by higher unit costs.
1977 results should be even better as Continental starts to reap the rewards of its major
capital spending program. The carrier's modern fleet is one of the most fuel efficient in the
industry. The new aircraft also permit CAL to have one of the best productivity records among the
trunks An additional benefit to CAL will be the tax benefits granted to the airlines in the new
tax bill. Because CAL has unused investment tax credits, ($59.6 million at 12/31/75), uses the -
flow-through method of accounting for ITCs, and should have healthy pre-tax income next year, the
new law should allow CAL to report only a negligible 'tax rate. A further benefit to the.carrier
could .come about if it is allowed to fly the Saipan-Tokyo route that the CAB recently awarded
CAL. The Pacific has been a consistent money loser for the airline, 1975's $120M profit is the
only year it has made a;'profit, but the addition of Japan on the route could make this a'highly
profitable` area.
The longer term outlook is one of the brightest among the trunk carriers. The carrier will
be earning 5.5% of revenues and will be making more than 120 on its investment 5 of the 9 years
under study. Over the past few, years CAL's,earnings have suffered as the carrier went through
the expensive reequipment cycle. Now, with the fleet intact, and capital expenditures drastically
reduced, CAL's earnings performance should outpace the industry's average over the foreseeable
future.
P.S. Pilots strike threatened for Saturday 10/23 would, of course,, drastically alter this
schedule if it went on for any length of time.
"EARNINGS"
n
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E A R N I N G S
calendar years -
1976-
Unit 1975 1976 1977 1978; 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1984
Actual -- - - -	 - - - - -_- - - - - P RO"JECTE D - - - -	 - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Revenues
Passenger $ i.l 455 507 569 634 702 778 858`<< 943 1,035 1,135 7,161
Freight '" 38 50 58 66 74 82 92 101 Ill 122 756
j	 Total Revenues "' 531 595 665 740' 825 910 1,010,`' 1,110 1,220 1,340 8,415
µ-	 Cash Oper Exp
Labor " 190 214 239 268 301 334 370 418 462 515 3,121
Fuel " 95' 106 119 132 144 160 175 191 20,7 2:27 1,461
Otl;er ^' 163 184 203 223 244 270 293 318 348 383 2,466
Total COE " 448 504 561 623 689 764 838 927 1,017 1,125 7,048
Depr/Rmort 48' 47 48 49' 50 55 58 64 74 86 531
Total Oper Exp 496 551 609 672 '	 739 819 896 991 1,091 1,211 7,579
Oiler Earnings "' 35 44 t56 68 86 91 114 119 129 129 836
Gross Interest 34 29 27 24 22 21 22 24 30 35 234
Pre-Tax Earnings "- 1 15 29 44° 64 70 92 95 99 94 602
Inc_ Tax SMil (7) 4 2 3 13 18 28 33 40 38 179
Efi:. Rate' % cr 27% 6% 6% 20% 25% 30% 35% 400 '^ 40% 30%
Net Earnings
Airline Operations $Mil 8 11 27 41 51 52 64 62 59 56 423
"Nettings^ (18) 1 3 4 (1) 3 6 8 11 4 39
Reptd to 'Stockholders 10 12 30 45 50 55 70 70 70 462
RATIOS
Traffic (All Services) Bil/%Chg
RPYs - DOM 6.33/ 13 6.76/ 7 7.24/ 7 7.72 / 7 a.22/ 7 6.76/ 7 9.29/ 6 9.85/ 6 10.4/ 6 11.1/ 6 4.77/ 6.4GRC
RPMs - System " /	 " 6.41/13 6.85 f7 7.34/7 7.82/ 7 8's.33 / 7 8.88/7 9.42/ 6 9.99/ b 10.6/6 11.2/6 4.79/ 6.4GRC
ASta	-System / _" 11.9/13 7.2.2/2 12.8/5 13.5/5 14.2/6 15.1/6 15.8/5 16.6/5 17.6/6 18.7/6 6.80/5.2GRC
Load Factor - System % 53.9 56.4 57.5 58.0 58.5 59.0 5915 60.0 60.0 60.0 6.1pts
Yield - Dom fiRPM/%Chg 7.06/1 7.35,/4 7.71/5 8.06/5 8.38/4 L 8.71/4 9.06/4 9.38/ 3 9.71/4 10.05V 3 2.99/ 4.OGRC
Yield -' System /; 7.11/1 7.40/ 4 7.76/5 8.10/5 8.43/ 4 8.76/4 9.11/4 9.44/4 9.77/ 4 10.1Y 3 3.00/ 4.OGRC
COST INCREMENT (COE)
-' Labor (Non-Add) $Mil/	 % 18/111 19 /10 20 /9 22 /9 22 /8 22 / 7 24 / 7 27 /7 30 /7 34 /7 220
-`Fuel	 ^ "	 " 25/35 10 /10 9 /8 7	 /6' 6 /5 6 /4 7 /4 8 /4 8 /4 9 /4 70
'	 -.Other / 3/2 16 /9 10,/5 _8	 /4' 10 /4 10 /4 10 /4 11 /3 12 /4 13 /3 100
- Total " / 46/ 14' ' 45 / 10 39 > /8 37 /7 --T6-38 	 _ 38 /5 41 /5 46 /5 50 /5 56 / 5 - 390
Weighted Index (1967=100) No /%Chg 218/14 239/10 258' / 8 275 /7 292/6 308/5 325/5 342/ 5 361/ 5 381/5 163/ 6.4GRC
HERO AD:	 EARNINGS	 1976-1984
C D N T I N E N T A L
C O M M E N T AR Y
"FLIGHT EQUIPMENT,'
With the acquisition last year of 4 727-200s and 4 DC-10s and disposal of remaining 3 747s,
Continental concluded its massive fleet revamping program. CAL has spent '$664 million on its
current aircraft and it now possesses the youngest, and one of themost efficient fleets in the
industry. By selling 'its '5 remaining 720Bs earlier this year, CAL's management simplified the
carrier's fleet to only two types of aircraft, 727s and DC-10s. Continental is one of the industry
leaders in the ever increasing move towards _fleet standardization'.
Except for 2'used 727-100s, which were bought this year to replace a stretched.727 which
crashed last 'year, CAL does not need any additional capacity until 1979-1980. However, if CAL
is awarded and able to fly some new routes (such as Saipan-Tokyo) the carrier may place an earlier
order. Continental could also be interested in freighter airc`aft as the carrier has experienced
phenomenal growth in its cargo; business over the last few years. Continental now carries cargo in
the belly of its passenger planes, but based on our belief that the carrier will be increasing seating
on all of its planes, CAL's management may decide to order a freighter.
In 1975 CAL flew its DC-10s with an average of only 209 seats which was by,far and away the
lowest seating configuration on a trijet. We have projected a gradual increase'to 240 seats by
1979. CAL has already announced that it will con-vert its 6 DC-10s to nine-abreast seating serving
the low-yield Hawaiian routes.
Our 'buys starting in 1979 are intended to maintain the carrier's ASM/range balance which is
about 500 long range and 50% short-to-medium range.. Our projected retirements of 727s include the
older 200s which do not meet current environmental restrictions.
Our study projects that in 1984 Continental will be flying 2.7 billion ASMs with aircraft not
meeting FAR Part 36 restrictions. To completely replace this capacity would cost CAL about $270
million in 1984 dollars.
I
"FLIGHT EQUIPMENT"
r
FLIGHT EQUIPRENT PURCHASE / RE140VALS / PAYMENTS / LEASES
GROUND PROPERTY & MUIPMENT ( ro'7 ected costs)P 
is 1976-
E`	 Unit	 1975
	 1976
	 1977	 1`978	 1979	 1980	 1981	 19A2	 1983	 1984	 1984
PURCHASES/L ASES(L)	 Actual	 -	 - -	 -	 -P R 0 J F  T E b - - -	 - - - - - -	 - - - - - -	 -
Additions ' No.'A/C
727-200/1,}:; 4 2*	 - _	 3 3	 -	 -	 - 8
DC-10 4 -	 - _	 - -	 2	 -	 2	 2 6
«	 180 Seat M/R - -	 - -	 - -	 -	 5	 5	 ? 13
, f	 Total Additions '' 8 2	 - 3 '_	 T	
7
Total Cost A/C	 el/ $ Mill
727-200/100 30. 5	 - A	 34 36	 -	 -	 -	 - 75
AC-10 90 -	 - -	 - -	 62	 -	 68	 71 201
180 Seat M/R - -	 - -	 - -	 -	 139	 139	 88 366
Total Cost Aircraft 120 5	 - -	 34 36	 --6T-	 —2w	 159 --m
Removals No A/C
747 3 -	 - -	 - -	 -	 -	 - -
7208 - 5	 - - -	 -	 -	 -	 - 5
727-200/100 1 -	 - -	 - -	 -	 5	 5	 5 i5
Total Removals 4_ 5	 - -	 - -	 -	 —5-	 t, - 20
P A Y M E N T S 4/
Flight £q Payments 	 $ Mill
Advance Deposits	 "	 7	 - - 11	 33 37 47 44 45 40 257
Delivery	 82	 4 -	 24 25 43 97 145 112 450
:Spares,'Modifs etc	 7	 _`6 5 9	 3 8 10 9 10 8 68
Total Flt Eq Payments`	 96	 10^ 5 20	 60 70 100 150 200 160 775
Total Flt Eq Leases 2/ -
Total Flight Equipment	 96	 10 5 20	 60 70 100 150 200 160 ' 775
GRD, PROP
	
& EQUIP 3/	 11	 10 15 20	 20 20 20 20 20 30 175
NOTES-M-Leased,'all others 70% purchased)
	 M/R ='Medium Range.
11 Cost cer Aircraft Tyne - number x cost per aircraft in'cl base price + CFE/MC/spares. SASE derived.
2./ ' Leases - tion e. AERO AD. Flt. E4/GPE 1976-1984
3/ Grd. Prop	 Equip..-i	 ..,	 _	 _	  Subject to management reprogramming.
Payments -(SH&E derived; reflect escalation)
Advance Deposits - pre-deli, : y@ 30% of unit price. C O N T I N E N T A L
Delivery - balance' `remaining-0 aircraft acceptance:
Spares,Modifs, etc - @ 10% of aircraft cost(or derived)
w
i
i
I
0 1
C 0 M M E N T A R Y	
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"CAPITAL NEEDS AND 'SOURCES"
Having completed its huge fleet revamping program last year, Continental is now in a position
to reduce its heavy debt load as capital spending will be at minimum levels through 1978. As a
matter of fact, our study forecasts that CAL will not match 1975's capital spending level for air
-craft and GPE until 1981. In the 1976-1978 period we project CAL to repay $143 million, or 33x,
of its $431 million in outstanding debt as of 12/31/75.
Over the entire study period CAL should have no trouble, in financing its needs. The key is,
of course, the carrier's superb cash generation which permits the carrier to supply over 70% of
its capital needs from internal sources. New outside financing is projected at $410 million which
is nearly equivalent to' the _$380 million in debt retirement. In other words 93% of CAL's borrowings
will just be a refinancing of its expiring debt.
Starting next year we believe: that Continental's Board will declare a cash dividend for the
first time since it was suspended in mid-1970. (A 10% stock dividend was paid out in January 1975).
The dividend level is protected at around 20% of earnings throughout the study period. CAL's cash
flow could be further improved if the carrier's management decides to change its depreciation
policy in regard to aircraft. For the 12 months ended 6/30/76, CAL charged $800M less to depreciation
expense than it would have if it had been using the CAB's depreciation guidelines.
4
	
	 Because it completed its fleet modernization program before most of the other carriers, CAL
will be spending only $950 million for flight equipment and GPE between 1976-1984. If these outlays
are discounted back at a 5% rate, the resulting present value is $724 million. Between 1967-1975
CAL spent $945 million for these items, so while in actual dollars capital spending over the next	
3
9 years will equal the previous 9 year's total, in real terms CAL's capital outlays will actually
decline.
Recap: 1976-1984
Needs:'	 $1.49 billion (520 flight equipment, 12% GPE, 26 debt retirement).	 A a
Sources:	 $1.06 billion or 71% from operations (31% earnings, 36% depreciation/amortization).
$410 million or 28% new financing ($410 million or 28% to be arranged)
	 ;'.
"CAPITAL NEEDS AND; , SOURCES"
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CAPITAL NEEDS AND SOURCES ($ MILL)
-calendar years -
t 1976-
_1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1984
CAPITAL14EEDS ACTUAL- - - - -- - -- - - - - - - - - P R 0 i ECTED - - - - - - - - - - - -'- - - - 
_ - -
-	 -- {'
^ PaymentsFlight Equipment   . i
- Advance Deposits 7 - - 11 33 37 47 44 45 40 257
- ` Delivery 82 4 - - 24 25 43 97 145 112 450 x
- Spares, Modif. etc. 7 6 5 9 3 8 10 9 10 8 68
Total Fit Equip Payments 96 10 5 20 60 70 100 150 200 160 775
Add: Flt Equip Leases - - - - - - - - - - - 7
If
Total Flight Equipment 96 10 5 20 60 70 100 150 200 160 775
Ground Prop	 &'Eq/Other
Grd Prop ,& Equip 11 10 15 20 20 20 20 20 20 30 175
Debt Retirement' 18 37+10 43 53 52 55 36 37 21 15+20 380
Dividends _ - 6 6 8 10 14 14 19 15 ,90
3
Other
Total GPE.& Other
4
33
3 1
65
1
80
- 5
90
-
70
(1)
70
-
60
-
80
10
65560 80
End Wkg Cap (3wks COE proj) 18 15 30 30 40 40 50 50 60 60 60
TOTAL CAPITAL NEEDS 147 85 100 130 180 200 220 270 320 300 1,490
CAPITAL SOURCES I
^
+
r a
Beginning Working Capital 9 18 15 30 30 40 40 50 50 60 20
Operations
- Net Earnings-(Rept'd) (10) 12 30' 45 50 55 70 70 70 60 460
-,Depreciation/Amort 48 47 48 49 50 55 58' 64 74 86 530
- Property Sale/Other 45 7 2 1 - 5 2 6 10 10 40 r
- 
Other (6)_
_ 1
5 5 - 5
-
_ 6_ 4 30
Total Operations 77 _677 85 100 0 124_, 130 140 _160_ 160_ 60
Firan zing Arrangements
-
50 40 50 20 40
- 200
Senior Debt-Banks 55 - -
-
_
- 60 40 50 150:	
-Insco/Others 2
_
- - 3 30 60
-`SUbard Debt 4 _ _ _ -
_
- 
#
Leases (Cap ,@ AC Cost)
-
Deposits returnable
-Stock Sales - - - - -
61 - - - 50 40 50 80 110
80 410
Tot Financing Arrangements
147 85 100 130 180 200 220 270 320 300 1,490TOTAL CAPITAL SOURCES
-
-
-
50 40 50 80 110 80 410FINANCING TO BE 'ARRANGED -
AERO AD: CAPITAL NEEDS &	 SOURCES 1976-1984
C O N T I N E N T A L
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"MONEYABILITY"
With. capital commitments at meager levels over the next fewyears, Continental will be able
_ to greatly improve its balance sheet. 	 At the end of 1975 only Eastern, Pan Am and TWA were more
leveraged than CAL.
	 However, a combination of large debt re payments together with vastly improving
earnings will reduce the debt/stock equity ratio an incredible 163 percentage points by the end of
1978.
CAL's cash generation is so strong that the carrier only has to take on 9'fi of additional debt
for every dollar of new equity.	 Outstanding bank debt actually declines in our forecast as starting
in 1982 CAL utilizes other senior money and subordinated debt to finance its needs. CAL's management
has continually expressed their distaste for the leasing of aircraft, but this financing option is
certainly available to the carrier.
	 By 1979, Continental will again qualify for insurance company
money under N.Y. State Insurance Law.
The carrier's operating ratio is projected to drop down to 89% which means that Continental
will be earning more than the CAB's 120' ROl,standard. 	 It should be noted, however, that back in
1966 CAL' s
 operating ratio'; was 79%, and its return on investment topped 18%. Working capital was at
only 1 week of cash operating expenses at 6/30/76, but it should 'reach 2 weeks by the end of 'this
year, and after that there is no problem in keeping it at 3 weeks for the remainder of the study
period.
Possessing the most modern fleet in the industry, Continental will not be faced with a massive
financial' headache if there is -a tightening"of environmental standards for aircraft.
CAL's bank agreement expires at the end of 1976.
	 With no debt needed until 1979, there is no i
reason for Continental to enter into a new revolving credit agreement with the banks unless it can
negotiate very favorable terms:
11
•	 MONEYABILITY O
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.^ ". M O N E Y A B. I L IT Y	 - I 	 V E S T 	 . D	 'C A P I T 	 L(System - All Services) ..,.
1976-
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1994
I3T7ESTEDCAPITAL UNIT Actual- - - ---- - - - ---------P"R0 J 	 C T E D - - - - - - - -	 - - - - - - - - - - - - -
'Debt $ Mil g
Senior Debt - Banks " 208 179 154 122 138 140 170 171 203 130 (28) b
Senior Debt-Insco/Other 84 78 72 65 58 52 47 102 136 180 96
Senior Debt-Leases Cap'd "
Senior Total - Reptd 292 257 226 187 196 192 217 273 339 360 68
' Senior Total + Cap Lses 292 257 226 187 196 192 217 273 339 360 68
Subordinated 139, 127 114 :' 101 90 79 68 56 79 103 (36)
total Debt - Reptd 431 384 340 288 286 271 285 329 418 463 32
Total Debt + Cap Lses 431 384 340 288 286 271 285 329 418 46.,• 32 9
Eauit
Stock " 147 159 183_ 222 264 309 365 421 472 517 370
'- Stock +Sub Debt' 286 286 297 323 354 38B 433 477 551 620 334
Tot Inv Capital-Reptd 578 543 523 510 550 580 650 750 890 980 402 e
Tot Inv Capital + Cap Lses 578 543 523 510 550 580 650 750 890 980 402
FLIGhT EQUIPMENT'
Depr Cost' 498 468 438 408 414 406 421 504 647 730 232
s Depr Cost + Mfr Deposit 499 468 438 419 448 466 509 595 720 795 296
Depr Cost +	 " +'Cap Lses 499 468 438 419 448 466 509 595 720 795 296
yi !
WORKING CAPITAL
Incl Cur Debt/Equiv Wk's COE $Mill/t9ks 18 /2 15/2 30 /3 30	 /3 40/3 40	 /3 50 /3 50 /3 60 /3 60 / 3 42 /1a
RATIO AUAZYSISL/ 	(G) UNIT/NORM
Sr Debt
Equity (Stk t Sun) %-1503 102 90 76 58 55 49 50 57 62	 ,: 58 (44)pts.
Sr Debt s
Fi'Eq (Net + Dep + Lse) B- 80% 59 55 52 .45 44 41 43 46 47 45 (14)pts.
3 Cap' Lses _Share FIt Eq %- 33% - - -
-
- - - - - _
' Total Debt
Stock Equity %-175% 293 242 186 130 108 88 78 78 89 90, (203)pts.
11 Y State Ins Law
Fix Chg Cov - 12 M!os X; l-.5 1.0 1.4 1.7 2.1 2.7 " 2.8 3.2 3.1 2.9 2.6 1.6x
Fix Chg Cov	 5 yr Avg x-1..5', 1.2' 1.1 1_2 1.47 -1.8 2.1 2.5 2.8 2.9 2.9 1.4x
Oner Ratio (Airline) % 93 93 92 91 " 90 90 89 89 89 90 (3)pts.
Return On Inv (Corp) 8 4.3 7.6 10.9 13.5 13.1' 13.1 14.2 12.5 11.2 9.7 5.4 pts.
Rev 1 Tot Inv Can $ 0.92 1.10 1.27 1.45 1.50 1.57 1.55 1_47 1.37 1.37 0.45
,let Cag Coatt-- 2/ $ Mil 30 60 120 170 210 290 390 410 380 400 -
Fin Argd /i B Argd ,/% 67 /223
e
Cash Generation
)
Flow per 5 Equity 4/% Chg-30 20 /11 20 /- 25 /25 28 /12 29	 / 4 28 /(3) 28 A 26 /(7) 24 / (8) 23 / (4) 3 /15
Rev Less COE	 Mills/% Chg-5.00
per ASH 6.97 / (23)17.46/ 7 8.13/9 8.67/7 9.58/10 9.67/1 10.8V13 11.02/1	 11.53/5 11.50/- 4.53 /65
Moneyability -
Note-	 (G)	 See Glossary. AERO AD;	 Inv. Capital 1976-1984
l/	 12 months basis.	 % Charges are from end of prior year.
3/	 uct Cab co =Y- = Next two y,z:ars prC-;ectcd capi tal' exueL:Iitures for flight C O fi ^ I N E N T A L
equipment and GPE.
P A R AMET ERS
-- - - -'. - - - - - - - - - U.S. TRUNKS & PAA - - - - - - - - - - - -.- - - - - - - - - - - -DELTA- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -. - -	 -
f 	 ECONOMY USA Strong growth into 1977_ 	 Thereafter resumption of secular DITTO
GNP real growth at 3-48 rate.
	
Inflation rate to be about
5% per vear in 1976 and 1977.	 Thereafter inflation to drop -
to 3;-48 per year.	 Une7tplovment rate to continue slow drop;
Y consumer -:-income..and confidence to continue to advance.'
World Turnaround from recession levels slower than U.S. with DITTO	 3
inflation .rates to continue. above USA' s.
1975-1980	 1980-1984 1975-1980	 1980-1984
Growth Rate Compounded "GRC" Growth Rate Compounded "GRC"
TRAFFIC Dom RPMs (All Services)'	 7.58	 6.18 Dom RPMs (All Services	 7.0%	 6.08	 )
Int'l'RPMs C'	 „	 )	 9.38	 7.48 Intl RPMs ( t,	 "	 )	 9.4	 7.4
CAPACITY ASMs ad hoc by carrier, but to generally increase at a
lower rate than RPMs. '1976-1977 and part of 1978's System ASMs (All Services)	 5.68	 5.3$
increase mostly' due to seating changes and maximum.
utilization. i	 d¢,
LOAD FACTOR Ad hoc by carrier; generally increasing between 3 and 4 LOAD FACTOR System (All Services) to increase from 55.78 in 1975 	 t
percentage points. to 61.08: by 1984.
1976-1984 1976-1984
"GRC" „GRC"
-COST Labor (System)	 (Avg Compens/Empl)	 7.78 Labor (System) (Avg Compens/Empl) 	 8.08
1NCR_v%^WNT Fuel	 (	 n	 )	 (4 gal)	 5.38 Fuel	 (	 n	 )	 (4` gal)	 5.48
PATE Other (	 "	 )	 (industrial Prices) 	 4.2% Other (	 )	 (Industrial Prices)	 3.58
Y-ELDS Carriers' need to stay at least even with general Yields - Dom (c/RPM) 	 4.0$
inflationary trends, necessitates annual yield increases - Int'1 {")	 3.98
between 3-58 minimum.
EQUIP_Y.'NT Buys concentrate on 727-200s, L-1011s and 180 seat medium rangeBuys to concentrate on presently available aircraft through
1980.
	
By 1981-1982 new technology aircraft parametered in aircraft type to allow for growth, flight range ASM distribution
are:	 180 seat medium range type needs, and gradual standardization of fleet. 	 Phase-outs center
200 seat long range type mainly on environmentally unacceptable DC-8s and DC-9s. i
to help with pressing . need: for fuel economies and to meet
the environmental imperative of the late 1970's and early
1980's.
YonEYABILITY Cost of Capital - Ad hoc b	 carrier.	 Prime lending ratey	 g DITTO j
at 8-8.52 with carriers paying between 31 and 1 percent above
prime.
Availability of Capital - very restricted until deregulation As the strongest cash generator in the industry, Delta will have
debate is settled.	 Funds to come from banks, manufacturers no problem financing itself.	 In the last ten years and continuing
and through leasing.	 Loans from insurance companies, throughout the study period, carrier never disqualified under NY
restricted to a very few carriers, due to constrained cash State Insurance Law coverage test. 	 Even if Delta is forced intQ. 	 t
generation and earnings outlook. quicker revamping of fleet due to environmental dictates, it should
be able to manage nicely.
CAB Proposals under Aviation Act of 1975 not parametered into DITTO -
study.	 AERO ADVANCED will be re-done, when and it the
various proposals have been enacted and a-time frame is
established.
C ltober 29, 1976 AFRO AD:.	PAR METERS 1976-1984
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C 0 M M E N  A R Y
"EARNINGS"
Delta's earnings have bounced back strongly after a disappointing 1975. Net  income should
approach 1974's record earnings of $87.3MH. Operating, earnings were up 2090 for the first six_
months', and should end the year about 63% above last year's level.
Delta-'s strong' performance can be partly attributed to the long strike against its competitor,
National. DAL has been able to keep some of its rival's passengers, and as a result, RPM growth
far outpaced the industry's average during the first half of 1976. Second half increases will
naturally be reduced as-NAL was on strike during all of 'last year's fourth quarter. Nevertheless,
DAL's :RPMs'should grow by around 8% this year. Yields should increase about 5% aided by the
elimination of the "no-frills" fare which diluted, yields last year. Delta's charter and freight
divisions have been very strong this year and will help total revenues increase $186 million .over
last year.
Expenses are projected to increase 10.4% this year with unit costs expected to rise 8.10 on
a
	
	
a weighted basis. Of the $126MB increase in COE $87 million, or 69%, is accounted for by higher
prices. Employment is projected to rise less than lo, fuel gallonage should increase between 3-4%,
and ASMs will increase only about 6.7%. Depreciation will be up about 11% as the carries continues
to bring new aircraft into its fleet.
"Nettings" will be fairly substantial for DAL this year. Because the carrier borrpwed pounds
sterling to pay for the Rolls-Royce engines on the L-lolls, any drop in the value of*the pound
will be an unrealized gain for Delta under the new FASB accounting rules.' Delta is also recording
profits on all of the planes they sell thanks to their extremely conservative depreciation policy
of writing off aircraft over only 10 years.
1977 looks like ^t will definitely be a record year for Delta. Pre-tax income, is projected
to be 31% higher than this year's, as the carrier continues to gain the advantages of its fleet
modernization program. The new 727 	 and 'L-1011s are much more fuel efficient than the older
DC-8's and DC-9's. Delta's productivity on an ASM basis should continue to improve with these
new larger; planes being added to the fleet. DAL's chances for productivity gains are further
enhanced by the fact that DAL is the least unionized of all the trunk carriers. Because it
amortizes investment tax credits, instead of "flowing them through", DAL's reported tax rate in
1977 will not be effected by the new tax law. However, on its own books DAL will record a lower
tax rate.
The longer term outlook is one of the best in the industry. Earnings are projected at 6.9%
of revenues. While this does not compare with the 11.80 profit margin in 1966, it is certainly
sufficient to insure that DAL will be earning over 120 on its total capital and over 15% on its
,equity. The key to Delta's success will be as with all other'profitable carriers, a modern,
efficient fleet and a management which can keep costs in check and productivity increasing.
"EARNINGS
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EARNINGS
,calendar years -
1976-
unit 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1984
Actual
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - P R O J E C T 	 D - - - - - - - - - - - - - _ _ - _ -
Revenues
Passenger $Mil 1300 1474 1650 1838 2037 2256 2490 2733 3001 3279 20,758
Freight " 69 87 98 111 123 136 150 165 180 200 1,250
Total Revenues 429 -, 161.5 1810 2020' 2240 2480	 X730	 3000 3295	 3600 22.790
cash Oper Exp
Labor " 576' 638 714 791 876 961 1059 1174 1295 1423 6;931
Fuel 257 287 332 363" 392 426 459 492 530 572 3,853
Omer 386 420 462 504 548 603- 660 720 785 857 5,559'
Total COE i219' 1345 1508 1658 1815 1990 2178 2386 2610 '2652 18,343 }
Depr/Abort 139 154, 161 160 161 172 199 236 264 273 1,780
E
Total Oper Exp 1358 1499 1669 1818 1977 2162 '2377 2622 2874 3125 ,	 20,123
Oper Earnings 71 116 141 202 263 318 353 378 421 475 2,667
Gross Interest 36 32 31 28 20 14 15 15 13 5 173
Pre-Tax Earnings 35 84 110 174 243 304 338 36.3 408 470 2,494
inc- Tax $Mil 8	 - 25 33 52 97 137 152 163 184 226 1,069
Ef£. Rate $ 223 303 303 303' 403 45%	 45% 45%	 453 484 434
-:et Earnings
Airline Operations $Mil 27 59 77 122 146 167 186 200 224 244 1,425
^.lettings"' 10' 21 33 8 14 13 14 10 16 16 145
Reatd to Stockholders 37'' 60 110 130 160 180 200 210 240 260 1,570
RnTEOS {
Traffic (All Services) Bil/%Chg i3
RP!s - DOM / 16.1/3 17.4/8 18.6/7 19.8;7 21.1/7 22.5/7 23.9/6 25.3/6 26.9/6 28.4/6 12.3/6.5GRC j
RPMs - System / 16.5/2 17.9/8 19.1/7 20.4/7 21.7/7 23.2/7 24.6/6 26.1/6 27.7/6 29.2/6 12_7/6.5GRC i
;^5Ks - System /' 29.6/4 31.6/7 33.5/6 35.0/5 36.8/5 38.9/6 41.0/5 43.1/5 45.4/5 47.9/6 18.3/5.5GRC
Load Factor - System 3 55.7 56.6 57.0 58.2 59.0 59.5 60.0 60.5 61.0 61.0 5.3pts
Yield - Dom ¢RPM/3Chg 7.90/3 8.26/5 8.66/5 9.04/4 9.40/4 9.77'4 10.16/4 10.50/3 10.87/4 11.25/3 3.35/4.OGRC
Yield -System / 7.89/3:: 8.24/5 8.64/5 9.02/4 9.37/4 9.74/4 10.13/4 10.48/3 10.85/4 11.22/3 3.33/4.OGRC
..n` ' I,iCR .1!ENT (COE) i
- ;.abor (.ion-Add) $,Vdl/	 3 43 /8 60 /10 66' /10 64 /9 66 /8 •62 /7 70 /7 - 78 /7 85 /7 90 /7 641 i
- Fuel " /	 " 58 /29 21 /8 30 /10 21 /6 18 /5 16 /4 17 /4 18 /4 21 /4 22 /4 184
- Omer / 11 /3 6 /2 16 /4 21 /4 18 /4 23 /4 24 /4 26 /3 27 /4 28 /3 189
- Total / 112/14' 87 /8 112/10 106/7 102/6 101/5 111/5 122/5 133/6 140/5 1014_
weighted Index (1967=100) No /%Chg 192/14 208/8 227/10 244/7 259/6 273/5 288/5 304/5 321/6 338/5 146/6.5GRC
t AFRO AD:-	 EARNINGS	 1976-1984
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C O M M E N T A R Y
"FLIGHT EQUIPMENT'S
Delta's fleet standardization program goes on. 	 Having entered the year 1976 with a
variety of seven different aircraft types, the carrier announced that an agreement has been
reached with F.B. Ayer for the sale of all its DC- 8- 5'1s.	 Eight of these aircraft will be
removed from the fleet this year and the remaining 13 early in 1977. 	 The three 747s have
been sold	 and will be returned to Boeing in the first half of 1977. 	 Delta is also continuing
strong sales efforts to * dispose,of'its DC9 -30 aircraft. 	In addition, our study projects sale
of the five 727-100s in 1978 and disposition of the 13 DC-8-61s between 1981 and 1983:
Delta currently has 27 727-200s on order for delivery between 1976 and 1978, and 12
.L-1011s for 1976-1980 deliveries.
	
Our study projects an additional order for four 727-200s
in 1979 and after that a switch-over to the advanced technology type aircraft with 180 seats.
We also believe that Delta will become a buyer of the L-1011-500 with its long-range capability,
especially if the long-delayed 'Trans Atlantic route case will finally get Presidential approval.
This 'aircraft will be ideally suited for the Atlanta-London route, and as a replacement for the
DC8-61s.	 In addition to the announced orders, our buys concentrate mainly in the medium-to-
short range where Delta flys about 90% of its ASMs.	 During the study period, we are projecting
the purchase of a total of 99 aircraft at a cost of about $2.3 billion and the removal of 92
aircraft.	 So, by 1984, Delta will have standardized its fleet on the 727-200s, L-1011s, and
the 180 seat medium range 'type.
At the end of 1984, Delta will still have 12 DC9-30s remaining in its fleet, and to
replace the ASMs generated by this aircraft, will cost an 	 additional $130 million in 1984 y
dollars.	 If the carrier	 should accelerate the phase-out of the DC9-30s, Delta would be the
proud owner of an entire aircraft fleet meeting requirements under FAR 'Part 36.
"FLIGHT EQUIPMENT"
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FLIGHT EQUIPMENT - PURCInA.SE / REMOVALS / PAY;',ENTS: / LEASES
GROL-4D PROPERTY E EQUIPMENT (projected costs)
1976-
Unit	 1975-	 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980
- - -	
1983 1984 1984 
f ? F3^,..5=8/LEASES (Z) 	 Actual - - - - - - - - - ---
 P R O J E C T E D - - - - -	 - - 	 -- - -	
- - -	 - _ -
Additions	 No. A/C
727-200_	 20 14* 9* 4* 4 _ _ - - - 31
L=1011	 _ 3* 1* 3* 3* 2* - - - 2 14
L-1011-500	 _ _ _ - _ 3 3 - _ _ 6
'^80 Seat M/R	 _
Y
_
- -
10 15 15 8 48
Total Additions
	
20 17 10 7 7 ' S 13 15 15
` Total Cost A/C Type s/
	$ Kill
727-200
	
169' 139 94 44 46 - - - - - 323
L-1011	 - 72 25 80 84 59 - - - 72 392
'
L-1011-500	 _ _ _ _ _ 128 135 - - - 263
180 Seat M/R	 - _ _ _' _ - 253 398 418 234 1303
Dotal Cost Aircraft
	 ^^a ?7^i 119 124 130 187 388 39^ 366 2281
@ Removals 	 NO ' A/C
FR 227/DC-10	 6 -
747/727-100	 1 - 3 5 - _ _ _ _ _ 8
DC9-30	 4 3 4 5 6 8 4 6 6 6 50
' DC9-50/708-61 	
-
8 13 _ - _ 5 4 4 - 34
Total Re ovals 	 11 11 20 10 8 —^ _^- --IT —10 6 92	 -
P A Y M E N T S 4/
=light Eq Payments 	 $ Mill
Advance Deposits	 43 48 58 63 110 127 105 76 50 50 687
:. Deliver-.1	 "	 118 148 84 87 91 131 271 278 292 214 1596
Spares, 9adifs etc
	
"	 5 4 8 10 9 12 14 16 6 6 87
Total Flt Eq Payments	 "	 166 200 150 160 210 270 390 370 350 270 2370
Total Flt Eq Leases 2/
Total F5. ght Ecuitnert 	 166 200 150 160 210 270 390 370 350 270 2370
~ GRD, PROP, & EQUIP 3/ 	 25	 I 20 20 30 30 30 30 40 40 40 280
} 7 ::1	 (L-Leased, all others 70£ purchased)	 M/R = Medium Range,
3/ Cost ncr Aircraft Tyoe - nur.d:?er x cost per aireraftinzlbase price + CFE/MC/spares. SH&E derived.
t 2/ Leases,	 .cane AERO AD: FLT.'EQ/GPE 1976-1984
I/ G_d_ Prop a'r^uip. - Subject to management reprogramming.
z V Pa	 :nts -(Si:&E derived; reflect_ escalation)
Advance De osits - nre-delivery;:@ 30% of unit price. D E L T 
Delivery -. balance remaining @`aircraft acceptance - ..
Spares,Modifs, etc - @ 10% of aircraft cost(or derived)
{ * Firm order.
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"CAPITAL 'NEEDS AND SOURCES"
Based on`our -earnings and flight equipment forecast, Delta will only have to borrow fi
' about $210 million during the study period which it also will be able to pay back in that
' time 'span.	 As the study shows, the carrier will have excess working capital during most of ?
the years, as cash generated internally <is'more than plentiful. i
Delta prepaid in early 1976 $25 million in bank debt which was not due until 1977.
However,_ we forecast that the carrier will have to borrow about $55 million in the fotrth
quarter of 1976 to help pay for delivery of 8 727-200s. 	 We have kept working capital in
1976 at the one week level, a policy which Delta has been following for a'number of years.
However, at the end of 1977 and 1978, working capital will be at a level of over 4 week's of
cash 'operating expenses, as the carrier is generating more capital than it needs. 	 Dividend
payments are increased to a payout 	 rate of 25% of net earnings, a change the carrier can
k
g
well afford.
Delta's fantastic cash flow (its cash generation ratio reaches 15.6 mills per ASM, the
highest in the industry) is a result of excellent earnings and a very conservative depreciation
_policy.	 All aircraft are depreciated over 10 years to 10% residual.	 If in 1975, Delta had
followed the depreciation guidelines of the CAB-, it would have reduced its depreciation charge
by almost $26 million. 	 The second largest generator of cash flow, net earnings, contributes more
than 40% to internal sources. 	 Delta is just starting to sell older aircraft, and this -will`.
( become a steady source of additional funds over the next nine years. R"
The bank borrowings shown in 1980 and 1981 are strictly for large advance deposits and
delivery payments'` forecasted by us.	 These borrowings can easily be repaid by the carrier
starting in 1983.
In general, Delta's financial officer will have one of the easiest jobs in the airline
industry. '	Even if environmental pressures should increase and Delta be.forced to accelerateits flight equipment revamping, it will be able to do so without any financial strain.
We are showing capital expenditures for flight equipment and ground property of $2.65 '.
billion between 1976 and 1984. 	 If these expenditures are discounted at a 5% rate,° the
resulting present value is $2.13 billion, still 18% more-than the carrier spent between
1967 and 1975.
Recap:
	
1976.-1984P
-
Needs:	 $3.89 billion (61% flight equipment, 7% GPE, 17% debt retirement, 8% dividend,
and excess working, capital 2%).
Sources:	 $3.64 billion or 940 from operations (40% earnings, 46% depreciation, and 8$
property sale/other).
$210 million or 5% new financing ($200 million to be arranged).
"CAPITAL NEEDS AND SOURCES"
p
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CAPITAL NEEDS AND SOURCES ($ MILL)
- calendar years - 1976-
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1984
CAPITALT NEEDS ACTUAL_ -- ---- ---- -- ^- --	 P'R0JE'CTE D - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - ---- - - - - - - - 
Flight Equipment Payments
- Advance Deposits 43 48 58 63 110 127 105 76 50 50 687
- Delivery, 118 148 84 87 91 131 271 278 292 214 1596
-Spares, bSodiE. etc. 5 4_ _8 _	 10 9 12 14 16 8 6 87
Total Flt Equip Payments 166 200 150 160 210- 270 390 370 350 270 2370
Ada: Flt Equip Leases
Total Flight Equipment 166 200 150 160 210 270 390 370 350 270 2370
G,ound Prop	 F Eq/Other
I
Grd Prop &-'Equip' 25 20 20 30 30' 30 30 40 40 40 280
Debt Retirement 21 84 51 78 60+50 142 20 9 8+60 8+80 650
Dividends 12 13 14 20 20 28 40 50 50 70 310
Other: _ 33
_5 2 - - - l 3 2 _	 40
Total GPE & Other 58 150 90 130 160 200 90 100 160 200 1280 E
End 'Wkg Cap 	 COE prof) 38 20` 120 140 120 120 130 14G 160 170+70 240 d
i 262 370 360 430 490 '' 590 610 610 670 710 3890TOTAL CAPITAL NEEDS
CAP ITAL SOURCES`
Beginning Working Capital
,
(21) 38 20 120 140 120 120 130 140 160 40
Operations
#,
y
- Det Earnings (Rept'd) 37 80 110 130 160 180 200 210 240 260 1570
- Depreciation/Amort 139 154 161 160 161 172 199 236 264 273 1780
- Property, Sale/Other 5 30 70 20 30 30 40 30 30 20 290
- 
Other 20 2 (1) - (1) (2) 1 4 (4) (3) -
Total Operations 201 266 340 310 350 380 440 480 530 550 3640
Financing Arrangements _ 195
-Senior Debt-Banks 40 55 - _ - 90 50 -
-
11
_	
-Insco/Others 42
_ Subord Debt -
- Leases (Cap @'AC Cost)'
- Denosits returnable
Stock Sales - - - - - -
-
-
210
Tot Financing Arrangements 82 66 - - 90
50 - - -
262 370 360 430 490 590 610 61U 6 07
710 3890 j5
TO-4AL CAPITAL SOURCES
-
55 - _ _ 90 50 - - -
200
FINANCING TO BE A-PRANGED-
t
AERO AD: Capital Needs and Sources 1976-1984
D E L T A S
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"MONEYABILITY"
Delta's Moneyability posture is among the top three in the industry, and will continue
to get even better during the study period. Even our forecasted heavy capital spending program
can be financed entirely from. internal sources (see Capital Needs and Sources schedule).
Bank debt will be totally paid off by 1984, and all other debt could be eliminated from
the balance sheet, if the carrier so desires, since we have forecasted working capital at a much
higher level than the carrier historically has maintained. Leases decline sharply in -1976 as
Delta purchased the assets of Storer Leasing, and are eventually completely eliminated with the
expiration of the 727-200 leases.
Stock equity more than triples over the study period, reflecting the better than average
earnings of this carrier.
All Moneyability ratios have been consistently better than our norms, and will continue
to improve over the study period. Delta will be in the enviable position of being virtually
debt free by 1984. While fixed charge coverage under the N.Y. State Insurance Law has never
been violated, this ratio increases dramatically. With the operating ratio dropping down to
87%, Delta achieves the highest return on investment of the industry, over 16%. However, back
in 1966, the carr3-er reached an ROI of over 20% and an operating ratio of 76%. The revenue
generated on the invested capital base has always been the highest among the trunk carriers, and
this improves to over $2.00 for every dollar invested.
Cash flow per equity improves dramatically in the next three years, but then starts a
steady decline, as the equity base increases so substantially. Cash generation per ASM, never
below our crucial 5.00 mills norm, more than doubles during the study period and is a clear
indicator that Delta will have no problems financing itself. This is an enviable position for
any management to find itself in,.
"MONEYABILITY"
r-	 _
i
r
... _ 4	 2	 C ,-:	 7	 R.	 ::^ ^i	 p  j )-.
C	
...
.r...-a
...:...A ^^-....7 t.T.... ^^' ...	 Z-'.a'T-
M 0 N E Y A B I L I T Y	 - I N V E S T E D	 C A P I T A L
-m - All Services)'(Syst
1976-
19:5 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1984
.737ED C:-:P=_L UNIT
 Actual
	
- - - -	 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - P R 0 J E C T E D - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -LeLt $ mil
Senior Debt - Banks 327 308 283 232 133 90 140 140 80 -o- (327)
Senior Debt-lnsco/Other 118 119 93 67 58 51 33 26 18 11 (107)
Senior Debt-Leases Cap 'd "_ 42 20 17 14 11 7 4 - - - (42)
Senior Total - Reptd 444 427 376 299 191' 141 173 166 98 11 (433)
` Serior Total + Cap Lses " 486 447 393 313 202 148 177 166 98 11 (475)
5ubordiated 25 24 23 22 20 19 17 15 14 13 (12)
Total Debt - Rentd 469 451 399 321 211 160 190 181 112 24 (445)
Total Debt + Cap Lses 511 471 416 335 222 167 194 181 112 24 (487)
Equity
I Stock 500 557 653 763 903 1055 1215 1375 1565 1755 1255
I Stock + Sub Debt 525 577 676 785 923 1074 1232 1390 15-19 1768 1243'
Tot Inv Capital-Reptd 969 1008 1052 1OB4 1114 1215 1405 1556 1677 17-9 BID
Tot Inv Capital + Cap Lses 1011 1028 1069 1098 1125 1222 1409 1556 1677 1779 768 4
a
FulGFT EQUIPJIEST 1
` Depr Cost 997 1102 1035 1012 1001 1038 1248 1433 1612 1677 680
Depr Cost + Mfr Deposit 1040 1129 1084 1087 1148 1255 1454 1596 1700 1723 683
d Depr Cost +	 + Cap Lses 1082 1149 1101 1101 1159 1262 1458 1596 1700 1723 641
:OP{I G CAPITAL
` Inc! Cur Debz/Ecniv Wks COE $Mill/Wks 38/2 20/1 120/4 140/4 120/3 120 /3 130/3 140/3 160/3 240 /4 202 /2
R?i4	 ANALY5is1 	(G) IINIT/NORD!
Sr Debt =
Equity (Stk. + Sub)
,
%-150% 93 77 58 40 22 14 14 12 6 1 (92)pts
Sr ucti.?t
rl Eq (%et + Dep - Lse) $- 802 45 39 36 28 17 12 12 10 6 i (44)pts
Cab Lses Share Flt Eq B- 336 4 2 2 1 1 1 - -- - - (4)pts
Total Debt
Stacie Equity %-1758
:
102 85 64 44 25 16 16 13 7 1 (101)pts
4. Y St	 Ltae Ins	 aw 1.
ti' } Fix Ch- Cov - 12 3203 ..-1.5 1.4 2.2 2.7 3.7 5.2 6.7 6.9 7.1 8.3 10.2 8.8x
t
f Fix Chg Cov - 5 yr Avg x-1.5 2.2 2.3 2.3 2.5 3.0 4.1 5.0 5.9 6.8 7.8 5.6x
Ozer Ratio (Airline) % 95 ' 93 92 90 88 87 87 87 87 87 (8)pts
Return Cn Inv (Corp) % 7.7 10.1 13.3 14.5 16.1 16.0 15.3 14.5 15.1 14.9 7.2pts
' Rev _ Tot Inv Cap $ 1.41 1.57 1.69 1_84 1.99 2.03 1.94 1.93 1.96 2.02 0.611
(
7 t Cap Cents 2/ $ Mil
	 ! 385 '360 430 540 720 830 800 700 700 .600
?
g "A 14/4 7/2
Cash Generation
Flow per $: Equity t/% Chg-30 32/(14) 37/16 38/3 36/(5) 33/(S) 32 /(3) 31/(3) 31/- 31/- 29 / (6) (3)/(9)
Rev Less COE
	 Mills/% Chg-5.00
per AS_X 7.12/(27) 8.54/20 9.01/6 10.34/15 11.52/11' 12.60/9 13.46/7 14.25/6 15.09/6 15.62/4 8.50/119
moneyability - E
.1;-, 1,
 
e_	 (G)
	
See Glossary_ AFRO-. Inv_ Capital 1976-1984
J
i/	 12	 a;tits basis. 3 Changes are from end c£ prior year. -	 -iII
: r	 - ._ pr	 ectecl capital e *cpen3iture,s D E L. A
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ECONOMY USA Strong growth into 1977. 	 Thereafter resumption of secular GNP Ditto
1
real growth at 3-48 rate. 	 Inflation rate to be about 5% per
year in 1976 and 1977. 	 Thereafter inflation to drop to 3^-48
per year.	 Unemployment rate to continue slow drop; consumer
income and confidence to continue to advance.
World Turnaround from recession levels slower than. U.S. with
inflation rates to continue above USA's. Ditto
1975-1980	 1980-1984 1975-1980	 1980-1984
Growth Rate Compounded "GRC" Growth Rate Compounded "GRC"'
TRAFFIC Dom RPMs (All Services)	 7.58	 6.1% Dom RPMs (All Services)	 6.8%	 5.8% --;
Int' l RP1.1s	 C' 	 9.1 s	 7.4% Int' l RPMs	 C'	 .r	 )	 7.2%	 7.28
CAPACITY ASMs ad hoc by carrier, but to generally increase at a lower System ASMs (All Services) 	 5.9%	 5.6e i
rate than RPMs..	 1976-1977 and part of 1978's increase mostly j
due to seating changes and maximum utilization.
LOAD FACTOR Ad hoc by carrier; generally increasing between 3 and 4 LOAD FACTOR System (All Services) to increase from 56.3% in 1975 to
percentage points. 60.0% by 1984.
°a
'
1976-1984
"GRC"
1976-1984
"GRC"
;x COST Labor (System)	 (Avg Compens/Empl)	 7.7% Labor (System)	 (Avg Compens/Empl)	 8.08
INCREMENT Fuel
	
(	 )	 (fi gal)	 5.3% Fuel	 (	 "	 )	 (G gal)	 5.78
(5
RATE Other (	 "	 )	 (Industrial Prices) 	 4.28 Other (	 )	 (Pndustrial Prices)	 3.6$ s
YIELDS Carriers' need to stay at least even with general Yields - Dom (VRPM) 	 4.18
inflationary trends, necessitates annual yield increases
between 3-58 minimum.
- Int'1	 ("	 3.9
EQUIPMENT Buys to concentrate on presently available aircraft through Buys concentrat,! on L-1011 for long-range, and 727-200, DC9-50 and
1980.	 By 1981-1982 new technology aircraft parametexed in 180 seat medium mange type to meet ASM requirements in short and
are:	 180 seat medium range type medium range markets.. No additional L-1011 sales beyond the ones
200 seat long range type announced parametered in.' 	 By 1984, 143 aircraft still in fleet not
to help with pressing need for fuel economies and to meet the meeting requirements under FAR Part 36.
environmental imperative of the late 1970's and early 1980's.
MONEYABILITY Cost of Capital - Ad hoc by carrier. 	 Prime lending rate at Ditto
8-8.58 with carriers paying between ^ and 1 percent above
prime.
Availability of Capital - very restricted until deregulation Even with strong earnings improvement, carriers' heavy debt repay-
g
debate is settled.	 Funds to come from banks, manufacturers ment schedule plus capital outlays for flight equipment force it to
i and through leasing.	 Loans from insurance companies seek financing from all outside sources. 	 Improving ratios over study
restricted to a very few carriers, due to constrained cash period should allow 'Ehis.	 No borrowings from insurance companies
generation and earnings outlook. possible, since FAL does not meet the fixed charge coverage test
throughout study period.
CAS Proposals under Aviation Act of 1975 not'parametered into Ditto
study.	 AFRO ADVANCED will be re-done, when and if the
various proposals have been enacted and a time frame is
established.
AERO AD:	 PARAMETERS 1976-1984
Ailgust 16, 1976
E A S T E R N
..	 ...s	 ..	 _ . _.. ^K,:<..i ... .m. _ il	 ..... ^.s^	 srma-^.^	 —	 _	 A9	 ^	 YaFC§i625w.Y.wiY6	 s	
1
C O M M E N T A R Y
"E_RNINGS 
Eastern is heading for a record year in 1976. The $37.6 MM earned in the first half
of the year is more than the`carrier•ever earned in any full year and with traffic continuing
to be strong and costs under control, Eastern should make some money during the last six
months of 197 6 While the $45 MM in projected profits far exceeds the $29.8 MM earned in
1965, it should,''be noted that this year's profit margin of 2.5% is considerably below 1965's
5.8% and EAL's 1976'ROI of 3.1% is again way below the comparable 1965'figure.
Eastern's stunning turn-around after last year's disastrous $49.7 MM loss can be accounted
for by the following three factors:
1) National' s long strike last fall;
"	 2) The wage freeze introduced for this year; and,
3) Management's tight control of costs other than fuel and labor.
Eastern, along with Delta, picked up most of National's passengers when last September
NAIL suffered its second major strike in the past two years.' National's rather timid post-	 i
strike marketing strategy has permitted Eastern and Delta to have a real windfall during the 	 3
s
	
	 first six months of this year as mutual aid payments stopped when National's strike was	 #
settled in the first week of January. As of 'this date, National has not yet regained its
1975 market share.
In order to get lender approval for a $75 million debt deferral (see Capital Needs and
Sources schedule) EAL was forced to institute a wage freeze program for 1976. The program
has produced (after accurals) almost 20% of $37.6 MM earned in the first half of 1976. It
is estimated that the net effect of the freeze will increase income by around $15-$17 MM.for
s	 the full year.
Under Colonel Borman's guidance Eastern is apparently becoming a better managed air-
line. Employee_ productivity is rising and "other" costs (all cash operating expenses excluding'
'	 fuel and labor) are actually declining on an ASM basis. Eastern's "other" cost her ASM was
down 20 last year and was reduced another 3": in the first ;quarter of 1976, while the industry 	 4
was up 7% last year and is up 5% so far this year. Borman likes to point out that EALis
management staff has been slashed so that now the carrier's group of 45 officers is one of
the smallest in the industry. Eastern has recently completed a study of their entire route
structure and has decided to cut service in the money--losing Caribbean acid to concentrate
"EARPdINGS"-
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"EARNINGS"	 (Continued)
their 'resources more heavily or the business market and less on the seasonal pleasure market.
EAL"s "Nettings" figure is considerably higher this year as a result of the airline's
giving up its Puerto Rican _hotels.
	 The Dorado subsidiary had lost $17 million pre-tax
between 1972-1975 before EAL decided to take a $16.8 million write-off last year.
	 Under
the new FASB accounting rules the drop in the pound sterling this year (EAL borrowed pounds
r	 tc finance the L-1011s_ engines) added $3.9 MM to EAL' s first, half profit.
"	 Colonel Borman recently said that Eastern must earn 2-3^ on every sales dollar to
remain a viable carrier.	 Over the study period we see -Eastern's profit margin at 2.64%
with a peak of 3.27% in 1982.
	 Even with these much improved earnings, Eastern is never able
	
a
to earn more than .a 10.3% ROI.
N.B.	 The "+" numbers after the 1977-1981 labor figures are the amounts of profit
	
a
sharing the employees will be entitle to because of this year's wage freeze program.
	 1977
_	 earnings will probably decline as National should become more aggressive and take back some
of its lost traffic'.
	 Also unit ,costs continue to rise at a 9% rate for Eastern, mainly
because ofoperation catch-up to average industry wage rates.
F
Recent proposals by Col. Borman to tie salaries to profit or losses in future years,
w	 employee contributions to a'flight re- equipment fund etc `. are not parametered into this study.
i
p
i
"EARNINGS"
	 (Continued)
F
`$;^YMRdl4	 4^!a N iLVWRY"°h	 r!	 'C	 ;^•'_"
	 a»c_'-w :^^^asw*r^me:^—
	 '^	 —^'	 .:„'°.. pi.'.3'z -a-^' ^	 ^-.^k^?
^ 	 7 -	 'mod -F K.-YGi.
. „!
E A R
 I. N G S..
- calendar years.
1976-
Unit 1975_ 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1984
Actual - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - P R O J E C T E D - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Revenues
Passenger $Mil 1453 1650 1826 2037 2255 2514 2778 3049 3357 3676 23,142
Freight" 61 61 69 77; 85 94 104 114 125 137 866
Total ;Revenues 1624 1830 2026 2260 2503 2790 3065 3365 3705 4055 25,599
Cash Oper Exp
fr:. Labor " 670 740 829+10	 940+5 1031+7 1148+14 1275+18 1402 1552 1726 10,643+54
Fuel " 272 306 356 397 436 479 521 _ 565 613 662 4,335
Other 578 609 679 760 830 917 1003 1099 1209 1320 8,426
Total COE 1520 1655 1864'' 2097 2297 2544 2799 3066 3374 3708 23,404+54
Dept/Amort 98 102 103 105 108 112	 - 119 129 142 161 1,081
Total Oper Exp " 1618 - 1757 1967 2202 2405- 2656 2918 3195 3516 3869 24,485+54
` Oper_ Earnings ^13--T3_ -53_ __ -_ -I2iT' `ZZ9- ^I7D__ `I8b- T66U-
Gross Interest " 54 48 43 41 42 46 50 53 58 63 '444
Pre-Tax Earnings " (48) 25 6 12 49 74 79 117 131 123 616
Inc. Tax $Mil -0- -0- -0- -0- 5 15 16 23 26 25 110
Eff_ Rate B - - - - 10% 20% 20% .20% 20% "208 18%
Net Earnings
Airline Operations $Mil (48) 25 6 12' 44 59 63 94 105, 98 506
"wettings" (2) 20 14 18 16 21 27 16 15 22 169 F
Reptd to Stockholders (50)' 45 20 30 60 80 90 110 120 120 675
RATIOS
+	 s
Traffic (All Services)` Bil/%Chg
RPus -'uGM ",/ 14.6/ 3 15.9/ 9 15:8/ 6 17.9/-6 19.0/ 6 20.3/ 7 21.5/ 6 22.7/ 6 24.1/ 6 25_4/ 5 10.8/6.3 GRC
RPMs - System ''`/	 " 18.3/ 2 19.9/ 8 21.0/ 6 22.4/ 7 23.8/ 6 25.5/ 7 27.1/ 6 28.8/ 6 30.6/ 6 32.3/ 6 14.0/6.5 GRC -
..,
'
ASNs - System " /	 " 32.5/ 9 33.9/ 4 36.3/ 7 38.7/ 7 40.7/ 5 43.2/ 6 45.5/ 5 48.0/ 6 51.0/ 6 53.8/ 6 21.3/5.8 GRC a	 E
s	 ;
Load Factor - System 9 56.3 58.6 57.7 57.9 58.5 59.0 59.5 60.0 60.0 60,0' 3.7 pts.
Yield - Dom CRPM/8Ch 8.18	 3 8.59	 5 9.02	 5 9.43	 5 9.80	 4 10.2/ 4 10.6	 4 11.0	 4 11.4	 3 11.8/ 4 3.58/4.1 GRC
i Yield - System- " / 7.94/ 5 8.31/ 5 8.72/ 5 .9.11/ 5 9.47/ 4 9.85/ 4 -10.2/ 4 10.6/ 4 11.0/ 3 11,4/, 4 3.43/4.1 GRC
COST INCREMENT (COE)
- Labor (Non-Add) $Mil/
	
% 56/ '9 71/11 68/ 9 85/10 69/ 7 75/ 7 82/ 7 93/ 7 99/ 7 115/ 7 757
- Fuel / 56/26 29/10 32/10 22/' 6 21/ 5 18/ 4 20/ 4' 22/ 4 23/ 4 26/ 4 213
- Other
	 " " /	 ^ (10)/(2) 6/ 1 26/ 4 36/ 5 32/ 4 36/ 4 38/ 4 43/ 4 41/ 3 45/ 4 303
- Total " /	 " 102/11 106/ 9 1_26/ g 143/'8 122/ 6 129/ 5 140/ 6 158/ 5 163/ 5 186/ 6 1273 t
Weighted Index (1967=100) No /%Chg 201/11 220/ 9 238/ 9 256/ 8 272/ 6 287/ 5 303/ 6 319/ 5 337/ 5 356/ 6 155/6.6 GRC j
AFRO AD:	 EARNINGS '1976-1984
E A S T E R N 
g^g
w, 	 2i:y. s,«a..	 +.»..-:FY:!.°w`,^.Y..'F ....F.^. _	 `i7zawas-n'^.^^y'^cy,'„-i^-CrN:^aatccu_=CUrx .+s'_^.x- zv:^xn	 rsva'.whirtLS<n._ «- _
.^..,.^.w..-sca...
	
..e...	 •_:_{.ursaWl.r..v rare.. ..0 .....	 ,. . ....
tC O M M E N T A R Y
"FLIGHT EQUIPMENT"	 y
CEO Borman recently' stated that Eastern needs more stretched jets (727-200s and DC9-50s)
if the carrier is to be able to successfully compete with its arch-rival Delta Eastern's
management is now trying to rectify the mistake made in the late 1960's when the carrier
over ordered the L-1011s. However, "Operation Catch Up" is a very expensive game in the 	 1
airline business. Eastern has been 'caught in a vicious cycle where it needs more efficient
aircraft but it 'cannot afford to buy them because of its poor earnings and capital structure.
Of course, one of the major reasons for the dismal income statements has been the use of
older, _less-efficient aircraft.
Earlier this year EAL was able to arrange the lease financing for six 727-200s to be
delivered this fall and for nine DCO-50s which are to be delivered during the second half of
1977. These 15 new medium-range jets, together with the seven L-lolls already on order, 	 ^I
will meet the carrier's needs through 1978. After that, buys will concentrate on short-to
medium range aircraft to'maintain *the airline's historical ASPS/range balance of 1z long and
3/4 short-medium. We have projected additional orders of 22 DC9-50s and only four 727-200s.
This ratio cou ld easily be reversed in Boeing's favor which would mean a slight reduction in
the number of aircraft ordered as the`727_has 137 seats while the DC9 has only 115. The new
180 seat aircraft, arriving in the early 1980 1 s, will permit EAL to down range some of its
older 727-200s to replace the standard 727s which are being sold.
n
Eastern has managed to reduce its L-1011 fleet by selling two, by leasing one out, and
by "discontinuing its seasonal lease agreement with TWA. In 1977 it will be selling its 14
remaining Electras (the Shuttle will become an all jet operation) and trading in nine DC9-10s
in 'exchange for the new DC9-50s. Eastern cannot yet afford a massive fleet revamping, so
there are no more removals from the fleet (except for two ' DC9-30s going off lease in 1978)
until 1931,	
g
Even with the $2.2 billion spent between 1976 and 1984 for the 102 aircraft, Eastern 	 t
will still be flying *143'aircraft in 1984 that do not meet the environmental` restrictions of
FAR Part 36: To replace these planes, or 18.96 billion ASMs, would require anadditional
outlay of $1.97 billion in 1984 dollars.
"FLIGHT EQUIPMENT"
	
_
r
i
FLIGHT EQIIIPt'WNT - PURCHASE / REMOVALS / PAYMENTS / LEASES
GROUND-PROPERTY & EQUIPMENT (projected costs)
1976-
Unit	 1975	 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1984
PURCFASES'/LEASES (L)
	
Actual	
- - - - - - - - - - - -P R 0 J E C T E D -' - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ------  - - - - -
- - -
Additions	 No. A/C
L-"101i
	
2+1L	 1*+1L* 2L* 3 -, 4 - - 5 4 20
727-200	 -	 6L'' - 4 - - _ - 10
LC3-50
	 	 -
9L* - 4 12 6 - - - 31'
180 Seat M/R	 -	 - - - - - 8 12 12 9 41
Total Additions
	 3	 8 11 3 8 16 14 12 T7` IT- 707'
E ' Total Cost A/C Typel/	$ Mill
L-1011	 67	 46 51 80 - 112 - - 171 143 603
727-200	 -59
- -
46
-
-
_
- -
105
DC9-50	 -	
-
91
-
44 141 74
- - -
350
180. Seat M/R	 -	 - - - - - 212 318 334 263 1127
` Total Cost Aircraft
	 77'— 17r2-- `_GU_ TJU_ 253— 286— -3= SUS— 406 S-
Removals	 No A/C
L-1011	 1	 2 _ - - _, _ _ _ 2,
DC9-10/30	
-	 -
9L 2L
- - - - 1L - 12
727-100/QC/200	 1	 - -
_
-
- 6 10 10+3L 10 39
-;
DC8-61, L-188	 2	
-
14
-
_
-
-
- -
5L 19^.
Total. Removals	 4	 2 23 2 -- - 6 10 14 15 72	 r ''
r
PAYMENT S 4/ {
Flight Ea Payments
	 $ Mill j
Adv=ice Deposits	 53	 11 16 71 95 98 117 106 100 90 700
Delivery
	 12	 6 - 48 36 101 ..114 127 202 163. 800
Spares, mDdifs etc
	 '"	 10 	 13 24 21 19 21 19 27 18 27 190
Total Fit Eq Payments 	 75	 30 40- 140 150 220 250 260 320 280 1690 f	 ^.
Total Fit Eq Leases 2/ 	 21	 80 140 - 30' 80 90 90 150 120 780
Total Flight Equipment	 96'	 110 180 140 180 300 340 350 470 400 2470
GRD, PROP, &EQUIP ,3/
	 10.	 20 25 25 30 30 30 40 40 - 40 280
t
p
NOTP.S;(L-Leased, all others 703 purchased) j
1/ Cost per Aircraft Type - number x cost per aircraft im-cl base price + CFE/MC/spares. SH&E derived. p
2/ Teases - @ 303 of total aircraft cost- per year (1979-1984). AFRO AD: FLT. EQUIP/GPE 1976-1984
3/ Grd	 Prop & Equip. - Subject to management reprogramming. i
Pa-r,m n*-s -(SH&E 'derived; reflect escalation) <
Advance. Deposits -.pre-delivery @ 303 of unit price. E A S T E R N
Delivery - balance remaining @ aircraft acceptance q
Spares,Modifs,''etc - @ 10% of aircraft cost(or_derived)
- -=,.,^.u^^, .,	 a	 .^.... _._.._.e.,..,^,^:^„b._•._.,.... ^.	 .m	 ._.,	 .., ^ . _	
_	 _ `--
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"CAPITAL NEEDS AND SOURCES"''
At the emd of 1975 Eastern.was staring bankruptcy in the face. 	 Its financial ratios were
either in or close to being in violation of its loan` covenants, all money had been drawn down
from its bank revolver, and $103.6 million in debt was coming 'due in 1976. 	 To stave off this
impending ,disaster 'L,AL negotiated a '$75 million debt deferral programwhich included a relaxa-
tion of some of its financial tests, and the wage freeze program
As it turns out EAL would have been able to pay off the debt this year as operating
f results have been much 'better than ex pected..	 The leasing of the 'six 727-200s and the pr'ob-
able	 lease of the L-1011 to be delivered in the fall will help conserve cash.	 We have pro-
aected that EAL will pay off $60 of the $75 million this year, but if it wants to cut into .?
working capital, the entire amount could be repaid.
a
In 1977 EAL's'debt due is $131 'million and with earnings declining, and even with the
Leasing of the nine DC9-50s'and the two L-1011s,,.outside financing of $50 million is required.
1978's debt retirement is another $97 million and combined with large advance	 deposits for
new aircraft will force EAL to raise an additional $1-20 million externally.
As with all the carriers EAL is facing the problem of underdepreciating its aircraft,
i.e. depreciating older planes whose replacement cost has skyrocketed. 	 EAL's cash flow is R
further hampered by the airline's liberal depreciation policy. 	 In 1975 it 'actually charged
$6.1 million les	 for flight equipment depreciation:than it would have if it had followed
CAB standards,-.,.,
Due to _"= relatively weak cash flow EAL must resort to outside financing to meet 47
of its needs. ~The 'airine'must' call on all outside sources of capital, but is should be
noted that whit, EAL will be adding $710 million in debt between 1976 and 1984, it will in
the same time s#an be amortizing $700 million.
For the ptxs_poses of this study 30% of all incoming flight equipment is leased starting
in 1979.	 If all ,of this lease financing cannot be arranged, EAL 'could probably borrow some
more, it could cu =p out the $110 million in dividends, and it could cut into working capital.
Total capita: needs for flight equipment and GPE are $2.75 billion dur:. ;.ng the nine year
study ,!period.
	 If these outlays are discounted at a 5% rate, the present value of the ex-
penditures	 is only $1.9 billion which is considerably less than the $2.4 billion EAL spent
between 1-67-1975.
` "CAPITAL NEEDS AND SOURCES"
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One major caveat to this whole study is the question of environmental acceptability of
aircraft. Our study assumes that Eastern in 1984 will still be flying 143 planes that do
not meet FAR part 36 restrictions. If the carrier were to be forced to replace all of
these aircraft, it is doubtful that Eastern would be able to 'get the necessary financing.
	 j
j
Recap 1976-1984
:.'	 Needs	 $3.77 billion (66% flight equipment, 7% GPE, 19% debt retirement).
Sources: $1.92 billion or 51% from operations (18o earnings, 29% depreciation)-	 '$1.78 billion or 47% new financing ($1.58 billion, or 42 to be arranged).
"CAPITAL NEEDS AND SOURCES" (Continued)
CAPITAL NEEDS AND SOURCES ($ MILL)
calendar years -
1976-
t 975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1984
CAPITAL NEEDS ACTUAL - F- -- - -- - - - - - - - - - - - P R 0 J E C T E D -
- - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - -
	
---- ----
Flight Equipment Payments
- Advance Deposits 53 11 16 71 95 98 117 106 100 90 700
= Delivery 12 6 - 48 36 101 114 127 202 163 600
-' --Spares, Mod-if. etc. % 10 13 24 21 19 21 19 -	 27 18 27 190
' Total Flt Equip Payments 75 30 40 140 150' 220 250 260 320 280 1690
Add: Flt, Equip Leases 21 80 140 - 30_- 80 90 90 150 120 780
Total Flight Equipment; 96 110 180. 140 180 300 340 350 470 400 2470
Ground Prop	 & Eq/Other
Grd Prop & Equip 10 20 25 25' 30 30 30 40 40 40 280
Debt Retirement 121 34+60 116+15 97 72 70 47 35+25 30+35 30+35 700
Dividends
- - 4 - 8 10 13 20 25 25 110
}
Other - 6 - (2) - _ - - - -
Total GPE & Other 131 120 160 120 110 110 90 120 130 130 1090 !
End Wkg Cap (3wks COE proj) 73 100 110 120 130 150 160 180_ 200 210 210 !
TOTAL CAPITAL NEEDS 300 330 450 380 420 560 590 650 800 740 3770
CAPITAL SOURCES ^§
Beginning; Working Capital 118 73 100 110 120; 130 150 160 180 200 70
(
Operations
- Net Earnings (Rept'd) (50) 45 20 30 60 80 90 110 120 120 680
- Depreciation/Amort 98 102 103 105 108 112 119 129 142 161 1080
-Property Sale/Other 33 20 17 15 12 10 21 21 18 19 150	 E
- Other 8 8 - 10
Total Operations 89 1.67 140 150 180 210 230 260 280 300 1920	 I
Financing Arrangements
- Senior Debt-Banks 40 - - 80 50 100 20 40 40 40 370
-	 -Into/Others - 50 - 80 40 170	 ¢
- Subord Debt 13 - 50 - 30 20 20 30 20 - 170
y - Leases (Cap @ AC Cost) 21 80 140 - 30; 80 90 90 150 120 780
-Deposits returnable 19 '10 20 - 10 20 30 30 50 40 210^
-Stock Sales - - - 40 - - - 40 80
' Tot Financing Arrangements 93 90 210 120 120 220 210 230 340 240 1780 a
TOTAL CAPITAL SOURCES 300 330 450 380 420 560 590 650 800 740 3770
FINANCING TO BE ARRANGED - 20 110 110 120 220 210 230 340 240 1560	 !
AERO AD: CAPITAL NEEDS & SOURCES 1976-1984 --
E A S T E R N
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"MONEYABILITY "
r
^
} Perilously close to bankruptcy at the end of 1975, Eastern is slowly starting to
strengthen its terribly weak moneyability posture. 	 Even with $45 MM of projected 1976
earnings, with no new outside money this year except for lease arrangements, and with $94
MR in debt retirement (see Capital Needs and Sources schedule), Eastern's key debt/equity
ratios are still considerably above the accepted norms at the end of 1976. 	 As the carrier's
crucial cash generation ratio gradually rises above the 5 mills norm, and EAL's earnings
continue to improve, all of its moneyability ratios by 1981 are finally below the danger
..l levels:
Over the nine year study period total debt plus leases increases $272 MP-1 with leases
°.. accounting for $263 MM.	 Actual bank debt will decline $55 MM as EAL borrows $370 MM from
` that source but manages to pay back $425 MM to the banks.
	
Eastern never qualifies under
the N.Y. State Insurance Law so that all other senior money will have to come from senior
note issues.
Not having any outside money available at this time, EAL has arranged two year renewable
lease deals for the six 727-200s and nine DC9-50s coming into the fleet.
	
Because of their
short term, these leases do not have to be included on Eastern's own statements, and thus
are, not included in the lenders' calculation of leased flight equipment as a Percentage of
total flight equipment.
	
For this study's purposes the leases are assumed to run for the full
14 years and are included in the lease ratio. 	 As can be seen on the accompanying chart, EAL
will be leasing 400 of its flight equipment at the end of 1977 which is way above the 33%
limit.
	
Because Eastern does not include .these short terra, leases, it will be able to lease
some of the L-1011s already on order:
With its operating ratio never going below 95'o Eastern is never able to earn the CAB's
12% ROI standard.
	
However, these projected results will have to make EAL's long-suffering
debt and equity holders happier than they have been during the dreadful past decade.
Eastern has been given anew life by a combination of the National strike and a booming
traffic surge this year. 	 With this new opportunity Colonel Borman hopes to make EAL a
viable, financially sound, carrier.
	 While it will never be as strong as Delta or Northwest,
Eastern's moneyability stance will become perfectly adequate if the airline can achieve
our projected earnings figures.
A
'
"MONEYABILITY"
;i
,

f
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M O N E Y A B I L 	 T Y	 -	 I N V E S T E D	 C A P I T A L A
(System - All Services)
1976-
3
}
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1984
IN'IESTEDCAPITAL UNIT Actual - - - - - - - - - -'- - - - - - - - - - P R 	 JECTE D - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Debt $ Mil 61
S ine or Debt -• Banks 358 284 196 216 231 298 302 309 306 303 (55)
Senior Debt-Insco/Other 226 212 175 146 117 68 114 98 167 196 (30)
Senior Debt-Leases!Cap'd 321 369 461 411 388 409 435 464 541 584 263
Senior Total - Reptd 584 496 371 372 348 386 416 407 473 499 (85)
seniordotal + Cap Lses 905 865 832 783 736 795 851 871 1014 1083 178
Subordinated 147 141 185 177 198 210 224 243 252 241 94 yi
Total Debt - Reptd 731 637 556 539 546 596 640 650 725 740 9
Total Debt + Cap Lses " 1052 1006 1017 950 934 1005 1075 1114 1266 1322+ 272
Equity
Stock " 290 335 351 421 473 543 620 750 845 940 650
Stock + Sub Debt 437 476' 536 598 671 753- 844 993 1097 1181 744'
Tot Inv Capital-Reptd " 1021' 972 907 960 1.019 1139 1260 1400 1570 1680 659
Tot Inv Capital + Cap Lses 1342 1341 1.368 1371 1407 1548 1695 1864 2111 2264 922 J'
j
ZZGhT EQUIPMENT " t:
Depx Cost 753 677 615 612 590 679 783 899 1135 1283 530 z
Depr'Cost + Mfr Deposit 613 734 688 724 770; 881 1016 1143 1328 1444 631 f
Depr Cast +	 " + Cap Lses 1134 1103 1149 1135 1158 1290 1451 1607 1869 2028 894
WORKING CAPITAL
a
Incl Cur Debt/Equiv Wks COE $Mill/Wks, 73/3 100/3 110/3 120/3 130/3 150/3 160/3 180/3 200/3 210/3 137/-
RATIO- A:IALYSISl/
	(G) UNIT/NOP2d
Sr Debt
Equity (Stk + Sub) 8-150% 207 182 155 131 110 106 101 88 92 92 (115) pts.
I' Sr Debt
Fl Eq (Net + Dep + Lse) 80%_ 80 78 72 69 64 62 59 54 54 53 (27) pts.
Cap Lses Share Flt'Eq 9-'33% 28 33 40 36 34 32 30 29 29 29 1	 pt
Total Debt
Stook Equity %-175% 363 300 290 226, 197 185 173 149 150 141 (222) pts. i
N Y State Ins Law
Fix Chg Cov - 12 P:os ;,^-1.5 0.7 1.2 1.1 1.1 1.3 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.52 1.45 0.75x
Fix ,Chg Cov - 5 yr Avg x-1.5 0.8 0.9 0.9 1.0 1.1 1_2 1.3 1.4 1.46 1.48 0.68x z
Oper Ratio (Airline) a 100 96 97 97 96 95 95 95 95 95 (5) pts.
Return On Inv (Corp)' 1.4 8.1 5.9 6.7 8.8 9.7 9.8 10.3' 10.0' 9.7 8.3	 pts.
Rev rr Tot Inv Cap' $ 1.21 1.36 1.48 1.65 1.78 1.80 1.81 1.81 1.76 1.79 0.58
:let Caa Cutts 2/ $ Mil 119 370 375 540 700 760 900 950 900 880 -
Fin Argd j
	 Argd' "ji 32/27 100/27 10/3
' Cash Generation
Flow per $ Equity	 Cj$ Chg-30 12 /(45) 27 /125 20 /(26) 20"/- 23/15 23/- 22/(4) 22/- 23 /-5 22/(4) 10/83
Rev Less COE	 Mills/% Chg-5.00
per ASK 3.22A43)
1
5.16/ 	60 4.46/(14) 4.23/(6) 5.06/20 5.6912 5.851 3 6.23(6 6.45V4 6.454(1) 3.23/100
MONEYABILITY
Note: (G)	 See Glossary. AERO:INV CAPITAL 1976-1984
1/ 12 months basis. 	 % Changes are from end of prior year.
Net Cap Courts = Next two years projected capital expenditures for 'flight2/ E A S T E R N
egc:ipmert and GPE
----mac.'^1
rNlin	 .. :; :	 ._.	 .. .::..^. ... ^.	 a.:....	 ....".^"..,ct.rr^...:._.dY[nl...v.:n:tu.N _ss...	 k	 ..;- ._..r3.. ^` ^4Y'^'
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- - - - - - - - - - - - - U.S, TRUNKS & PAA -: - - - - - - - - - 	 - - - -. - - - - - - -NATIONAL- - - - -	 - -	 - -	 - - - - - - - - -
ECONOMY USA Strong growth into 197'7.
	 Thereafter resumption of secular (	 DITTO
GNP real growth at 3-49 rate_	 Inflation rate to be about
5% per year in 1976 and 2977.- Thereafter inflation to drop
to 34-4x per year. 	 Unemployment rate to continue slow drop; ?.
consumer income and confidence to continue to advance.
s
World Turnaround from recession levels slower than U.S. with DITTO
inflation rates to continue above USA's. 	 - -
F, 1975-1980	 1980-19841975-1980
	
1980-1984
`. Growth Rate Comoounded "GRC" Growth hate Compounded "GRC"
TRAFFIC Dom RPMs (All Services) 	 7.5%	 6.1% Dom RPMs (All Services	 12.8%	 6.Q8
' Int'1'RPMs	 ("	 "	 )	 9.3%	 7.4% Int'l RPMs	 C'	 J	 13.5%	 7.2%
CAPACITY Asms ad hoc by carrier, but to generally increase at a
lower rate than RPMs. 	 1976-1977 and part of 1978's System ASMs (All Services)	 12.2%	 5.0%
increase mostly due to seating changes and maximum
utilization.
LOAD FACTOR Ad hoc by carrier; generally increasing between 3 and 4 LOAD FACTOR System (All Services) to increase from 51.5% in 1975
j percentage points. to 55.0% by 1984.
" 11976-1984 1976-1984
.
'GRC" "GRC"
1
a COST Labor (System)	 (Avg Compens/Empl)
	
7.7% Labor (System)	 (Avg Compens/Empl) 	 8.6%
INCREMENT Fuel
	 (	 )	 (C gal)	 5.3% Fuel 	 (C gal)	 8.98	 r
j RATE Other (	 )	 (industrial Prices)	 4.2% Other (
	 "	 )	 (Industrial Prices)	 (0.1)8
` YIELDS Carriers' need to stay at least even with general Yields - Dom (C/RPM) 	 4.2%
^	 7 inflationary trends, necessitates annual yield increases "'	 - Int'1	 (")	 3.28
between 3-5€ minimum.
EQUIPMENT Buys to concentrate on presently available aircraft through Buys concentrate on 727-200s, DC-10s and 180, Seat Medium Range
1980.	 By 1981-1982 new technology aircraft parametered in type aircraft to allow for continued growth and SM distribution
are:	 180 seat medium range type by r•rge and phase-out of 727-100s and older 727-200s not meeting
200 seat long range type requa. iments under FAR Part 3G.
to help with ,pressing need for fuel economies and to meet
the environmental imperative of the late 1970's and early
r
'
1980's.
MONEYABILITY Cost of Capital - Ad hoc by carrier. 	 Prime lending rate Ditto
' at 8-8.5% with carriers paying between ^i and 1 percent above
prime. rf
Availability of Capital -very restricted until deregulation Recovery from two lengthy strikes is very slow on an operating
debate is settled.	 Funds to come from banks, manufacturers basis.
	
However„ improvement in basic earnings position coupled
and through leasing. 	 Loans °rom insurance companies to no flight equipment purchases until 1979, allows carrier to
- restricted to a very few carriers, due to constrained , cash make interim accelerated repayments of bank revolver. 	 No new =
generation and earnings outlook. financing indicated until 1980, and by then all avenues of finan-
cing are open to carrier including borrowing from insurance
companies from 1977 on.-' No aircraft leasing parametered into a
study; this option to finance also available to N=,L. k
CAB Proposals under Aviation Act of 1975 not parametered into Ditto
study..	 AERO ADVANCED will be re-done, when and if the
various proposals have been enacted and a time frame is )
established.
.ttA,w= 13, 1976 AERO AD:	 PARA?MTER_S 1976-1984
1
NATIONAL
thi's yearlast fall. System traffic was down 12% for the first six months of	 vs. an industry
average of plus 12%) and July and August RPMs were also lower than last year l s figur-s. NAL's
management decided to scale , down its operation when it resumed service this January and to onlygradually increase its scope of service. In retrospect this may have been a major mistake. Delta
and Eastern were handed a lot of National's traffic and NAL so far has been unable to recapture all
of its market share. (NAL lost its popularity with travel agents by having two extended strikes in
the past two years). United, which also took on a strike last year, adopted a different post-strike
philosophy and resumed its full operation almost i mmediately. While suffering high losses initially,
UAL quickly managed to reduce the length of the typical post-strike recovery period.
Besides having to contend with its labor problems, National has had to face huge fuel price
increases this year, as its long-term contracts expired in the middle of last year. Unit fuel costs
wereup 61% for the lst 6 months of 1976 but should moderate to 48% for the full year. Unit labor
"other" costs on an ASM basis will be down 27% in 1976 ("other"costs will be up another 18%; however,
was down only 10% for the lst 6 mos 1976 but will decline further as NAL flew only 1.95 bil. ASMs durir
ve been reduced considerably as NAL has paid off some of itsthe 2nd half of 1975). Interest costs ha
bank debt and the prime rate has declined. NAL's 2Q '76 domestic yield increase was the largest in
-frills" fare. International yieldsthe industry as last year's figure was influenced by the "No
have been very weak and are down 8% for the 6 months ended June, 197G.
In order to insure a profit for fiscal 1976 NAL extended the depreciable lives of 49 of its 53
aircraft. The 727s are now written off over 16 years instead of 12 and the DC- 1 0s 17 years as opposed
to 14. NAL's $1424-M in calendar 197G operating earnings would be wiped out if 1975's depreciation/
amortization expense were,to be used this year.
In the 1976 annual report Chairman Maytag says that, "We are optimistic, yet cautious about the
outlook for fiscal 1977." With unit costs forecasted to increase only 8% in 1 ,977, which should trans-
late into a near doubling in operating earnings; we, too, are optimistic about NAL's near-term outlook.
Over the nine year study period NAL's earnings outlook is relatively good but not spectacular. The
carrier earns 4.4% on revenues but never earns 12% on its capital. By comparison in 1966 it earned
12% on sales and over 15% on capital. The key ingredients in NAL's success will be its tight control
of expenses, its excellent productivity,(it has much more flexible work rules in its union contracts
than does competitor Eastern), and its,fuel efficient fleet.
National hopes to have solved its labor problems by signing a no-strike agreement earlier this
year,, with ALEA which called for binding arbitration, a first in the industry. The carrier also
spon sored a seminar to promote better telations between management and the unions. With labor peace
guaranteed until 1978 NAL's management has plenty of time to put its new labor relations philosophy
to -work. NAL does face potential, problems as a result of the CAB's recent Transatlantic Case ruling
which would add competitors on the Atlantic route.
^
C77YdS_':^
E A R N I N G S
i
- calendar years -
1976-
Unit' 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1984
Actual - - __--_--'_-__ _P R 0 J E C T E D - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- -
Revenues
Passenger $Mil 281 407 468 522 578 641 707 777 854 934 5,888
Freight 12 20 23 26 28 32 35 38 42 47 291
Total Revenues " 358 447 510 570 630 700 770 850 930 1,020 6,427
Cash oiler Es E
Labor 108 166 185 210 232 257 285 316 353 394 2,398
Fuel 44 89 104 112 123 134 145 156 166 177 1,206
Other 138	 - 147 164 177 194 211 229 251 273 297 1,943
Total'COE
"
290 402 453 499 549 602 659 723 792 868 5,547
Depr/Acc^rt "  46 31 31 32 34 37 39 44 53 61 362i Total OPer EXP 336 433 484 531 583 639 698 767 _ 845 929 5,909
Oiler Earnings ^2^- 14 26 39 47 61 72 83 85 91 518
Gross Interest 7.7 19 7 5 6 9 12 16 24 29 118
Pre-Tax Earnings 5 4 19 34 41 52 60 67 61 62 400 1'
Inc- Tax $Mil - 1 8 14 16 21 24 26 24 25 159
Eff_ Rate % 8$ 25% 40% 40^ 40% 40% 40% 40% 40% 40% 40% f
1.
Net Earnings $Mil'
Airline Operations „ 5 3' 11 20 25 31 36 41 37 37 241 ^'.
"Nettings^ 6 6 4 2 3 4 4 4 8 8 43 t
Reptd to Stockholders 11 9 15 22 28 35 40 45 45 45
l
284 a
1^
RATIOS
Traffic (All Services) Bil/%Chg
RPys - DOM / 3.58/(7) 4.90/37 5.40/10 5.75/7 6.12/7 6.52/6 6.91/6 7.33/6 7.77/6 8.20/6 4;62/9.6GRC
RPMs - System ^	 /	 ' 3.88/(6) 5.30/37 5.84/10 6..23/7 6.64/7 7.08/7 7.51/6 7.98/6 8.46/6 8.94/6 5.06/9.7GRC a
ASMS -- System / 7.53/(7) 10.9/45 11.7/7 12.2/4 12.8/5 13.4/5 14.0/5 14.8/6 15.5/5 16.3/5 $..77/9.0GRC
Load Factor - System $ 51.5 48.6 50.0 51.1 52.0 52.8 53.5 54.0 54.5 55.0 3.5pts
Yield - Dom MPM/%Chg 7...34/(1) 7.76/ 6 8.15/ 5 8.52/5 8.86/4 9.21/4 9.58/4 9.92/3 10.27/4 10.63/3 3.29/4.2GRC
Yield'- System / 7.27/(1) 7,.62/ 5 8.01/ 5 8.37/5 8.71/4 9,06/4 9.41/4 9.74/3, 10.09/4 10.45/3 3.18/4.1RC fj
COST I*7CREMENT (COE) i3
--Labor (Non-Add) SMil/	 $ 1/1 25/18 15/9 17/9 17/8 16/7 18/7 21/7 23/7 ,' 25/7 177 a
- Fuel ^ /	 " 10/31 29/48 8/8' 7/6 6/5 5/4 5/4 7/4 6/4 6/4 79
- Other	 " /  13/11 ( 53)/( 27) 6/4 7/4 7/4 7/4' 8/3 8/4 10/3 10/4 10
- Total ^ / 1 / NM 29/8 31/7' 30/6 28/6 31/6 36/5, 39/5 41/6 266
Weighted Index (1967=100) No /%Chg 197/8 226/NM 245/8 262/7 279/6 295/6 312/6 329/5 347/5 367/6 170/7.2GRC
AFRO AD:EARNINGS.1976-1984
N A T I O N A L
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C O M M E N T A R Y
"FLIGHT EQUIF24ENT"
In selling ;,its two 747s to Northwest earlier this year National has joined Continental as
the only trunk carriers to operate just two types of aircraft."-National's 727s and DC--10s are
well suited to its route structure which has the shortest average flight length in the industry. y.
By increasing seating (the equivalent of 5 727s) and utilization on its existing fleet,
National will not need any additional capacity until 1979.	 However, it is possible that NAL's F
a management may order some 727-200s before then in order to stage a flight frequency battle with
- its two main competitors in the strategic Northeast-Florida market. 	 We order only 4 DC'-•10-10s
for NAL'as the 4 DC-10-30s on hand will be able to supply all of the capacity needed on the
Atlantic.	 (NAL is using less than	 of the intercontinental DC-10s on the route this year.)
Our buys concentrate in the medium-to-short range where NAL flys about 500 of its ASMs.
' Starting in 1982' we see the carrier replacing its 727-100s with down-ranged 727-200s, and
replacing the stretched 727s with the new advanced technology 180 seat aircraft. 	 By the end of
1984 our study shows that National will still be flying 19 727-200s that do not meet the current
environmental restrictions.	 To completely replace, these aircraft would cost approximately $350" =;
MH in 1984 dollars.
N.B. Our 3.5 percentage point increase in the system load factor between 1975-1984 is the
second lowest we have projected for any carrier.	 Assuming that our traff i c forecast is correct,
it is obvious that National would have to decrease its ASM generation per aircraft (remove seats,
lower hourly utilization) or buy less airplanes than we have predicted if it is to raise its
load factor above 55%. {
pp.
"FLIGHT EQUIPMENT"
9
eFLIGHT EQUIP14ENT - PURCHASE / REMOVALS / PAYMENTS / LEASES
GROUND PROPERTY & EQUIPMENT (projected costs)
1976-
'.	 Unit 	 1975	 1976	 1977 1978	 1979	 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1984
PURCHASES/L_-ASES (L)	 Actual - - -	 - - - - - - -P R 0 J E C 	 E D - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Additions	 No. A/C
727=200	 - _	 _ -	 4	 4 - _ _ _ 8
DC-10	 4 - -	 - 2 - - 2 4
180 Seat M/R	 _ _ _	 _	 _ _ 5 6 4 15
Total Additions	 4 - -	 4	 4 2 5 6 6 27-
Total Cost A/C Typel/	S Mill
727.-200	
_ -
-	
46	 48
-
_
- - 94
DC-10	 84- -	 - -	 - 62 _ 71 133
180 Seat M/R 139 167 117 423
Total Cost Aircraft
	 84 -	 - -	 46	 48 62 139 167 T8 —SVT
Removals	 No A/C
DC-B-61/747	 2 2	 - -,	 - - - - - 2
727-100	 - -	 -
- - 6 7 - 13
727-200	 - -	 - -	 - - - 6 6
Total Removals	 2 2	 -, -	 -	 - - 6- —^- --^- 21
P A Y M E N T S 4/
Flight Eq Payments	 $ Mill
Advance Deposits	 1.28 -	 7 14	 30	 40 42 39 30 30 230
Delivery _	 3 -	 - -	 32'	 34 43 97 117 132 460
Spares,_Modifs etc	 „	 1
— Z	 -_3_ 6	 _. B	 6 .5 4 13 so
Total Flt Eq Payments	 "	 32 2	 10 20	 _ 70	 _ 90 90 140 160 170 74p
Total Flt Eq Leases 2/	 - -	 - -	 - - - - - -
Total Flight Equipment	 32' 2	 10 20	 70	 80 90 140 160 170 740
GP.D, PROP, & EQUIP 3/	 10 8	 10 10	 10	 10 20 20 20 30 140
F.02'?:S:(L-Leased, all others 708 purchased) MR = Medium Range.
L/ Cost per Aircraft TvRe - number x cost per aircraft incl base price + CFE/MC/spares. SH&E derived.
Leases--	 None. AERO AD: FLT. EQ/GPE 1976-1984
3/ Grd. Prop & Equip. - Subject to management reprogramming.
: / Par_;ents - (SH&E derived; reflectescal&tion) N A T 1 0 N A L
Advance Deposits - pre-delivery @ 30% of tout price'.
Delivery - balance remaining @ aircraft acceptance
Soares,Modifs', etc'- @ 104 of aircraft cost(or derived)
.........	 .» .. .. ..........	 ...:...-._Y ._.._. mum,«^n_..x..a.
	 a..
C O M M E N T A 	 Y
"CAPITAL NEEDS AND SOURCES"
With no aircraft on order, and none needed before 1979, National will not have to
borrow any money for three years, 1976-1978. 	 As a matter of fact, the carrier will be
able to prepay close to $100MM of its outstanding revolving credit as cash flow together
with the proceeds from the sale of its two 747s farexceeds the carrier's meager needs
o^^er the next few years. 	 In 1976 'working capital is temporarily raised to 5 weeks of
cash`pperating expenses (it was 7 weeks at 6/30/76) before returning to its normal 3
_ weeks' level in 1977.
Of the $420MM in projected borrowings the majority will come from a new enlarged
bank revolving credit, agreement. 	 National has never borrowed from insurance companies,
but except in 1976, it does qualify under N.Y. State Insurance Law. 	 All avenues
of 'financing, including leasing and equity offerings, are available to National's financial
officer.
By extending the depreciable lives of 49 of its 53 aircraft NAL has improved its
reported earnings, but has weakened cash flfiow. 	 As an example, for the 12 months ended
12/31/75 NAL charged off $37.4MM to flight equipment depreciation vs. the $33.6mm the Y!
CAB allowed for rate making purposes.' After the accounting change, NAL charged off only
$26.7MM for the 12 months ended 6/30/76 vs. the $34.7MM the CAB's standards allowed.
	
Under-
depreciating its assets is one of the major problems facing the airline industry today.
Between 1967-1975 National's capital spending for flight equipment and GPE totaled
$636MM.	 Our 1976-1984 forecast shows the carrier spending $880MM for the same items, but s
if these'outlays_are discounted at a 5% rate, the resulting present value is only $667MM,
or very close to what was 'spent in the previous 9 years.
Recap:	 1976-1984'
Need's:	 $1.2 billion (62% flight equipment, 12% GPE, 17% debt retirement".
sources:	 $750 million or 63% from operations (24'o earnings, 30% depreciation).
$420 million or 35% new finan-cing (33% to be arranged).
"CAPITAL NEEDS AND SOURCES"
.
6LTS	K, ., 	 -	 ,,.+.....^,_....
a
Col. M"M ass,
CAPITAL NEEDS AND SOURCES ($ MILL)
- calendar years -
1976-
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1984
CAPITAL NEEDS ACTUAL - r - - - - - - -- - - -- -	 P' R O J E C T E D - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - _ - - _
Flight Equipment Payments
- Advance Deposits 28 - 7 14 30 40 42 39 30 30 230
- Delivery 3 - - - 32 34 43 97 117 132' 460
_ Spares, 14odif. etc. 1 2 3 6 8 6 5 4 13 8 50
Total Flt Equip Payments 32 2 10 20 70 80 90 140 160 170 .740
Add- Flt Equip Leases
1
Total Flight Equipment 32 2 10 20 70 80 90 140 160 170 740
Ground Prop	 & Eq/Other
Grd'Prop & Equip 10 8 10 10 10 10 20 20 20 30 140
Debt Retirement 17 4+49 4+30 4+20 4 24 32 31 1 - 203	 4 '
Dividends 4 4 4 6 6 6 8 9 9 10 62Other: - 3 2 - - - - - - - 5
'	 Total GPE &Other 31 68 50 40 20 40 60 60 30 40 410
End tikq Cap'- (3wks' COE prof) 30 40 30 3U 30 40 40 40 50 50 50
CAPITAL NEEDSTOTAL 93 110 90 90 120 160 190 240 240 260 1,200
C_7—DITAL SOURCES
Beginning Working Capital' 25 30 40 30 30 30 40 40 40 50 30	 ••
Operations
- Net Earnings (Rept'd) 11 9 15 22 28 35 40 45 45 45 284
- Depreciation/rmort 46 31 31 32 34 37 39 44 53 61 362
- Property Sale/Other 11 40 4 2 - 3 1 11 12 21 94
- 
Other _ _
__
(2) _ - - - t^
Total Operations 69 80 50 60 60 80 80 100 110 130 750
Financing Arrangements
-
30 50 70 80 40 10 280
- Senior Debt-Banks - - - 50
-Insco/Others - - -
 20
20 140
Subord Debt - - -
- 
Leases (Cap @ AC Cost)
- Deposits returnable
- Stock Sales - - t
-
-
-
30 50 70 100 90 80 420 Toc Financing Arrangements -
TOTAL'CAPITAL SOURCES 93 110 90 90 120 160 190
240 240 260 1,200
- -
-
50 70 100 90 80 390FI,VAtICING TO BE ARRADIGED - -
AERO AD: CAPITAL NEEDS & SOURCED 1976-1984
i
N A T I O N A L
^a
r.; C O M M E N T A R Y
a
"MONEYABILITY"
Even though it has suffered through two long, costly strikes during the past two years,
National still retains one of the premiere "Moneyability" postures in the industry.
	 With
excess cash flow forecast for the 1976-1978 period (see Capital Needs and Sources schedule)
NAL's ratios will improve even further during the next few years.
Cash generation per ASM does decline precipitously this year before bouncing back in
€
1977 and then crossing, the important 5`Mills barrier in 1978. 	 National's cash flow permits z
it to take on less than one dollar of debt for every additional dollar of equity during the
1976-1984 period.
National's operating ratio never falls below 90o which results in the carrier never
oCAB ' s standard of 	 on its capital.	 The revenue to invested capital ratio goesearning the ' 	l2-s A
up dramatically over the next few years because of the shrinking investment base. 	 With new
borrowings forecast from 1979 on, the investment base swells and the aforementioned ratio
declines steadily.
t
Except in 1976, when it temporarily fails to qualify under the N.Y. State Insurance Law,
National has all avenues of financing available to it.
	 As was predicted in last year's
., Aero Advanced study, National did extend its current 'bank revolving credit agreement to
terminate now in 1982. 	 Because of its strong balance sheet and the absence of JT3-D powered
aircraft in its fleet, National would have relatively little problem if there were to be an
immediate tigheninq of environmental standards.
J
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"MONEYABILITY"
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M O N 	 Y A B I L I T Y	 I N V E S T E D	 C A P I T A L
(Systen - All Services)
1976-
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1984
1VJr-STED CAPITAL UNIT Actual - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - P R O J E G T E D" -' - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - _ - - _ - _ - - - -
Debt $ Mil
Senior Debt -Banks " 149 100 70 50 80 110 150 200 240 250 101
Senior Debt-lnsco/Other " - -. - - - - - - 50 100 100
Senior Debt-Leases,Cap•d " _ -' _ - -' _ _ _ - - -
Senior Total'- Reptd " 149 100 70 50 80 110 150 200 290 350 201
Senior`Total -+ Cap Lses " 149 100 70 50 so 110 150 200' 290 350 201
Subordinated. " 23 19 16 12 8 4 - 2 21 20 40 17
Total 'Debt -'Reptd 172- 119 ;" 86 62 68 114 152 221 310 390 218
Total Debt +Cap Lses 172 119 86 62 88 114 152 221 390 2
Equity
Stock : " 192 197 208 224 246 275 307 343 379 414 222
Stock '+ Sub Debt " 215 216 224 236 254 279 309 364 399 454' 239. i
Tot Inv Capital-Reptd 364 316 294 286 334 389 459 564 689 804 440
Tot Inv Capital + Cap Lses 364 316 294 286 334' 389 459 564 804_ =sue
i
'FLIGHT EQUIPMENT "
Depr Cost 374 318 293 268 287 306 337 435 552 684 310
Depr Cost + Mfr Deposit 374 318 300 289 325 369 424 819 616 722 348
Depr Cost +	 " + Cap Lses, 374 318 300 289 325 369 424 519 616 722 4348
WORKING CAPITAL
Intl Cur Debt/Equiv Wks COE $Mill/Wks 30/5 40/5 30 /3 30 /3 30 /3 -40/3 40/3 40 /3 50 /3 50/3 20 /(2)
PATIO 7IIIALYSISL/	 (G) UNIT/NOR*1 a
Sr Debt -
Equity (Stk'+ Sub) i-150$ 69 46' 31 21 32 39 49 55: 73 77 Bpts.
Sr Debt c
Fl Eq''(Net + Dep + Lse) ♦- 80% 40 31' 23 17 25 30 35 39 47 48 apts.
Cap
 Lses Share Flt Eq B- 33%
-
-
-
- - -
- - -
- - 3
Total' Debts
stock 'Equity' 9-175% 90 60 41 28 36 41 50 64 82 94 Opts. l
N Y State Ins Law
Fix Chg Cov - 12 Mos ::- 1.5 1.2 1.1 1..8 2.4 2.6 2.8 2.8 2.8 2.3 2.2 1.0x
Fix Chg Cov - 5 yr Avg x- 1.5 1.7 1.6 1.6 1.7 1.8 2.1 2.5 2.7 2.7 2.6 0.9x
Oper Ratio (Airline) +t 94 97': 95 93 93 91 91 90 91 91 (3)pts. r';
Return On Inv (Corp) i 7.5 6.0 7.5 9.4 10.2 11.3 11.3 10.8 10.0 9.2 1.7pts.
Rev c Tot Inv Cap $ 0.98 1.41 1.73 1.99 1.89' 1.80 1.68 1.51 1.35 1.27 0.29
Ret,cap Co=ts
	
2/ $ Mil 10 50 110 170 200 270 340 380 400 370 -
Fin Argd / i Argd "/i 51>/410 72 /144 72/65 62 /36 9 /5
f	 Cash Generation
C	 Flow per $ Equity	 0/t Chg-30 24--/(20) 16 /(33) 19/19 22 /16 23/5 24/4 24/- 23/(4) 23/-' 22/(4) (2)/(8)
Rev Less COE
	
Mills/i Chg-5.00
per ASK. 9.02/(20) 4.15/(54) 4.88/18 5.79/19 6.32/9 7.30/16 7.90/8 8.61/9 8.93/4 9.34/5 0.32/4
1976-1984
AEROi4oneyability-Inv.	 CapitalNote:. (G)	 See Glossary.
l/	 12 months basis.	 t Changes are from end of prior year. N A T I 0 N A L
f	 Net Cap. Coats = Next.two years projected capital' expenditures for flight equipment and GPE. - - )
-d	
^ I
4«m	 r.
P A R 	 M E T E R S
-.
- - - - -	 - - - - - 
U.S. TRUNKS & PAA - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -NORTHWEST-. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - z
ECONOMY USA'- Strong growth into 1977.	 Thereafter resumption of , secular GNP DITTO
real growth at 3 -0, rate. 	 Inflation rate to be about 58 per
year in 1976 and 1977.	 Thereafter inflation to drop to 3-5-4$
i
per year.	 Unemployment rate to continue slow drop; consumer
income and confidence to continue to advance.- a
World Turnaround from recession levels slower than U.S. with DITTO
666 inflation rates to continue above USA's:
f 1975-1980	 1980-1984 1975-1980	 1980-1984
Growth Rate Compounded "GRC" Growth Rate Compounded "GRC"
TRAFFIC Dom RPMs (All Services)
	 7.58	 6.18 Dom RPMs (All Services)	 7.9%	 6.0%
Intl RPMs (r•
	
}	 9.38	 7.48 Int'l RPMs	 ( ^^	 „	 )	 8.1%	 6.6%
CAPACITY AS.'is'ad hoc by carrier, but to generally increase at a lower
rate than RPMs.
	
1976-1977 and part of 1978's increase mostly System ASMs (All Services) 	 5,58	 5.6%
I due to seating changes and maximum utilization.
LOAD FACTOR Ad hoc by carrier; generally increasing between 3 and 4 LOAD FACTOR System (All Services) to increase from 46.44
percentage points. in 1975 to 53.08 by 1984.
1976-1984 1976-1984
„GRC" °GRC"'
COST Labor (System)	 (Avg Compens/Empl)	 7.78 Labor (System)	 (Avg Compens/Empl)	 8.58 )
INCREMENT Fuel	 (	 )	 (c gal)	 5.38 Fuel	 (	 "	 )	 (0 gal)	 4.68
RAE Other ' (	 }	 (,Industrial- Prices)	 4.2% Other (	 )	 (Industrial Prices)	 4.64
s,
YIELDS Carriers' need to stay at least even with general Yields - Dom (C/RPM) 	 3.98
inflationary, trends„ necessitates annual yield increases - Int'l	 (")	 4.9$
between 3-58 minimum.
EQUIPMENT Buys to concentrate on presently available aircraft through Buys concentrate on advanced 727-200's, DC-10-40's, 747's and
1980-	 By 1981-1982 new technology aircraft parametered in 180 seat medium range type to allow for growth and phase-out
are:	 180 seat medium range type of 707-320 fleet, 727-100's and older 	 727-200's not meeting
200 seat long range type' requirements under FAR Part 36.	 Carrier has, next to Continental,
to help with pressing need for fuel economies and to meet the strongest widebody posture (over 708 of ' ASMs in 1976) of all
environmental imperative of the late 1970's and early 1980's. domestic airlines.
'	 MONEYABILITY Cosh of Capital - Ad hoc by carrier.	 Prime lending rate DITTO
at 8-8.58 with carriers paying between 'S and I percent above
prime.
Availability of Capital - very restricted until deregulation Superb earnings posture together with depreciation and aircraft
debate is settled.	 Funds to come from banks, manufacturers sales, allows carrier to repay all.debt currently outstanding and
and through leasing.	 Loans from insurance companies to finance all needs from internal sources.	 Carrier has excess
restricted to a very few carriers, due to constrained.cash working capital during study period, which should be used for !
generation and earnings outlook. diversification or in a merger. i
CAB Proposals under Aviation Act of 1975 not parametered into DITTO
study.	 AERO ADVANCED will be re-done, when and if the Impact of Transatlantic Route case not parametered into study
various proposals have been enacted and -a time frame is pending final decision.
' established.
AERO AD- PARAMETERS 1976-1984
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"EARNINGS"
Northwest's 1976 operating earnings will be almost double last year's figure, but due
to ,a higher tax rate (the carrier will not be benefiting from the inve stment  tax credit
e	 will not be as spectacular. 1977 looks to be a record year forthis year), the net result 1 	 	 y
NWA as earnings approach $100 million.
RPM growth on a system basis should be up about 12% this year, and combined with a
5% yield increase, will produce a 17% gain in passenger revenues. NWA's cargo business
is booming and revenues in that area will be up 43. Total operating revenues will
approach $1 billion this year.
NWA's unit costs are expected to rise 9% this year with labor costs leading the way
with a 18`o increase. The big jump in labor costs is the result of the numerous .-. 'ective
bargaining agreements that 'NWA 'signed last year. NWA's unit fuel cost will rise only
4% as the carrier has already 'bitten the bullet in this area and is paying more than the
industry average. The airline is keeping ASMs in check this year which should produce a
2.1% increase in the carrier's 'load factor.
Northwest's excellent long-term earnings prospects (over 20% GRC) are more a result
of strict controls Over expenses rather than an extraordinary rise in revenues. Labor
cost increases are held in check through the unusually high producitivity of NWA's employees
(1.95 MM ASM/employee vs. an
 industry average of 1.15 in 1975). Having wide-bodies fly over
70% of its ASMs, NWA has one of the most fuel efficient fleets and is better able to
absorb any fuel price increases. The carrier's hard-nosed, management is well-known for
despising overhead, and as a result, NWA's "Other" costs are the lowest in the industry
(1.17 /ASM in the first quarter of 1976 vs. an
 industry average of 1.55G)
	
Northwest's
equipment and its management of costs permits the carrier to make substantial profits
while flying with the lowest load factor in the industry... For the 12 months ended 3/31/76
NWA's,system scheduled passenger break-even load factor was 41.6% while the industry averaged
55.0%
Other ,
 items which keep expenses down and profits up include management's decision to
strive for commonality among its . aircraft ' which reduces inventories, maintenance, and
training costs;. As Northwest pays off its debt (see other schedules) interest expense is
reduced to zero and totals only $64 MM for the nine years. The carrier records substantial
capital gains on its used aircraft as it writes the planes off quickly, and sells them as
`	 soon thereafter as possible.
Even with this optimistic forecast it should be noted that NWA's peak profit margin
is 10.903 in 1982 and its highest 'ROI is 14.3% in the same year.. .Back in 1965 NWA earned
17.4 on every dollar of revenue and the carrier made more than 2Q% on its investment
between 1964-1966.
x  :: f ' v	 Y.	 ,_: i	
-'-'try,	 f	 - t	 ^	 a	 Y- —r. :y 	..t	 --`^	
E
	
—•y	 r'- .ra	 r.-y	 a . r..ss	 --a	 >	 h^--"-4	 '^'-*t
Actual
-	 - - ^ - - - - - - - - - - - P r o j e c t e d - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Revenaes
Passenger $Mil '579 795' 896 1002 1113 1238 1370 1504 -	 1659. 1817 11,394
Freight'i 89- 127 149 168 187 207 228 250 276 303. 1,:895
^	 '	 Total Revenues " 815 970 1100 1230 1365 1500 1670. .1830 2030 2230 13,925
Cash Oper' Exg
Labor " 2.23 265 295 330 369 413 463 517 578 697. 3,8'7
Euel 186 208 227 254 2:72 291 316, :142' 373 413 2,696
tY,her " 255 299 328 361 398 938 480 5'21 571. 627. 9.023.
2bta2 GOE b66 ?72 850 945 1039 1142 i259 138.'.1 1522 1687 10,596
i	 ,:	 Depr/Amort " 99 102 102 105 105 106. 116 131 149 171
__
1,087.
-	 Total Open Exp 765 ::874 952 1050 1144 1248 1375 1511 1671 1858 }1,683
Opex. Earnings ^^ 96 196 160 221- 252 295- 319 359 372 2,242
Gross Interest ^^ 19 18 12 8 8 8 6 3 1 - 64
t	 Pre-Tax Earnings 31 7S 136 172 213. 244 289 316 358 372 2,178.
Znc_ Tax $Mil 2 37- S7 78 96 110 130 142 161 167 :978
Eff. Rate ^ 8^ 47$ 42^ 45^ 45$ 45^ 45$ 45$ 45# 458 45t'	 ;;
`	 Net 'Earnings"
- Airine'Operations $Mil. 29 41 79 94 117 134 15,9	 ': 174 197 205 1,200
^	 'Nettngs" 14 19 21 26 23 26 ^1 26 23 25 210
`	 Reptd.to Stockholders 43 60 100 120 140: 160 180 200 220 230 1,410
RATIOS
Traffic i^1'Services) Bl/BChq ,
RF;15 -' DOM " / 7,0/_2 7.'92/13 8.48/.'7. 9_05,	 7 9.64/ 7 10.3/'7 20.9/ 6 11.5/ 6 12.2/ 5 13.0/ 5 5.95/7.0 GRC
'RP^s -, System ^ " /	 " 9..98/	 - 11.'2/1Z 12.0/ 7 12,8/ 7 13.7/_7 14.6/ 7 15...6/	 7 16.5/ 6 17.5/ 6 18.6/ 6 8.62/7.2 .GRC
AS^Ls -:System "	 /	 "	 : 21,5/ 3 23..0/	 7 23.9/ 4 25.1/`5 26:5/ 6 28.1/ 6 29.6/ 6 31.2/ 5 33.0/ 6 35.0/ 6 13.5/ 5.6 GRC
Load £actor -.System: $ 46.4 I	 48.5 50.0 51:.0 51.5 52.0 52.5 53.00 53.0 53.0 6.6pts.
Yield -Dom CRPM/9Chg 7.20/ 2 7.45/ 3 7.81/ 5 8.16/ 5 8.ae/ 4 8..82/ 4 9..16/ 4 9.44/ 3 9.79/ 4 10.13/ 3 2.93/3.9 GRC
'Yield -System ," /	 " 6.80/ 5 7.13/ 5 7.49/ 5 7.82/ 4 B. 14/ 4 8.46/ 4 8.80/ 4 9...10/	 3 9.45/ 4 9.79/ 3 2,'99/4.1 GRC
COST ZNCRE?^NT (COE)
Labor (Nona-Add) SMl/	 +i 25/12 41/18 23/ 8 24/ 8 25/ 7 26/ 7 33/ 7 33/ 7 39/ 7 42/ 7 284
-Fuel "' /	 " ' - 27/17 8/ 4 14/.7 15/ 6 13/ 5 11/ 4 13/ 4 13/ 4 14/ 4 17/ 4 118
Other "	 /	 " ' 19/ 8 25/ 9 ' 17/ 6 17/ 5 16/ 4 16/ 4 18/' 4. 16/ 3 20/ 4 2]/ 3 166
'= Total	 » ' " / 71/14 74/ 9 541 7 56/ 7 54	 5 53/ 5 62/ 5 621 5 73/ ' S 80/ 5 568
7^Teighted Index (1967=100) No /$Chg 216/14 236/ 9 - 252/ 7 270/ 7 284/ 5 298/ 5 314/ 5 330/ 5 348/ 5 367/ 5 151 6	 GRC
II
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EARNINGS 1976-1984
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, FLIGHT EQUIPMENT"_
In this year's annual - report President Nyrop writes, "fleet superiority represent
	
°	 the single biggest marketing advantage an airline can have in a highly competitive industry."
In fo lowing this philosophy h?WA has assembled one of the most modern fleets in the industry..
Nearly three-quarters of the carrier's ASMs are flown with wide-bodied equipment. 	 `
Northwest's consistent profitability together with its extremely . conservative accounting
policy ,727s and 707s are 'depreciated over-ten .;years,: DC-lO and 7476 over 15 years) has
permitted the carrier to turn-aver its fleet at a much faster rate than other airline .
Between 1955 and 1975 NWA purchased 2s6 aircraft awhile selling 139 .planes, an average of
17 aircraft transactions per year. Because of managment's philosophy to continually
upgrade its equipment,::NWA will be:'one of .the least vulner«ble airlines to environmental
restrictions. Ir. our study only five 727-200s in NWA's 1954 fleet are not meeting FAR Part
	
'	 3fi. To replace these aircraft :would cost about. $90 MM in 1984 dollars. With all of the
	
^	 exces cash that it will be building up (see other three. schedules) NWA will have no
	
F	
.problem in meeting any tighter_ng of environmental'standards.
Notess We have not increased eating on an:1 aircraft until 1979-195D. We believe that
NWA will be ordering some, more 747 freighters in the early 1.980's as the plane
has worked out very well for the airline in . 'the year that it .has been in service.
The effects of the recent CAB ruling in the Transatlantic cash have not been
parametered into the study. If ^^'^3A does gain the new European routes, our wide-
bodied orders would have to be increased. according to our . projections, (see
other hree schedules) Northwest will be an over-financed`carrer starting in
the next few years-. As a result,. we wouldnot be surpr ed if she carrier buys
E
	
	 more >aircraft than cte had predicted and enters the charter market -in a much
bigger way.
FLIGHT EQUIPMENT"
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F>LZGHT EQUIPE'.ENT -PURCHASE 1 RIdOVALS / PAYMENTS /LEASES
k{
' 	 GROUND PROPERTY & EQUZPAIENT (projected costs)
.Unit	 1975	 .1976. 1977	 ..1978 1979	 1980
-	 - -
	 - -	 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
	 -
1985=
1981 1982. 1963 1984 1984
Y
PURCIiASES/LEASES (L)
	 Actual -	 -P R O J E G T E D--
Additions	 No. A/C
^^	 727-200	 8 - 4*	 5 '4	 4 -- _ - 17	 11	 ^
747F/747	 3F 2* 1F* 1 3 -
=
7
^;.^
	
180 Seat M/R	
- - -	 - -	 - -
8 6 4 18	 ,^i
DC-10-40	 - - -	 - -	 - - - 5 3 8	 ^	 „trf':;
Total Additions
	 11 2 S	 5 5	 4 3 8 11 7 50	 ^^ s
a,^',
' Total Cost A/C Type2^ 	 $Mill` .,. ;
'727-200'	 66 -	
-
41	 55 46	 '48 _ _ - _ 190
747F/747	 90 37 39	 - 44	 - 148 - - - 268
^'! ^ '180 Seat M/R	 - - -	 - -	 - - 212. 167 117 496
DC-10-40 - -	 - - - 186 17 303
dotal Cpst Aircraft
	
"-^b^ ^T -""SD-	 —"55' 96"	 X13 ^8' ^T ^3' — -4^ IZ5'^
F
Removals	 No A/C a
f	 707-320' B/C	 3 3 4	 3 -	 - - - - - 10
727 100	 - 2 4	 6 6	 7 7 - - - 32
727-200	 _	
_'
-
-	 - _	
-
_ 6 6 6 18
Total. Removals	 ^"^. -^ ,8.'-	 —3 —G'	 ^'T ^^ ' ^i —mss ^T 60
PAYMENTS 4/
;...Flight Eq Payments	 $Mill
` Advance Deposits 	 37 20 i6	 28 43	 67 80 77 70 B0 480
Delivery
	
114 37 56	 38 63	 34 103 149 247 164 890
.Spares, Mods eta.	 °	 4 3 B	 4 4	 9 17 14 13 16 90
Total Flt Eq'Payments	 "	 155 60 80	 70 110.	 110. 2D0 240 330 260 1460
'Total Flt Eq Leases 2/	 - _ _	 _ -	 _ _ _
Total Flight Equipment 	
_153 60 80	 70 110	 110 200 240 330 260 1460
jjj_
I'	 IGRD, PP,OP,	 &EQUIP^3/	 "	 10 10 10	 1D BO	 20 20 30 30 "30 180
; P:O^ES c (L-Leased, alI others 70^ <purchased) M/R = Diedium range; F = E'reighter.
1/ Cost oer Aircraftr Type - numhe	 x cost per aircraftin^lbase price f CFE/MC/spares. SH&E derived.
2/ Leases -'NONE. AERO ADt FLT. EQUIP/GPE 1976-1984	 ;,
$/ Grd'. Prop ,E Equip. -Subject	 p management reprogramming.
4/
 Pay^feats -:(SH&E derived;- reflect escalation) ^ f	 ...Advance Deposits.- pre-delivery @ 3D8 of unit price. N O R T H W E S,T ^
Delivery - halance remaining @ airc:raft acceptance
Spares,Modifs, ggc - @ 10^ of-aircraft cost.{or,3erived)
_, Firm Order
<, -	 G'
^,.—^
y
-,--.. -.... -.,.r
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	 -- ------	 --	
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'	 ^ "CAPITAL NEEDS ANI1 SOUECES" ?
Based on>our earnings 'and flight equipment forecasts, Northwest wil 	 not have to borrow
,", any money 'through 1984 to meet, its $2.? b 	 lion capital needs. 	 In fact, NWA will be genera-
,e ting more.:cash than it needs and we have had to increase working capi^^-.a1 above the three
weeks norm to absorb tree excess-cash.
^, 'Northwest's fantastic cash flow (its cash generation ratio reached 15.5 mills} is
a product of excellent earnings and a conservative depreciation policy. 	 In 1975 NWA
charged $7 t^IM more ta'depreciation expense than. it would have if it had followed the. CAB's
^, depr'eciaton 'standard,	 A..unique feature of NWA's cash flow is that earnings account for
^', more than 50^;of it; whereas with most carriers, depreciation is the major . .component of
cash flow.:	 The airlines° continual sale of used aircraft is an additional steady source
of funds.
We have. prematurely ,retired NTn7A's $200 MM bank revolver by the end. of 1977. 	 Flowever,
we did not prepay the existing $100 1^^
	
arm loan which expires in 1983e	 Tlie carrier .
 could.,
:g of course, prepay'this'debt based cn caur projections of excess working capital starting in	 - "'
,,. y977 . > Dwidends are increased .almost five-fold during the .study period.n4
NWA's ;financial officer has a problznt rairly unique among tYie airlines -what , to do ;
with excess cash.	 nle have assumed that it will be used for short..-tErm money-market °'
investments, but we would not be surprised if NWA buys more aircraft than we have projected
(see Flight Equipment commentary},°or if it div_rsifies outside of ^.he industry.
• In putting these capi al expenditures in perspectve^it should be remembered that NWA
^spent:$1.4 billion on flight and ground •equipment over the last nine. year s.
	 Over the next
nine years we have prof acted ,outlags of $1.6 billion, but if .these 'expenditures are dis-
counted at a 5o rate, the resulting present .value is only $l.3 blliom, or 'less than
Northwest 'spent between 196.6-1975.
Recap. ':	 1976-19 84 &
^^f heeds;:	 $2.7I billion {54$ flight equipment,...7^ GPE, 10$-debt retirement, 10$ dividends, ^^and excess working capital 15$).	 •
4 Sources:	 $2.70 billion or 100	 a=rom operations (52$ earnings, 40$ depreciation, and 7$
^.
property sale/other).
r
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"CAPITAL' NEEDS AND SOURCES"
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CAPITAL NEEDS AtTD SOURCES, ($ 2•iILL)
- calendar years -`
1976-
1975; 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1983 1982 1983 1984 1984
^ CAPITALNE'ED5 ACTUAL- F' ----'------ ------ PROJECTED-- -- --- -- ----- --- ------ ----
^: Flight Equipment Payments
{,
- Advance .Deposits 37 20 16 28 43 ^	 67 80 77 70 80 480
-Delivery 114 37, 56 38 63 34 103 149 217 164 890
-Spares, Modif. etc.
^^ __3 _^_ ^ ^4 _2 17 14 _13 16 q0
.,	 ^ Total'Flt equip Payments 155 b0 80 70 110 110 200 240 330 260 1,460
^ Add: Flt Equip Leases
- - - - - - -
-
_ _ _
s
<{ Total Flight'Equipment 155' 60 80 70 =?0 10 200 240' 330 ^..F2_ 1.460.
°? Ground Prop	 & Eg/Other - °
.	 JJJ Grd Prop & EquiP 10 10 10 10 20 2b 20 30 30 30 180bebt!Retirement 15 26+60 3+79 4 - - 38 50 12 _ 270,.
Dividends 10 10 13 22 28 28 36 36 48 48 270 }Other - l 4_ 5 4 2 2 6 4
-
_^— 30 !S
`	 ^ Total GPE &Other 36 110 110 4C 50 50 100 120 90 80 750
^
End Wkg Cap {3wks COE proj) 13 40 50+40 60+170 60+270 70+380 70+390 80+370 90+330 100±400 500
`TCTAL,CAPITAL NEEDS. 209[10 280 340 490. 610 760 8i0 840 840 2,710
C2.PITAL SOURCES tcl
Beginning Wozking Capital (14) 13 40 90 230 330 450 460 4S0 420 10
Operations 1
-Net Earnings (Rept'd) 43 60 100 120 140. 160 180 200 220 230 1,410
- Depreciation/Asnzt 99 102 102 105. 105 106 116 131 149 171 1,090 .^
t -Property .Sale/Other 8 30 35 25 15 14 14 19 21 19 190
`' -Other 10 S 3
- - - _ - - - 10 ^
^, :Total Operations 160 197 240 2.50 260 280 310 350. 390 420	 - 3.700 j
Financing, Arrangements
r	
'
- :S2nor Debt-franks 58 _
- -
_ _
_
-
_
_ _ ^
-	 -InscoJOthers - - - _
-
_
_
_ i
,.. - Subozd Debt - ^_ _ _ _ _ _
-
-
_
- heases {Cap @ AG Cost) _
-
_
- - _
_ _
{;
,^ - Deposits returnable - - - - _ _ _ _ - _ _ s
-Stock Sales - !	 ,
^
Tot Fii.ancing Arrangements 58 - - - - - - - _ ^ _
^^E
-TOTAr 'CAFxTAL SOURCES 204 _ 210 280 340 490 610. 760 810
840 840 2,.710 j
i^
,'ZZAIAIvCING TO BE ARRANGED
_
- - ^ -
_ _ -
- _
_
?!
t
^'
AERO AD • CAPITAL NEEDS & SOURCES 1976-1984
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C O M' M E N T A ,R Y
'°MC)NEYABILITY"
,; In an industry that's known..far its use of leverage (bothfinanc^al and operat;=Zg)
Norti-iwzst may in'the next few years be in the anomalous position of b p^ ing debt free.	 At' ''^
•; the end of 1978 NWA °s only debt could be their ,$100 MM term loan {due 1981-1933) now out-
^'"^ standing.	 However; with $230 b5M in working.. capital at the end of 1978, NWA could certainly
prepay this debt if it so chooses,
^^^•:, "becauseWorking: capital is raised to unusually high levelsthe carrier's superb
cash flow generates more funds than are needed.. 	 Besides prepaying debt, as mentioned
:above, hIWA may decide to use some'of this excess cash to buy more equipment and enter
;^ the expanding charter. markets, andjor tg dversify outside o£ the industry.
Northwest's excellent ear^:ings ar_d cash flow outlook show up vividly in the operating
^"^ ratio declining to 820, the x•eturn on investment climbing to 14.3, and the cash generati^in^,
zat.o staying way above the 5 mills norm. 	 It should be noted, however, that back in the ''
. .mid-1960's, NWA's ratos`^zere even better than thasea 	 '', ^
" NWA' s "Moneyabiity" ratios are the best in the industry;	 The carrier present y
"^ qualifies under ache N,aY. State Insurance ^,aw. 	 All avenues of financing are open to NWA's
^^ treasurer, but as indicated on the Capital Needs and Sources schedule, there wi11 proba.biy
^"	 ; be no reason 'for NWA to seek external financizig;. k
^^
^•	 : , If onF can find a fault with NWA's "h^oneyabilty" postsre, it woul^3 knave to be t:zat
p "'
``'
the carrier is over-financed.	 The revenue. to invested captal'ratio-rises in ],976 and 19?7
but thenflattens..out for the next seven years.
	
Also, the cash flow per .
 dollar of equity
^, ratio is-very low for such a praft,able carrier. 	 This indicates that NWA'has too much
equity for .its size of ,operation.
^' As mentioned in last ;year's Aerb Advanced report, the only "Moneyablity" problem
Northwest has is what to do wi h ics abundant riches. ^	 ^^
^
^:
^:
^:
"MONEYABILITY"
j
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^.	 ; M O N' E Y A B I L I T Y	 - I N V E 5 TED C A P L T A L
r:	
^ (System <- All Services)
-
,^	 '
f,;
^ 1976-
1975 1976 1977' 1978	 1579	 1980	 1981	 1982
-
1983	 1984 1984
"' ;' Z^'zlrST^ CAPITAL	 UNIT Actual - - - - - - - - - - -	 - - - - - P x o j e c t e d - ,- - - - - - - - - - _ _ - - - - _ _ _ _ _ _ -
Z:ebt	 $Mil
;Senior Debt -Banks 	 " 239 179 100 100 100 100 62 12 - - ,(239)
Senior Debt-Insco/Other	 " 33 7 4 100 100 100 62 12 r - (33)
Senior Debt-Leases Cap'd	 " - - r - - - - - - -
Senior Total - Reptd 	 " 272 186 104 100 100 100 62 12 - - (272)
'^ :Senior Total +Cap Lses	 " 272 186 104' 100 100 100 62 12 - - (272)
Subordinated - - - - - - - - - - - j
'' Total Debt ^ Reptd	 " 272 186 104 100 100 100 62 12 - - (272)
Total debt +Cap Lses 	 " 272 186 104 100 100 100 62 12 - ^ [>
E4'u^tY
,: Stock' 624 674 761 859 971. 1103 1247 1412 1583 1765 1141
z Stack +Sub Debt 	 " 624 674 761 859 971 1103	 '.:1247 1411 1583 1765.: I14I
:-^ Tot Inv Capital-Reptd .896 860 _ 865 959 1071 1203 1309 1423 1583 1765 869 5;
'. Tat Inv Capital +Cap Lses _ '896 860- 865' '959 1071 1203 1309 1423 ^ ^6#.^ a R6^^	 + Y
FLIG3T' EQJZP.'4EtiT	 "
Depz Cost 977 915 894 849 844 7^5 837 931 1L'^0 ^	 1230 253.
Depr ^;ost +.Mfr Deposit 977 935 906 872 884 1888 !	 966 1073 •.1256 1346 369.
Depr Cost +	 +Cap Lses 977 935 906 872 884 888 ^9^i6 1073 ^ 1256 1346 ^_
^`
MT".3FLSI::G CAPITAL ^
^' L^cl Car Debt/Eguiv Wks COE	 $Mill/Wks 13 / 1 40 / 3 90 / S 230 Q3 330 d5 450 h0 460 Q9 450 h7 420 ^4 500 ^5 487 ^4 ':
1i
^.. RATIO A^IALYSISl/ 	 (G)	 UNIT%NORM
^^ Sr Debt -
Fgcity'(Stk +'Sub) 	 i-150Y 44 28 14 12 10 9 5 1
-
(44)ptS.
Sr Debt -
Eq (icet + De 	 + Lse)	 $- 80$ 28 20 11 11 11 11 6 1
Ca,2 Zses Share Flt
	 $- 33i
^. :: Total Debt c	 , _
^;	 ^ StoV7c Equity	 ^-2:75$ 44 28 14 12 10 9 5 1 - - (44)pts. "
^°State Zns Law
^	 a
F:z C.':g Cov - 12 t:os 	 ;:-1. 5 2.0 3.3 5.7 7.6 8.7 9.5 11.2 12.7 14.3 14_3. 12.3z i	 ^
Fiz C:^q Cov -Syr Avq	 x-1.5 1:7 2.2 3.1 - 4.2 5.5 7:0 B.5 9.9 11.3 12_^ 10.7z jj
oper Ratio (Airline)	 t 94 90 87' 85 84 83 82 83 82 B3 (11)pts.
Return On Inv (Corp)	 $ 6'.9 9.1 12.9' 13.3 13.8 14.0 14.2 14.3.. 14_O' 13_O 6.l pts.
Rev = ibt Inv Cap	 $ 0.91 I.13 1.27: 1.28 1.27, 1.25 1.28 1:. 29 1.28 1,2b 0.35
Pet' Cag Coats 2/	 $Mil 30 170 210 260 350 490 630 650 580 600
Fin 71rgd / 4 Argd , 	"/g 61/ 203 29/ 17 / r -f - -/- -/- -/- _,^- ^_ '/_ J_
Casb Generation
Flo:r per S Equity	 C/i Chg-30 21/ (9) 21/- 24/14 23/ (4) 23/- 22/ (4) 2?^- 22/- 22^- 21(5) ^-
... Rev ]Gass ODE	 Mills/i Chg-5.00
.per ]1SlI 6.93/(17) 8.67,/24 10.5/21 11.4/ 8 12.3/8 12.7f4 13.9/9 14.4t4 15_4/7 Il5_5>1 8'.57/124
II^.YABTLITY
leotec	 (G)	 See Glossary_ AEaD: ^. ^JIPITAL 1976-1984..
?f	 I2 months basis.	 $Changes are from . end of prior year.
2J Set Cap Comts =Next two yearsprojected capital expenditures for
flight equipment and GYE.
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P A R A ME T E R 5
^'
- _ - _ - - '- - - - - - - -	 U.S. TRUNKS' ^ PAA' ^ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -PAN AMERICAN - -	 - - - - - - - - _ - -	 _
i ECONO.'+;Y USA Strong growth into 1977. 	 Thereafter resumption of secular Ditto ^
' GNP real growth at 3-4^ rate. 	 Inflation. rate to be about 56
per year in 1476 and 1977.
	
Thereafter inflation to drop to
3^-46 per year.	 Unemployment rate to continue stow drop;
consumer income and confidence to continue to advance.
^, World Turnaround .from recession levels slower than . U_S. with. Ditto ',	 j
^:
,'
inflation rates to continue above USA's. 1
h
:F; ,13715-1980	 1980-1984 1975-1980	 1980-1984
^"
«
Gxawth Rate Compounded "GRC" Growth Rate Compounded "GRC° ^ j
TRA°FIC Dom RPMS (AIl Services)' 	 7,5$	 ^6.1^ Dom RPMS (A11 Services)	 7_98	 b.Qi	 ,
Int'1 RPMS ("
	 )	 9.36	 7.46 Int'1 RPMs ("	 "	 )	 9.06	 7.6i ^.
CAPACITY ASMs ad hoc by carrier, but to generally 	 at a lower.increase System ASMs (All Services) 	 6.1$	 7.Ot ^
rate 'than RPi7s.	 1976-1977 and part of 1478's increase n
^ mostly due to,seating changes and"maximum utilization.
IAAD FACTOR Ad hoc by carrier; generally increasing between 3 and 4 LOAD FACTOR System (All Services) to'increase from 52.26
.percentage points. in 1975. to 60.06 by 1984.
'^ 1976-1964 1976-1984
• uGRC" °GRC°
COST Labor (System) (Avg Compens/Empl) -	 7.76 Labor (System)	 (Avg Compens/Empl)	 8.16
INCREMENT 'Fuel	 (	 )	 (C gal)	 5.36 Fuel	 (	 '"	 )	 (fi gal)	 5.26
' RATE Other (	 } (Industrial PricesL
	
4.26 Other (	 )	 (Industrial Prices)	 4.2Y±^ ,
p
1'
YIELDS 'Carriers' need to stay at least even with ..general Yields -..Dom (fi/RPM)	 4.06'
it inflationary trends, necessitates .annual. yield increases - Int'1	 ( ")	 3.7t
{: between 3-56 minimum.
EQUIPMEEIT Buys to concentrate on presently available aircraft through Buys concentrate on 7475P, 7478 and 200 seat long range
3,^ -1980.	 By 1981-1982 'new technology aircraft parametered in types to allow for growth and ,gradual phase-out of tt
^ are:	 13Q seat medium range type 707-300B6C aircraft.	 No Concorde operations parametezed t
^" 200 seat long range. type in for economic reasons.	 ^ (
^
t	 ?	 ^
to help with. pressing need,for fuel economies and to meet the
^!environmental imperative of the late 1970's and early 1980's. ^	
Illj
MONEYASILITY Cost of Capital - Ad hoc by carrier.	 Prime lending rate Ditto
at B-8.5$ With carriers paying between ^s and 1 percent above ' '
^<-
^
prime
Availability of Capital -very restricted until deregulation Restructuring ofsubordinated debt in 1976 plus dramatis
debate is settled.	 Funds to come .from banks, m^',iufacturers earnings. improvements from 1978 on will allow PAA to
'and through leasing. 	 Loan$'-from insurance companies finance most needs internally.	 Combination of aircraft
) .restricted to'a very few carriers, due to constrained cash leasing, some bank and other senior 	 oans plus sale. of
generation and earnings outlook. equity will be most likely financing options to fulfill
^'remaining needs.' NYS insurance lav fixed charge coverage
^ test .met. by 1981:: i,
$'
^'	 .CAS Pro_oosals under Aviation Act of 1975 not,parametered into DittoYk.
study.	 AFRO ADVANCED will be re-done, when and if the . Impact of Transatlantic: Route case and court ruling on Route
various proposals. have been enaoted and a time: frame is swap with TWA'not evalua*_ed until final decisions.
,^
established.
^,
"^
:---
AFRO AD:	 PARAMETERS 1976-1984
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C O M M E N T A R Y<< -
;^ "EARNINGS"
^^ Last year Pan Am' s system all services^yield was up ,a whopping 15% while the domestic
trunk carrers. ` had to settle for a virtually-flat year as discount fares eroded-their
yield ,base.
	 This year, however,: while the .trunks are beginning to'benefit from rate
increases .and discount fare reductions, Pan Am is facing an actual decline in its. yield ask discount RPMs are wiping out all of its fare increases.
	 Scheduled yields in the: second' ^	 '
i quarter were down 5.9% from ,last year.
	 'So, whereas system RPMs will be up 9^, the yield
decline will .keep .revenues from 'rising more than 8%.
Operating expenses are bung held in check by a combination of factors.. The route
' restructuring of the. airline has permitted Pan Am to reduce employment 6.6% from the June T
30,.1975 .figure.
	 .The much .
 greater. utilization of 747s has reduced fuel .consumption and
x even the price-per 'gallon of fuel his not increased as much as had been expected.
	 F3.nally,
.- ;
^'
the airline has kept capacity in check ( gip only 0.5% in the second quarter).
Opera ing earnings.. should improve $36"million over last year, and-if the revenue
' adjustment Pan Am made in 1375 is excluded, the improvement would be $64 million.
	 However, t
as simply an operating ^.irine, Pan Am S^rill still be^ in the red.
	 The' $108 millior, in
^""Nettngs "	 which wa..11 permit Pan Am to'report a record profit, is composed primarily of ^
an $83! million after-tai: gain an its" debenture swap..
`
.The longer term earnings outlook for PAA is quite .optimistic for the following reasons:
;7..^	 Internatonaletraffic growth will be increasing at a faster rate than domestic'
RPMs;	 -
2)	 Pan Am's employee productti=ity will continue to improve faster .than that of
the domestic trunks because of its route structure and its equipment, and
3)	 Pan ?dm's fleet is the most fuel efficient in the industry. _On a gallon
	 of
fuel per .ASM basis,Pan'Am's aircraft-was 10o better than runner-up Northwest.
in 1975.' With the' introduction of the 747SPs and the ..gradual phase out of xl	 ^ the 7Q7s 'Pan Am's fleet wi l continue to be the industry leader in this key area.
It should^be kept in mind that . in 1931 Pan Am's earnings©f $160 million is only
^ 4.9% of revenues and the resulting R0I is only .12.8$.	 The corresponding figures for ^^
1966 were '10.2	 and 14.6$.
_
x
^.
"EARNINGS"
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EARN Z N G S ::._
'^ -calendar years
i f 1976- ^
^^ Unit 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1.980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1984 ^
!' S' Actual .^ - ^ _ - - _ -
_ '- - - - - -' P R.O. J E C T E D - - - - - - - - - - ^ - - - - - - _
Revenuesr	
' Passenger ' $Mil 1230 1340 1547 1765 2000 2249 2524 2814 3136 3487 20860
§ Freight 264 294 327 364 4.05 450 496 546 602 663 4150
,,
Total Revenues " 1674 1807 .2037 2314 2610. 2930 3283 _3652 4063 4510 27200
Cash Open' Exp
Labor 606 638 723 Sll 911 1024 1149 1292 .1451 1632	 - 9x30.
Fuel 343 368 402 435 478 522 567 b20 688 762 4840
Other " 636 682 768 853 950 1058 1177 1305 1460' 1626 9880
Total COE ^' 1585 1688 1893 2099 :2339 2604 2893' 3217 3599 4020 24350	 ^ '
' bepr/Am,^rt 124. 118 115 125 133 141 I48 156 171 191 1300
Total Oper Exp 1709 1806 2008 2224 2477 2.745 -3041 3373 3770 4211 25650 ^	 '^
i
Open. Earnings "' (35), 1 29 90' 138 185 242 279 2.93 299 1550. ,^,
Gross Interest " 54 46 45 46 49' S0 49 48 46 43 420-
Pre-Tax Earnings "` (89) (47) (16) 44 89 135 193 231 247 256 1130
Inc. Tax $Mil (8) (25) (2) 13 27 41 58 Fil 99 102 390
'' Eff_ Rate ' i cr cr cr 30$ 30i 30+k 30g ,^35R 40^ 40t 35C
__ - ^.
Net Earnings
:^,
^
Airline ,Operations $Mil (81) (22) >(14) 31 62 94 135 150 ;^ 148 154 740' 1
"Nettings" "'' 35 108 24 29 28' 26 25 20,;:" 22 26 310 i
Reptd to Stockholders (46) 86 10 60 90 120 160 170 170 180 1050 t`
4
RATIOS
', Traffic (All Services) Bil/BChg ^	 `.'
' RPMs -uui'1" . " / 1.75/ 3 1.98/13 2.11/ 7 2'.25; 7 2.40/ 7 2.56/ T '^?..72/' 6 2.88/ 6 3.06/ 6 3.23/ 6 1:48/7.0 GRC i
RPtLs -System / 18.2/(9) 19.9/.9 21.8/ 9 23.7/ 9 25.6/:8 27.7/ 8 29.9/ 8 32.1/ 7 34..5/ 7 36.9/ 7 18.7/8.2'GRC ^ y
.ABMs -.System_ / N4.9/(5) 36,.3/ 4 38.:4/ 6 '41.0/ 7. 43.8/ 7 47.0/ 7 50.3/ 7 53.5/ 6 57.5/ J 61.6/ 7 26.7/6.5 GRC
Loan Factor -System $ 52.2 54.8 56.7 57.6 58.5 59.0 59.5 60.0 60.0 60.0 7.8
Yield -Dom CRPM/$Chg 5.:37/13- 5.64/.5 5.88/ 4 6:12/ 4 6.35/ 4 6.61/ 4 .6.87/ 4 7.11/ 4 7.36/ 3 7.61/ 4 2.24/4.0 GRC
Yield -System ." / 6.78/15 6.73/(1) 7.11/ 6 7.46/ 5 ',7.80 / 4 8.11/ 4, 8.43/ 4: 8.76/ 4 9.09/ 4 9.44 / 4 2:6673.8 GRC
^ COST INCREMENT (COE)
i - Labor (Non-Add).. $Mil/	 ^ 51/10 75/13 60/ 9 60/ 8 68/ 8 66/ 7 75/ 7 -	 86/'7 94/ 7 107/ 7 691
-Fuel / 34/11- 23/ 7 33/ 9 24/ 6 23/ 5 21/ 4 21/ 4 ZS/ 4 26/ 4 29/ 4 225
-Other " / 49/ 8 21/ :3 46/ 6 '33/ 5 39/ 4 38/ 4 45/ 4 S3/ 4 57/ 4 61/ 4 393
^; -Total	 " / 134/10 119/ 8 139/ 8 117/ 6 130/ 6 125/ 5 141/ S 164/ 6 177/ 5 197/ 6 .1309
Weighted Index (1967=10^) No /^Chg . 214/10;. 231/ 8 25O/ 8 264/ 6 280j 6 294/ 5 .309/ 5 326/ 6 343/ 5 _ 362/ 6 148/6.0 8RC_
^;
AERO AD: Earnings 1976-1984
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"FLIGHT EQUIPMENT"
As a result of its route restructuring during the last two years, Pan Am has been 	 .
able to sel'1 off nearly one-third of its older, narrow-body fleet and increase accordingly
the role of the' 7474. This year the 747s,' including the five new SPs, will account for
^ ^
	
	
75$ of :the ^Stiis flown by; the carrier. By utilizing the 747 to its fullest potential,
Pan Am 'is saving money, in two key areas: the 747 ` is much more fuel efficient than the
707; and labor 'costs can. be reduced as not as many employees are needed when one: 747
replaces 2^ 70Ts.
^,	 Based on the traffic forecast u ed far .this 'study (see Earnings schedule), Pan Am
';` will need additional equipment ^y 1978. Assuming that our'earnings'foreca t'i not too -"	 '
^
	
	 far off the mark, SH&E believes that PAA should have .little problem in getting creditor
approval to buy the aircraft. Additional 747s and SPs are. bought to meet RPM/ASM growth and
to replace some of the sold-off 707 capacity. By 1982 SH&E believes that there will be 	 ^^'
' an advanced. technology 200 seat long-range aircraft which caill replace 707s and DCBs.
Pan Am will use triis aircraft on its lower density routes.
^	 With s cargo'busness booming . this year, PAA has. just recently added its third
747 freighter. However, one''of tre 747Fs is .leased and must be returned to ta'orld Airways
at'the'end of 1977. SH&E would not be surprised f_Pan Am added additional 747Fs to its
fleet,. particularly' if they could bu^^ used ?47s and have them .converted. to a' cargo :con- 	 ^ ^^
figuration.'	 1
By the end of 1984 the'I3 727s flying in and out of Berlin wild be the. only aircraft 	 -
in:Pan`Am's fleet that do not meet the environmental requirements of. FAR Part. 36. Assuming
the 727s had to be :replaced,' it cvoulc'L cost Pan Am about $100. million in 1984 dollars. By far 	 ;.
and, away Pan, Am in 1984 will have the most modern and fuel efficient fleet=of the Big Five. 	 ^ ;'
'! N.B. It is'assumed'for the .purposes of this study that the current two. year leases on the 	 ^
five 747SPs will be extended to 16 years.
`;
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"FLIGHT EQUIPMENT"
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f ' ^ £LIGHT. EQUIPt•!ENT -PURCHASE '/ REDIOVALS' / PPYt•SENTS / LEASES
'	 ^ GROUND PROPERTY & EQUZPhIENT (projected costs)
r. 1976-
I^
Unit	 1975	 1976	 1977 1978	 1979	 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1984
PURCHASES/LEASES (L)	 Actual - - - - - - - - - - - -P R 0 3 E C T & D - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ^^
„
^^	 ^'
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1
Additions	 No. A/C
>.	 ^ 747 SP	 -' S*L	 - 6	 4	 4 3 - - - 22
,..
747 Cargo	
-
I*L	
- -	 -	 - - - - ^ 1
747 B
	
- -	 - -	 2	 2 3 4 - 2 13 ,
200 Seat L/R	 - -	 - -	 -	 - - 6 12 8 26
fi
Total Additions	 - 6	 - 6	 6	 6 6 10 12 10 62
X41
Total Cost A/C TYPel/	 $ Mill
747 SP	
-
142	
_
211	 148	 155 122 - -, - 778.
^ 747 Cargo 33	 - _	 -	 - - - _ - 33
747 B	 - - 85'	 89 141 197 108 620'
^ 200 Seat L/R	 - -	 - -	 -	 - - 185 371 260 816 '
`^
..`	 ^
^	 ^
dotal Cost Aircraft 	 - X75" ^f ^^ ^- ^- ^- ^- ^- ^T
,
No ARemovals	 /C
707-300'BSC	 14' 14/2L	 5 5	 5	 7 7 7 2/SL 5/1L 65
'727	 7 -	 - -	 -	 - -
^ 707-120/720	 5 4	
- -	 -	 - -
-
-
-
4
747=100 F	 - -	 1L -	 -	 - - - - - 1
,- Total Removals	 ^ ^S	 6 5	 5	 7 -^ ^- ^ --,^- —^- -^- •
µ'	 ^
^^
^' PAYMENTS 4/ 1
^i
^, Fhght 'Eq Payments	 $ .Mill ^ ^	 °'
Advance Deposits	 - 17	 85 85	 95	 125 111 79 60 fi0 720
'Delivery	 - -	 - 148	 93	 98 105 153 148 147 890,
Spares. Modi fs etc	 ^^	 S7 13	 15 ' ^7	 ,^^	 _77 ]4 _lam_ _2Z _^^ 1S(4
t Total 'Flt Eq Payments	 "	 57 30	 T00
_2.^^ '	 _2120_	 _24Q- ^- ..25^. _.23L1_ _?34_ l ^^n ^
I Total Flt Eq Leases 2/	 "	 - _17^	 - -	
_-Z^	 ^.4_ ^^ 11II_ i i n _1].II._ 7ZS
^, Total F1g:^t Equipment 	 "	 57 205	 100. .244_	 12.0_..	 st 0 z^ 0 360__ icn ._340- Z48i_
GRD, PPDP, ^ EQUIP 3/	 °	 12' l5	 ^n ^21L	 X11_.	 ^_	 ___3^- .-.40_ -4.0._ --_4G- -365-
I.
f
.'NOTES: (L Leased, a21 others 70vs purchased) ^	 ^
1/ Cost cer ?ircraft Tune -number x cost per aircraftiacl base price + CFE/MC/spares. SH&E derived..
I '2/ Leases , C^'30$ of total aircraft cost. per year ..(1979-1984)_ AFRO AD: F'lt. Equip/6PE 1976-1984 r,
-
3/ Grd. Prop & Evu_p 	 - Subject'to management ;reprogramming.-
^(
4j Payer=_ats -'(SH&E derived; reflect escalation).
Advance Deposits -pre-delivery @ 30^ of unit price. PAN	 A M E R L C A N s	 i
,' Delivery -balance remaining @ aircraft acceptance ';
^' Spares,MOdifs,,etc - @ 10 +s of aircraft cost (or derived} ^	 °^
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C. O M M E N T A R y
"CAPIT?^L NEEDS & SOURCES "' ^
Pan I^m's cash position is so improved that the airline: recently prepaid its'remainng ^
^	 bank debt.
	
A :combination of_leasng the siX new T47s, the-sale of 707s, and improved s
operating results w	 l	 ncrease:Pan Am's working capital (including current debt due).
$45' million during 1.976. i
With no flight.-equipment on `order far 197 .7 and debt retirement. only $29 million (the. ^^
recent'. debenture swap improved an already'managable mandatory debt amortization schedule) "
Pan. Am dill be able to meet ail of its capital needs from internal sources. ` 	In 1978,
however, Pan Am will need $1:10 nrnillon iiz outside _financing to help pay for the needed
six. additional SPs.	 If -earnngs , are as good as predicted ('see _Earnings,schedule),'Pan Am
could probably go to the stock market. to xase some of the-.needed funds with the remaining
money corning from the banks .
^'	 Pan Am's cash generation ratio goes over the 5 mills norza in '1978 ( ee Moneyabliay
schedule) which; permits the carrier 	 during the study period to finance 68% of 	 ts'needs
from in ernal operations.	 .The largESt source •of outside f nancr^g is leasing which
accounts for 30 0 of the value of ixicoming airplanes .between 1979 and 1984. 	 T^ lith the
earnings that we have projected, Pan Am may decide to lessen its reliance on lease
financing	 lessors may also lose 'interest in this 	 ype of financing for a variety'of t
reasons).	 If this does. occur, Pan Am should not ha^Te too. much trouble getting money from'-'
other sources as the:. carrier's ratios are'all well below the danger level.
During the nine. year study period projected capitalexpendtures for flight_.,.equipment
and GPE are $2.75 billion.	 If these. outlays are discounted back to'theepresent'^a a
5$ 'rate, the resulting $2.2 billion is exactly the, same arount that Pan Am spent between -
19 6,6 and 19 7 5 . 4.
i
Recav 1976-1984
Needs:	 $3.73 billion (67o flight equipment 7^ GPE, 14^ debt retirement and 6o dividends).
Sources: $.2.,53..billion or 68$ from operations (28$ earnings, 35$ depreciation).
$1.13 billion or 30^ new financing ($.92 billion, or 25$ to be arranged..) ,;i
"CAPITAL NEEDS & SOURCES"
•
^-.	 .^a
,._	 ^.n,r^	 ^rr<•- ^-x^	 ^ ^	 u=^t	
Fn-^t^•cn
	 'z=r.^'s^	 'urns%=."i	 i^ae.'t
	 firms "?	 e^aah	 ry	 ^+^k	 ^a^wk...nrarc.^	 ^-+^^^rr• ^	 +^I	 .ai	 e.^^swgn
Vi ,µ.:
	
--Y- ._... -	 _ T -^
_
^.
__
_ '.
p^
i
4s .....,	 ., art.. Y.;^
._	 .,.
,^^-r^ _	 _..
_
^^
..	 ._	 _.
^^ 
_,.
_._	
__
^.,.
_"	
_^	 _	 .. ,.	 _..
	 _ ^__.._.^___.._
_^_.^._.	
.r
x .	 7;^ra.. ^ 3 n..A ^ _ .
^ ^^
i
v^.	 ,..
d
i
ry
^
CAPITAL NEEDS AND SOURCES: ($ MILL)
t
- calendar years -
.	 ^
1976-
1975. 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1.982 1983 1984 ^y84
^= CAPITALt+EEDS ACTUAL- - - ---- --- --- --	 - PROJECTED---	 --	 -	 -----
Flight,Equipment Payments
- Advance Deposits - 17 85` 85 9S 125 111 79 60 60 720
^
- Delivery
-Spa=es, Modif. etc.
-
57
-
-
13
-
15
148.
17
93
12
98
17
105.
14
153
18
148
27
147
23
890
.150
. Total Flt Equip Payments 57 30 100 250 200 240 230 250 230 230 1760
Add: Flt Equip: Leases - 175 - - 70 70 80 110 1.10 110..._ 725
'
2bta1 F1ighC Equipment 57
.^5 1Q^ ^^ _ 27p ^1R_ a^ n a^n adn ^y`L 2485-_ a{ Ground Prop	 & Eq/Other '
•^ Grd Prop &Equip 12,' 15 20 20 30 30 30 - 40 .40 40 265
Debt Retirement 90 67+114 29 30 37 33 35 B5 37+30 42+30 520 <,
Dividends - - - - 13 27 35 45 45 45 :210
Other - 9 1'
- - - - - 8 3 20 '
^` Total GPE &Other 102 205 50 50 80 90 100 120 160 160: 1015
Y End Wkg Cap (3wks COE proj) 75 l20 110 120	 _ 130 150 170 190 210 2.	 30 230 ^-
TOTAL CAPITAL NEEDS 234 530 260 420 480 550. ...580. 670 710 7^^ 3230—
^^
CAPITAL SOURCES
i
^`
Beginning Working Capital 69 75 20^.— 112- .120 130. l50 17D
_].3n ^^n ^	 l
Operations -35— ,
;- - t3et Earnings (Rept'd} t46) 86 i0 60 90 120 160 170 170 180 1050
- Depreciation/Amort 124 118 115. 125 133 141 148 156 171 191 1300
-Property Sale/Other 59 45 15 15 15 20 22 14 19 9 170
p. -Other ( 2) (2) - - 2 9
- - - -
1D^
_,	 ^ Total Operations 135 247 140- 200 240 290 330 340 360 380 3D
3 Financing Arrangements
-
160. 3
-Senior Debt-Banks' 30 - 70 30 40 - 20 -
-	 -Insco/Others - - - - - - - - 20 = 20
- Subord Debt - -
175
_
-
-
-
-
70
-'
70
-
80
-
110 110 110 725 t,,^
-Leases (Cap f^ AC Cost}
20 20 30 3D 30 180^ -Deposits returnable 33 - - 20
-Stock Sales' - - - 40 - - - - - -
40
`r
1bt Financing .Arrangements 30 208 _ 110 120 13 0 100 160 160 140 1125
^	 ^ TOTAL. CAPITAL SOURCES 234 530 260 420 480 b50 580 670 710
730 3730 '
F	 m FINANCING TO BE ARRANGED _ - - 110 120 130 100 160 160 140 920
^,
::
^'
• AERO AD: Capital Needs & Sources .1976-1984
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C O M M "E N T A R' Y
"MONEYABILITY"
Pan Am's improving fortunes are clearly evident on this schedule.. The crucial cash _
generation ratio goes over the 5 mills norm in 1978 and stays comfortably above that level..
As'a result of its strohger operating pastur^:F Pan Am is able to reduce its debt load over.
the nine year period even though •the book w^_`'ue of its flight equipment almostdoubles
during the same time span.	 ^,
The potential earnings improvement is ref?ected by the operating. ratio falling to
92^ and the carrier's ROI reaching 12.8% in 1981.4Pan Am is the only one of the Big 5
carriers in, t^-,.is year's SH&E studies to earn more than the CAB's 12o standard) . By 1981
the airline: will be meeting he fixed charge coverage test in the N.Y. State Insurance haw
and will thus be eligible once'again for long-term insurance money.
By selling 14 707s and leasing tiie 6 new 747s (5 SPs and 1 freighter), Pan Am has gone
way above the 33% norm of leased flight equipment to total; flight equipment.. 'This rules 	 _^
out the ?easing of any of t3:ie 6 neca SPs to be del^^ered in x.'978.' (see Flight Equipment
schedule) . Starting i;^^. 1979 80 % of the value of incoming: flight... equipment is leased fore
the purposes of this study. Ifs however,. PAA decides not tolease, ali other auenues of
outside • financng should be open to t:he`carrer as all of its key ratios are in .good shape.
As`'opposed to the other'Big 5 carriers, FAA woulu not face a massive financial. headache
if the environmental restrictions of FA.^t-Part 36 were to be strictly enforced . in the next
few years. With 75a of its AShis current y being produced by 747s Pan Am is'much less
vulnerable .to a forced 'f lee equipment revamping than'the other major carriers.
The recently completed debenture swag has improved. Pan Am's "M^^neyabilty" stance by:
1), getting some equity .onto the balance srieet; 2) lengthening the carrier's debt maturity;
and 3) increasing the possibility, through the lower conversion price, ..that some. of the
c.v. debt will _be converted into, common equity.
• 
'^MONEYABILLTY„
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^ (System -All: Services) ;
L`a
1976-
$
^	 ,
( 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1922 1983 1984 1984
Z1ILS'=_'ED ,CAPITAL ]SJTIT Actual
- - - - - - - - - -
- -	 - -
- - P R 0 J E C T E D - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
D_bt $ 24i1
' Senior Debt -Banks " 30 - - 70 100 140 140 160 130 100 70
Senior Debt-Znsco/Other : " 380' 343 317 292 266.. 240 215 190 185 160 (220)
^ Senior Debt-Leases Cap'd 236' 375 342. 309' 342. 373 405" 466 516 562 :326 j
Senior Total - Reptd ! 410 343. 317 362 366 380 3S5 350 315 260. (150) i'
}` Senior Total +Cap Lses 646. 718 659 671 708 753 760 Slb 831 822 176 ;j
'+ Subordinated " 466 351 348 '..343 332 325 315 305 :292 276 (190)
? Total Debi - Reptd 876. 694 665 ^- X38- ^ ^STa-^ "-6QT- ^3&- -j3A•OT- ^
'# Total Dzbt +Cap Lses 1112 1069 .1007 1014 1.040.
1078 1075 1121 1123 1098
^
(14)
^^
-	 "j^j
^kf^#<< Equity 1
-j Stock " 257 343 353 453 530 623 748 673 996 1133 876
G ^ Stock -]^ Sub Debt. " 723 694 701 796 B62 948. 1063 1178 12.90 1409 686 ;
Tot Inv Capital-Reptd 1133 1037 1016 1158 1228 1328 1418 1528 1605 1669 536
Sr
^' Tot Inv Capital +Cap Lses 1369 1412. 1360 1467 1570 1701 1823 1994. 2121 2231 $62 (
FLIGfi'T EQUIP:CERT 3,
Depr Cost 696 588 511 617` ..670 724 789 933 1060 1166. 470
.,Y Deo^ Cost +Mfr Deposit 712 588 596 724 802 906. 1005 1113 1189 1244 532	
^^^ Depr Cost-+	 +Cap Lses 948 963 938 1033 1144 1281 1410 1579. ,1705. 1806 85 8. ^	 {4
,,	 , ^	 ^
4?JRIQNG CAPITAL x	 ^i
Incl Cur Debt/Equiv Wks COE $Mill/Wks 75/ 2 120/ 4 '.110/ 3 120/ 3 130/ 3 150/ 3 170/ 3 190 /3 210/ 3 230/ 3 155/ 1 ^4 i
RATIO AVALYSISl/ ' 	 (G} U2]ZT%NORM
Sr -:Debt - _
`" Equity (Stk +Sub) t-150t' 89• 103 94 84 82 79- 72 69 64 58 (31) pts.
Sr debt - F
E1 Ea	 , ^:t'	 ^. ; Lse) $- BOt 68 75 70 65 62 59 54 52 49 46 {22) pts. t
Cad Ls_., Siar_ c,.t Eq -t- 33t 25 39 36 30 30 29 29 30 30 31 6	 pts. ^,
Z"otai Debt i
Stock Eguilty 5-1758: 433 312 285 224' 196 173. 144 128 113 97 (336) pts.
:] v State Sns Law. g'
?ic Chi . Cov - 12 2:0^ ^.-1.5 0.3 07 0.9 1.3 1.6 1.8 211 2.Z 2.2 2.2 1.9x (
•^
?ix Chg Cov - 5 yr Avg x-1.5 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 1.0 1.3 1.5 L8 2.'0 2.1 1,8x
Oaer Ratio, §Airline) t 102 100 99 96 95 94- 93 92 93 93 (9) ptc.
'^ Return. On Inv (Corp) t ,'	 1.5 10:8 5.4 8,4 1051 11.2 12.8 1^.3 11.6. 11.4 9 . 9	 pts.
F	 !
Rev = To t.Iav Cap $ 1.22 1.28 L 50 1.56 1:66 1.7.2 1.80 1.83 1. 92 2.02 0,80
^1
` uet Cap Caa2ts 2/ $Mil 69 390 570 640 680 740 780 760 7.00 660 - ^
^ Ein'Azgd / g Argd "/t 60/87
-/-
-/ -/- -/- -/_ _/_ _^ _/_ _f_ .r
Casa Generation
Flow per $:Equity
	 C/	 Chg-30 6/100. 14/133 14/- 20/43 23/15 259 27/8 26/.(4) 25/(4) 24/(4) 18/300
^° Rev Less COE
	 Mills/t Chg-5.00
2.55/2641
'
( per ASM 3.28/29 3.75/14 5.2440 6.29/18. .6.94/12 7,75/12 8.13/5 8..07/(1} 7_95/(1) 5.40./212.
wte:	 (G}	 Sea Glossary. MoneyabilityAFRO •AD :Inv. Capital 1976-1984
1/	 12 2aonths basis.	 i Changes are .from end of prior year. i
2/	 Net Cap Courts =Next two years projected. capital expenditures . for flight i---;=
equipment and GPE. P A ;] AMERICAN
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P A R' A Df E T E R S
--------- -- ---- U.S. TP.[7:iF'•5 & PAA------ -----=-------------TRA^1SWORLD------------
ECdNOMY USA	 Strong growth into 1977.. 	 thereafter resumption of secular GNP Ditto.
real growth at 3-48 ratz, 	 Inflation rate to be about 5$ per
yeaz,in 1976'and 1977.
	
-Thereafter inlation to drop to 3^-4t
per year_	 Unemployment rate to continue slow drop; consumer
,income and confidence to continue. to advance.
^^
World	 Turnaround from recession levels slower than U.S. with Ditto
inflation rates to :continue above USA's.
^ y;
1975-:1980	 1960-1984 1975-1980	 19.80-1984
x
Growth Rate Compounded "GRC" Growth Rate Compounded "GRC''
TRAFFIC	 Dom RPMs CAl	 Services)	 -	 7.5^	 <	 6.1^ Dom RPPL '(All Services) 	 7.6t	 6.0@
.	 ^ Int'1 RPMs	 (^^	 n	 ),	 9..38	 7.4$ Int'1 RPMs	 ("	 „	 ^	 8.9t	 7.bt ,
CAPACITY	 ASMS ad hoc by carrier, but to generally increase at a lower.. '
t rate than RPMS.	 1976-1977 and part of 1978"s increase mostly System ASMs (All Services)	 5.9f	 6.4t
due to seating changes and maximum utilization.
^;
"	 ^ LOAD FACTOR	 Ad hoc by carrier; generally increasing between. 3 and 4 LOAD FACTOR System (All Services) to increase from 54.9R
percentage points... in 1975 to 61.08 by 1984. ^
4
^	 ^	 ^
^
"^
? 1976-1984. 1976-1984 ^	 a
"GRC"	
_
°GRC'•
`
,^^ COST.	 Labor (System)	 (Avg Compens/Emjl)	 7.7t Labor (System)	 (Avg Compens/Empl)	 7.7t ^^
^*' ^
INCRE.`+^NT	 -Fuel	 (	 „	 )	 CC gal)	 5.38 Fuel	 (	 "-	 )	 (t ga17	 4.88 k	 :
RATE	 Other..'(	 )	 (Industrial Prices) 	 4.28 Other (	 "	 )	 (,Industrial Prices)	 4.^c
'YIELDS	 Carriers' need to stay at least even with general Yields	 -	 Dom (C/RPM)	 3.9t
^
^ inflationary trends, necessitates annual yield increases "	 -	 anti ("	 )	 3.6t
` between 3-5 g minimum. ,
Ey^UIPMENT	 'Buys to concentrate on presently-available aircraft through Buys concentrate on 72.7-200s, L-lolls, 74'7s and 180 seat
1960.- By 1981-19t32 new technology aircraft parametered in medium range type to keep fleet mix in balance.
	
No
are:	 180 seat medium range type additonal:L-1011 sales beyond the'two to Saudi Arabia
200 seat long range type parametered in. 	 By 1984,. 145 aircraft still in f1Pet	 -
'^ to help with Dressing need for fuel economies and to meet the not meeting FAR Part 36 requirements.
environmental imperative of the late 1970's and early 1980's.
`' MONEYABILITY Cost of Capital - Ad hoa by carrier.	 Prime lending rate Ditto
at 8-B:Se with carriers paying between ^: and 1 percent above
^Y prime.
Availability of Capital -.very restricted until. deregulation Decision to sell (2) L-1011s and equity offering in 1976
debate is settled. ,Funds	 o come from banks, manufacturers help to put a very weak balance sheet into a better position..
and through 'leasing., Loans from insurance companies However, heavy mandatory debt retirements through 1981 and
restricted to a very few carriers, due to constrained cash sizable _outlays for flight equipment, force 'TWA to tap all
generation and earnings .outlook_	 ^ financing markets in the future including a possible additional ^.
^ equity offering.	 Lease restrictions continue into 1978; NYS
ins. law coverage . not met until 1984.
'CAB	 Proposals under Aviation Act of 1975 not parametered into Ditto
study.' AEr'iD ADVANCED will be re-done, :•rhen and if the Zmpact of'Transatlantid Route . case . and court ruling cn
various proposals have been enacted and a tiskke frame is Route swap with PAA not evaluated until final decisions.
established.'
£	 i
AFRO AD: PARAMETERS 1976-1984. ^.^
-
T R A N S	 w 0 R L D
.,-...
'
_...	 ..-,...:	 ....-.„...:	 _.,...._
	
_-ern,-^+,^.^.-,4-^...,m...^.>,..	 ^	 ^	 s..^Z',A'G	 ..	 .,..a..m.,h^,	 ^mmmars	 ,za.r3
j
'	 ^_	 a.	 ..L. u....-,.d.Y.. .,S_rv.vu_s	 s1Sl	 -	 _v..	 r:..
^
^	 '^^a:
Ei
;-
I	
C O r1 M E N T A R Y
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"EA^tNINGS"
T6aA is making a fi:;^e turn-around after last year's disastrous- result.. 	 Operating
earnings for the first six months of 1976 have improved $57.8 million over last year • ,(even. with the-'damaging strike threat) and with the peak summer months stall ahead,..
should:.end ` up about $95 million higher than. in 1475. 	 Strong. traffic growth, ,RPMs
'	 ; 	 were up 12:2$ at the half year,'together with. increasing yiElds, up 8.2$ 	 m June,
wall increase revenues Tao over'1975. 	 Costs are being held in check."by acombinaton of
`	 flat ASMs	 for the .first six months and-a lessening impact of inflation on 'the care}er's 	 -
^` ^	 costs {foi: Example, TT^7A' s unit: cost per gallon of fueh was up only 2^ in June over the
;:	 1975 figure).
	
TWA's cost increment index :for 19:76 w^.l be up on .y 7$ versus a 9^ increase
's 	 for American and an llo'hike -for United.`
^ ^;
"Nettngs'° will be substantially higher than'.. Last year's as a result of foreign
^	 exchange gains'on the carrier's pound sterling debt; the purchase at a discount of i
the 6^o income debentures, (see Capital Needs and'Sources schedule), improvedperfor- !
i	 mance by the Canteen and Hilton suk^sdiaries, and the elimination of ..the $15.7 million ^
t	 ^'	 loss on the sale of the;'nine 74?s	 to Iran.
The longer term earnings .outlook is ,modestly, optimistic: as the operating ratio
f	 fa is to 94% by 1930 and the carrier's ROI :F_ses to 3-0.'S^ in 1981. 	 However,'t should F
be noted that in 19 64 T^^JA' s ROI -was 13.5' o , ' its operating ratio was 8 5 $ , and whereas
`	 it earned 8^ for every sales dollarn 1965, it will be earning less-than 4C per dollar
'	 of revenue'. in 3981. ',.
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"EARNINGS"
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19'76-
Unit 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 _,",,,;^_ _ 1984
Actual -	 - -----	 ------ -PROJECTED- ---- --	 - ---	 - -----
Revenuas
Passenger_:. SMil 1540 1747 1982 2227 2485 2770 3073 3395 374b 4121. 25,546.
Fzeight 129 150 168 188 209 231 254' 280. 307 338 2.,125
Total Revenues " 1805 2040 2312 2597 2896. 3221 i	 3578- 3950 4360 4790 29;750
Casa Oper Exp
.abor '^ 140' 791 892 996 1104' 1226 )_367 1527 1703 187 I1„503
Fuel " 38C ' 415 469 517 571 623 677 739 808 873 5,692
Othez "	 ' 656 7lT 795 884 977 1081 1194 1320 145.5 3596 10,013
^'.	 Total CD£- " 17'S 197 2156 239 2652 2930 3238 3586 '.3966. 4366 27,2u8
u	 pep=/Amorf^ >^ 1 1 110 111	 - 111 111 109 112 .120 137 152 1,.073
Total Oper Exp 188; 2027 2257 2506 2763 3039 3350 3706 4103 4518 ^ 281
Oper. Earnings " (82) 13 45 y 89 133 138 228 244. 257 272: 1,469 Sl
Gross Interest " 54 56 53 52 54 58 62 69 75' 78" 557k	 Pre-Tax Earnings.: " (136) (43) (8) 37 79 130 166 175 182' 194 912
Inc. Tax . $.^'ll (32}' (10) {2) 9 20 46 :58 61 64 68 314
Eff. Rate g. Gr cr cz 25^ 25+t '358- 35^ 35^ 35^ 354 34^	 .'
r
Net Earnings
Arl:.neoperatons $^yl {104) (33} (6) 28 Sg 84 lOB 114 118 125 598
"Ne;ttings" " 18 43 26 22 21 36 32 35 32 34 272
Reptd tre Stockholders -(86) 10 20 50 80 110 140 150 15U _ .160 870
I
RATIDS!l
I
9
f	 Tzaffic {All Services) Bil/$ChgC	 Pp;LS - DOP3 /	 " 14:.9 /4 16.5/11 17.7/7 18.9; 7 20,2,/7 21.5/7 22.9/6 24..3/6 25.8/6 27.2/6 12.3/5.9 GRC a
^'	 RPYS -System /c	 " 22.,5 /(2)' 24.7/10 26.7/8 28 7/B 30.8/7 33.1/7 35..4/7 . 37.8/7 '40.2/6 42..8/6 20.3/7,-0 GRC
AS.75 - System / 41.0 /C4)' 42.3/3 4.5.21? 48.3/7 5l_4;16 54.7/7 58.0/6 61.9/7 b6, 0/6 70.L6 '_29.]/6.1 GRC +,
'
Load Factoz -System $ 54.9 58..3 59.0 59.5 60.0 60.5 61.0 61.0 61..0 61.0 6-.1
!
Yield -Dom CiRPFI/eChg 7..06 /- 7.33/4 7.70/5 8.03%4 8.3514. 8.68/4 9.01/4 9.?2/3 9,65/4 9.98/.3 2,92/3.9 GRC a
i	 Yield -System / 6:85 /b 7.0313 7.44/5 7.7614 8.05/4 8.36/4 8.68/4 8.99/4 9.31/4 9:6413. 2.7913.9 GRC ^	 41
^
COST Z`:CRE,*iENT (COE)
.
- i:^baz (Non-Add} $,*iil/' ^ 5"I	 /10 68	 ./'9 8Q	 /10 73	 /8 71	 /7 60	 /7 89	 /7 100 /7 109 /7 128 f7 798
- Fuel " ! 31	 /9 21	 /5 30	 /7 30,	 /6 28	 /5 24	 /4 25	 /4 28 /4 33 /4 32 /4 _^51 ;,
-Other " / 7O	 /12 ^34	 /5 36	 /5 34	 /4 36	 /4 42 -/4 46^	 /-0 45	 /3 49 /4 54../3 376 +
-Total ° / .168/10..,.123 /7 146 /B 337 /6 135 /6 146.;%5	 160%sy 1'73 /5 131 /5 214 /5 1425 _ j
Weighted Index (1967=100) No /^Chg 219	 /10.1234 /7 252 /B 267 /6 '282 /6 257 /5 312 /5 328 /S 345 /5 3b4 J5 145/S,^ GRC 1i
^:^
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"FLIGHT EQUIP^'IE'JT"
With the sale earlier this year of tcao L-lolls
	
and the indefinte'deferral of 14
0
f	
`.
727-200s
	 (mentioned in 1975's'Aero Advanced}, TLVA wll'not be accepting any, new air-
craft until ?978,	 Assuming• the Pan e Azn-.TWA. route swap is :not undone and the recent CAB ^
ruling in the Transatlantic Case does not take effect in'the near futures.. TWA will be; ` ^'_t
able to generate suffcientASMs through,l977 by 'increasing seating and utilization on
F, existing aircraft.
'
Having sold the nine 747s
	 to Iran_ last year, TWA is facing an equipment disad- ^
vantage on the North Atlantic as more and more of its European wompe'^tors' ASMs
 are
y
^
;^
^ bei.ng flown with wide-body, aircraft.
	 The 17 747s
	
are bought to redress the prob em A
^^; and for use also on the transcontinental markets.
	 The relatively small order for k
L-lolls	 .could, of course, be
	 *creased if TWA decides to purchase stretched Tristars
for its Atlantic equipment:
	 The 727-200s
	
and the later 180`seat medium-range aircraft ,'
are bought to preserve TWA's ASM/range balance at 3/4 long-range, 1/4 short-to-medium.,
It should be note3 that SI3&E has beAn very '.conservative in :its removal of airplane' ^	 ?
from' Tt^TA's Fleet.
	 As a result,. 145 aircraft: will still be in TWA's ..19 .84 fleet that' do
not meet the environmental requi^ement^^ of 'FAR Part 35.
	 'To replace these 24.23 billion: ^'^
Asl►is'would cost TWA an additional ^1a9 billion on top of the $2.1 billion ix^ new . flight
^^
equipment para^-netered into the study.
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^^
^-j
^ 5
j^	 j	 ^"	 -_..	 _	 ..-.cl^i	 -..	 far.	 --t	 f^^ r_'^t 	^'. =>'^	 e	 E..
	
^	 ^	 ^.^^-^„^	 iu^.c,t	 ^,^o-„i	 f	 v.	 ^1^were^s.'	 fdeYA?r '	 C^.rsµ .^..i	 ^taw^r {	 ^^..x3	 ^•^•• x ;	 i:rr„xarrwr	 °	 .*-a-r"	 ,	 w„ewrr^-v,	 r: a:uxv.i	 - _^	 z^,^t.	 s+i 'L.^,.-.^ rE	
^
f	 f
... 1	 ..._	 _	 _	 ...
	
..	
_,.^-^	 .,	 _...._...vw.^.^ ...............^.._...._ ......	 ._..
r .'	 ^.	 a ,._
^-	 ..,.	 .
.	 _.. _..
` _.i
	
{g	 g N t
FLIGHT EQUIPI•iENT -PURCHASE / REMOVALS /PAY^ffiNTS / LEASES
GROUND PROPERTY & EQiJZPt•IENT (projected costs)
1976-
Unit	 1975'	 1976	 1977 1978 '	 1979 1980 1981' 1982 1983 1984 1984
PURCHASES/LEASES (L)	 Actual - - - - - - - - - - - -P R 0 J E C T E D -
"'.Additions	 No. A/C
727
-
200	
-
-	
_ 5	 9
- - - - -
14
L-1011	 6 -	 - -	 - 5 - - 3 4 12
747
	
- -	 - -	 3 2 2' 2 3 5 17
_. :180 Seat M/R 	 - -	 - -	 - - 8. 9 _ _ 9 - 26
Total Additions	 6 -	 - —5-	 i^ 7 10 11 15 9 69
Total Cost A/C Typel/
	$Mill
"727=200	 _ _:
	
_ 52,	 98
- - -
_ _ 15U
L-loll'	 130.. `	 _	 _ _'	 '- 140. - - 98 137 375.
:..747	 _ _ -	 134. 93 98 99 155 271 850	 .
180 Seat M/R	
-' -	 - -	 - - 211 239..... 251 - 701 t
Total Cost Aircraft 	 130 -	 - 52	 232 233 309 338 ^^ ^0^ ^^
s
. Removals	 No A/C ^
747	 9 - -	 - - - - - - -
727QC	 -
707-120B	
-
-	 - -	 - - -
-'
_
5
2L - 2 )	 ^f
-	 - -	
-
3/2L. 5_' 15 ^
707-320 series'	 1
Total Removals.	 10
-	 -
-	 -
5	 5
^_ _^
-
-
-
-
-
___^_
6L
.13.
5
_^^
^1
_ 38 '
PAYMENT 5 4/
Flight.Eq Payments 	 $-X.ill
-.Advance Deposits	 32 -	 -42 95	 94 100 100 129 90 80 730
Delivery	 74 -	 - 36	 93 93 124 135 201 163 845 1
Spares, kndifs etc	 30 20	 18 19	 23 17 26 26 29 27 205 ,'
Total . Flt Eq Payments 	 '136 20	 60 150
	
210 210 250 290 320 270 1780
.Total rlt Eq Leases 2/	 •'	 - _^	 - -	 70 70 90 100 150 120 600
Total Flight Equipment 	 136 20	 60 150 '	 280 290 340 390' 470 39D 2380
GRD, PP.^P,	 & EQGZP 3/	 12	 ( -' 30 30 30	 30 40 40 40 40 50 330
t70TESc(L-Leased, all others 70$ purchased) J
1/ Cost per Aircraft Tvne - number x cost per aircraft inol base price + CFE/MC/spares. SH&E derived.
2/ Leases - @ 303 0£ total aircraft cost. per year (1979-1984). F+ERO ADe FLT. EQUSP/GPE"1976 -1984
3/ Grd. Proa & Ev_uip. -Subject to management reprogramming.
,^
i
4/ Pav-re.^.ts - (SiisE dez'.ved; .reflect escalation)
•Advance Deposits . - pre-delivery @ 30^ of unit price. TRANS WORLD ,`.
Delivery -balance remaining @aircraft accepr_anca
Spares,t4odifs, etc - @ 108 af'aircraft cost(oz derived) ^	 --
}'. ^ -
r	 ..
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C O M I^4 E N T A R Y ^
CAPITAL NEEnS A^^D .SOURCES "
Not meeting the "incurrEnce tests" in its loan agreements :TWA is unable to borrow
any money at this .time.
	 There
	 s'also a question of_whether or not the air 	 ne is
complying with the "main-tenance tests" in its.load covenants. 	 Fortunately for TtVA, it
does not need to borrow any honey this year as a result of -the L-1011 sale and improved
.operating results.
1976 capital expenditures are a minimal $50 million ($20'millom for"spares and
modifications, $30 million for ground property and equipment).
	 ...Combining the above with
the $89 million in mandatory . debt retirement and $11 million fcr miscellaneous items, ^^^
TWA°s needs, excluding er^d.ing working capital, are only $15.0 million.	 TWA can fulfill	 ^ ^
this need by generating $144 million from operations and by cutting into beginning g^^
working . capital.	 SK&E be ieves that the postponed TWA stock offering will be ^^creased ^
in size '.and bring i11 about $50 million..	 This :
 additional cash c^=ill be used to,'buy back
abbot $30 million of outstanding.:6^% sui^ordinated income debentures and to increase	
_working , c:ap^.tal - to four eaeeks of cash operat^.ng expenses . ;
1977 capital needs can be met totally from operations. 	 By'1978 TG1A will need
^`$90'million in outside financing.'' Taking into account the airline °s Sr. D/E ratio, its.
inabiii.ty to lease, and its improving earnings, TWA will probably offer more stock end ^
issue sd^«e senior notes. ^^
The $1 ^ 6 bullion that Tti4^A wil?^ need in external financing over the study period will ^
have to come fron all of 'the carrier's outside money sources. 	 Leasing will account for
$790 million, or 30^ of incoming flight equipment .
 starting in 1979.	 It shoo d be noted ^
^ tha	 while T[tiTA gill be borrowing $710 mi lion during the study -period it wily 'be- amorti-
zing $70-0 million of"debt over tie same time span.
TWA ° s cash 'flow is hampered by the carrier'. s very liberal depreciation policy (for ' ''
book reporting it writes off aircraft 'slower than the CAB'
	 ratemakng standards) and
the relatively few a'ircra'ft being added to the fleet . during.
 the' next five years.	 As
with all thecarriers, TWA faces the problem of under-depreciating its current f eet in
relation to the cost of replacement -aircraft.
TWA will be spending $2.71 billion for flight equipment and cPE between 1976 and
1984.	 If this total is discounted back to the .present at a 5^ rate„ the resulting
figure of $1'.97 billion is actually considerably less than-the. - $2.^5`;billon TWA spent '
during the past nine years.
,.
^; "CAPITAL NEEDS AND SOURCES"
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CAPITFiL NEEDS AND SOURCES ($ MILL)
- calendar years -
1976-
1975' 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982. 1983 1984 1984
CAPITAL2dEEDS ACTUAL- ---	 -- --- ------ P ROJECTED---------- ------------- ---- ^,
Flight Eguipment.Payments
- hdvance Deposits 32 - 42 95 94 100 100 129 90 80 730
-'Delivery 74 - - 36 93 93 124 135 201 163. 845 ^
Spares, .abdif. etc 30 20 18 14 23 17 26 "'	 26 29 2? 205
'" Total Flt Equip Payments 136 20 60 150 210 210 250 290 320 270 ' 1780
Add:. Flt Equip Leases - - - - 70 70 90' 100 150 120 600
Total Flight Equipment 136 20 60 150 280 280 340 390 470 390 .2380
Ground Proms & Eq/Other
G=d Prop . & Equip 12 30 30 30 30 40 40 40 40 50 330.
t Debt Retirement._ 63 89+30 58 63 64 128 127 48 48 45 700
Dividends
- - '8- `2 2 10 12 22 22 22 100
Other
_^—' I1 4 5 4 2 l -
_ 3 30 ;^
Total GPE &Other 81 160 1D0- 100 100 180 180 110 110 120 1160
End Wkg Cap (3wks COE proj) 'l16 130 120 140 150 170 190 210 230 :250 250
TOTAL CAPITAL NEEDS 333 310 280. 390 530 630 710 710 810 760 3790 :
r
€
` _DI:1L SOURCES
^	 ;,
^
^	 Y!v
^
Beginning Working Capital 20 116 130 ! 120 190 150 170 190 '.210 230 120 _- '
Operations -'
- Net Earnings (Rept'd) (86) 10 20 50 $0 110' 140 150 150 160 870 i
-Depreciation/Amort 1]1 110 111 111 111 109 112 120 137 152 .1070 ^
} -Property Sale/Other 140 2D 19 15 9 11 B - 3 16 100
-Other 32 ,_ 4 - 4 _	 10 - _ _ 1^ 2 30
` 2bta1 Operations 197 144 150 180 210 230' 260 270 300, 330 2070
Fnanciag'Arrangements
- Senior D.:bt-Banks 79 - - - BO 80 100. 60 - 40 360
-	 -Insco/Others 2p _ - 40 10 20 30 30 100 _	 - :230
- Subord Debt 12 - - - - 60 30 30 - - 120
-Leases (Cap @ AC Cost) - - - - 70 70 90 100 150 120 600 ^
.Deposits returna2she' _ _ - - 20 >	 20 30 -	 3D 50 40 190 r ;i
- Stoc;c Sales S 50 - 50 - - - - - - 100 `!
Tot Financing Arrangements 116 50 - 90 180 250 280 250 300 Z00 1600
i`O2'AL CAPITAL SOIIRCES 333 310 280 390 530 630 710 710 810 760 3790
.FINANCING: TO BE ARRAP1Gh'D -	 ^ 50 - 90 180 250 280 250 300 200 1600 t
AERO AD: CAPITAL .NEEDS & SOURCES'1976-1984
TRANS WORLD
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"MONBYABILITY" d
Being in serious violation of its .senior debt ratios'.. at the end of 1975, TF7A last
fa l ..began negotiations with its senior 1end^rs to establish a debt deferral progam. 	 i
However, in April of this year, TF7A'discontinued the discussions claiming that its m-	 # '
proved cash position made the program uiznecessary. Assuming the earnings outlook con-
tinues to improve, (see Earnings schedule) and TWA is- . able to'se11 equity in both 1976
and 1..978, the crucial Sr. Dabt/Cquity ratio will be comfortably below 1500 by the end of
11.978.
Because of the sa1^ of its mine owned 747s last year, T^VA's ratio of .Teased flight
eqa? pment to total-'flight equipment gent considerably; above its 33 0 limit.
	 As a result,
Tt^7^ will not be able to lease any a%rcraft until 1979.
►^^.th the operating ratio falling to 94o the airline's ROI peaks at 10.5 	 in 1981(^rhich' is -below the CAB's 12^ star.:dard) . " Th]'.s operating improvement does permit the ^+
carrier to'qualify for .insurance money under the New York State Insurance Law by 1982.-
TtiVA's steadily rising cash generation ratio reaches the'five Hills level by 198.0.. ^
Obviously, the .
 greater zhe..internal cash flow, L-he less outside financing the carrier
will require.	 Over the nine years inthe study period, TTr7A's invested capital base will
increase more than $1 billion, but total debt will only . account for $ .186'rii lion with
1^ases'beng 94a of that figurea 7
It seems that TI4A has flown through the worst of its financial storm.	 It is, `of
course, very fortunate that traffic: has been so strong this year,, that United Airlines ,
ha'd a strike last December, and that it had .enough capacity on hind to be .able to°sell.the
typo L-lolls	 and defer a^liv'e1Ry of the 727-^OOs: TWA was on the brink of bankruptcy
i	 this past .winter, .:but the combination of"the above listed events together with an improved
earnings outlook should make the carrier a T,^able borrowing entity ^y the early 19$0's
when its major 'fleet revamping must begin.
l
"MONEYABILITY"
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^.^-i M O N E Y A B I L I T Y	 - I N V E S T E D	 C A P I T A L
(System -All Services)
1976-
^' ]975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984. 1984
2_FTSTEDCAPSTFiL U?IZT Actual ^----'-------------PROJE CTE.D------------- - ------ - -
Debt $Mil
^% Senioz Debt -Banks 264 260 250 232 284 272- 280 330 320 3GD B6
Senior Debt-Insco/Other: " 403.. 329 291. !304 278 263 258 255 322 290 {113)
Senior Debt-Leases Cap'd " 485 499 413 -377 407 432 474 518 606 660 175
^ Senior Total - F.eptd 667 ' 589 541 - 536 562. 535 538 585 642 ^T?- -{I73`-	 '
k; Senioz Total +Cap Lses 1152 1038 954 913 969 967>, :m"'1012 1103 1248 1310 158
}t Subordinated " 331 291 281 263 263 323 352 377 372 359 28
Total Debt - Reptd - 998 860 822 799 825 858 890 962 1014 1C09 ^^-
1.
^:.al Debt +Cap Lses " 1483 1329 1235 1176 1232 1290 1364 1480 1620 1669 186
r Equ	 y
'Stock " 339' 399 411: 509 587. 687 815: 943 1072 1209 B70	 _
`. Stock.+ Sub DebC " 670 090 592 772 850 1010 1167 1320 1443 1568 698
^. Tot Inv Capital-Reptd " 1337 1279 1233 1308 1412 '1545 1705 1905 2085, 2218 881 ^
Tot Znv Capital +Cap Lses " 1822 1728 1696 1685 1819r 1977 2179 2423 2691 2878 1056
FLIGHT EQUIP_x1ENT
Depr Cost' " 836 775 714 674 746 822 950. 1091 1333
^-^
1495 659 II	 ^3
Depr Cost +Mfr Degc3sit " 860 779 760 799 896 1002 1137 1306 1487 1607 747
^' Depr Cost +	 ^ Cap Lses 1345 1228 1173 1176 1303 1434 1611 1824. 2093 2267 922 _:
YiOR3Ci'NG CAPITAL i
Zncl Cur Debt/Eauiv Wks COE $Mi ll/Wks 116 / 3 130 / 4 120/ 3- 140 /3 150 / 3 170 / 3 190 / 3 210 / 3 230 / 3 250 /3 134 /- '}
RATIO A"IALYSISlf	 (G)' UNIT/NORM
y Sr' Debt- z '
^. Equity (Stk +Sub) ^-1506 172 150. 138 118 114 96 87 64 86 84 (88)pts.
^ Sr Debt-:
^ F1 Eq (.Ter + Dep-+ Lse)' ^-..806 86' BS 81 78 74 67 63 60 60 58 (28)pts.
Caq Lses'Share Flt Eo 6- 33 36 37 35 32 31 30 29 28 29 29 (7)pts.
Total Debt z,;
^`
4
Stock Equity 6-1759 437. '333 300 231 210.. 188 167 157 151 138 ^ (299)pts. ;
'' :7 Y State Ins Law ,:
Fix Chg Cov - 12 t^s ::-1.5 0-2 0.8 1.0 1.2 1.4 1.5 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.Sx '
Fix Chg Cov - 5 yr Avg x-1. 5' 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.9 i.2 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.? 0.9x
Oper Ratio (Airline) 6 105 99 98 97 95 94 94 94' 94 94 (11)pts.
Return On Inv (Corp) 6 q0.7) 5.'0 5.6 7.2 8.6, 9.7 10.5- 10..3 9.6 9.5 10.2pts. ^	 .3
'.8
Rev	 Tot :Znv Cap $ 0.99 1.18 1.40 1.54 1.59 1.63 1.64 1.63 1.62 1.66 0.67
We! Can Carats 7/ 'S Mil 252 270 490 630 700 810 940. 950 880 ^	 800 -
Fin Azgd / ^ Argd "/$ 118 / 47 04 / 25 - / - - / - - / r - / - - /- - i r - / - - / - - / -
-Cash Generation
'Flow per $Equity C/9 Chg-30 l	 / (86) 11 / 1000 . 15 / 36 18 / 20 20 ^ 11 19 /(5) 19 / _ 18 /(5) 18 / - 18 / - 18 / 1700 ^
R_v Less COE
	 Mills/6 .Chg-5.00
prvr ASM 0.7]/ (66) 2.9]/ 310 3.45 19 4.14 / 20 4.7y 15 5.43 14 5_ By 8 5.8^ - 5.97/ 2 6.05 / 1 ^ 5.34 / 752
Note.:	 (G) See Glossary..
MOATEYABDLITY-
1/	 I2 months basis.	 +( Chan es are from end ofg	 prior; year. AFRO AD:	 INV. CA.ITAL 1976-1984 `
2/	 .het Cap-Courts =Next ttuc years projected capital expenditures. _
for flight equipment and GPE. TRANS	 W O R L D
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^,	 ECON^!a	 USA Sarong growth. ,into 1977. 	 Thereafter resumption of secular'GNP real Ditto
fr growth'at 3-4$ rate. .!Inflation rate to be about 5^ per year in
r 1976 and 1977. 	 Thereafter inflation to drop to 3^-4$ per year.
^ Unemployment rate to continue slow drop; consumer income and
r confidenoe to continue to advance..
.World Turnaround from recession levels slower than U.S. with inflation Ditto
rates to continue above USA's. ,,
'i
i	 ;: 1975-1980	 1980-1984.; 1975-1980	 1980-1984
^' Growth Rate Compounded "GRC" - Growth Rate Compot:i'^ded "GRC"
5	 TItAE'FIC Dom RPMS- (All .Services)	 7.5$	 6.1$ Dom RPMs;(All Services) 	 8,5^	 6.1i
^
F
Int'1 RPMs	 („'	 ^^	 )	 9.3^	 7.4!t Int'1 RPMs ,(”	 "	 )	 -o-	 ro
-''
CAPACITY- ASMS ad hoc by carrier, but'to generally increase at a lowerrate
'' than RPMs. -1976-1977'and part of 1978's increase mostly due. to System ASMs (A1L Services) 	 7^Oi	 6.1\
^' seating changes and maximum utilization.
LDAD FFCTOR Ad hoc by carrier; generally increasing between 3 and-4 percentage LOAD FACTOR System (All Services) to increase from 57:91
points. in 1975 to 62.S +k by .1984.
1976-1984 1976-1984
^GRC" "GRC"
-COST Labor (System)-(Avg.Compens/Empl)
	
7.7$ ^ Labor (System)	 (Avg Compens/Empl)	 7.6t
,INCREMENT Fuel	 (	 )	 (^/yal)	 5.3^ Fuel'	 (	 )	 (C/gal)	 6.2i	 `• ^)
^	 RATE Other (	 )	 (Industrial Prices) 	 4.,2^ Other (	 )' (Industrial Prices)	 3.4
,YIELDS Carriers' need to stay at least. even with general inflationary Xields
	 -	 Dom	 (fi/RPM)	 4.Ot
trends, necessitates annual yield increases between. 3-5$ minimum. "	 Int'1 (	 "	 )	 -o-
£QUIPI^NT To maintain seat mile range distribution and to allowBuys to concentrate-on presently available aircraft through 1980.
By 1981-1982 new technology aircraft parametered in are: down-ranging of older type equipment, new 	 buys concentzate ^
r
180 seat medium range type 'on 727-200s:, DC-lOs, 7476 and 180 seat medium range ,type
' 20D seat. long range type aircraft.. By 1984, 219 aircraft still in .fleet do not
to help: with pzessng need for ..fuel economies. and to _meet the meet FAR part 36 requirements.
environmental imperative of the late 1970's and .early 1980's.
MONEYA82LITY Cost of Capital - Ad " hoc by carrier: Prime leading rate at 8-B. Si Ditto 9
^^th carriers paying between.	 to 1$ above prime.
Availability of Capital -very restricted until deregulation Strong improvement in earnings and cash generation, plus
debate is settled.	 Funds to come from banks, manufacturers and excessive. working capital on hand, allows UAL to finance ^ `^
through: leasing:.	 Loans from insurance companies restricted to most needs internally.
	
Reliance on small bank revolver
a wezy few carriers, due to `constrained "Gash gereratop and plus leasing of aircraft cover remaining needs. -0ther 	 ^
earnings. outlook. financing Options open: equity market and insco money from '^
1980 ,
 on.	
^ 1
CAB Proposals under Aviation Act of 1975 not parametered"into study.' Ditto ^
AFRO ADVANCED will be re-done, when and if the various proposals
have been enacted and-a time frame is established.
i
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„Earnings” ^s
United has made an excellent recovery from	 a - 16 day strike last December and. its
aftermath which continued into the first quarter ^f this year. 	 After posting a $70.5
million operating loss in the e. first quarter, we believe that United will end 1976 with
a $38 million operating profit. 	 .The main seasons for this turn-around are strong RPM
^ 	 ;growth (United .benefited from the on-.again, off-again .strike threats against TWA), very.
strong charter growth, and vastly improving yields thanks to fare increases and major
`reductions in discount fares. 	 GAL's unit costs are expected to rise 11% this year with
fuel up 18% as a result,of its contracts having expred..at the end of 1975. 	 "Nettings" r
i^	are reduced from their 19.75 level because of much. lower, interest income.
The: outlook for a healthy 1977 ^s promising as RPM growth will continue to^be above.
the 1976-1984 average and costs look to be under control. 	 The all important operating
..ratio should fall two points and the carrier's ROI will be more than double. its 1975
figure.
^	 Over the 9 year period under examination United's earnings prospects . .are . good, but
not spectacular.	 Net earnings as a percentage of . revenues is 3.5% and the operating ^
ratio is 94%.	 HoweE^er, back in 1967^United earned 6.6% on sales and had an .operating
ratio of 90%.	 With earnings increasing sharply over the next five years^and,the invest-
^y
ment base actually. declining,UAL's return on investment shoots up from 3.3% last year to
'' its peak of 10.9% in 1980' and 1981. 	 It should be kept.. in mind that .even . though. the a
carrier: does not earn the CABs 12% ROI standard during the period;, United should have no
trouble Financing its equipment needs. '^
(See other 3' schedules.)
Notes:'	 The:'$11 million-jump in 1976's depreciation expense is :caused by the carry- ,:
over of 7 DC-lOs`delivered last: year and large ground property and e quipment additions
this year.	 Grows interest expense falls throughout. the study as'UAL +does_not_-need to
borrow any money-until 1982. 	 "Nettngs" which accounted for e. 60% of reported earning
during the last four years will only be 24% of the $1.3 billion in projected earnings
over thee. 1976-1984 period.
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E A R N I N G S
_calendar .years
1976-
,` Unit 1975 1976 1977 -----I978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983-	 -	 ----1984 -- 1985
Actual
---------	
P R O J E C T E D--------------	 ---------
-	 --
L:	 Revenues^,, I
Passenger SMil 1899 2297 2586 2883 3205 3556 3922 4314 4736 5182 32,681
^..	 Freight
^°`
143 161 179 200 223 245 270 296 325 356 2,255
^,	 Totat Revenues 2230 2629 2957 3297 3666 4064 4484 4931 5412 5423
--
37,363.
^^^
Cash Oder' £
Laber " ' 997 1163 1300 1440 1584 1762 1963 2185 2417 2677 16,4,1
Fuel " 374 482 542 597 64S 696 751. 816 891 968 6,385
Other " 685 756 845 926 1022 1124 1242 1367 1500 1646 10,428
Total COE 2^6" 2401, .2687 2958 3251 3584 3956 4368 4808' ^1 33,30
Depr/Amon 179 190 194 199 206 216 226 229 236 259 1,955
s
^
Total Oper Exp " 2235 2591 2881 3157 3457 3800 4182 4597 5044. 5550 35,259
Oper. Earnings " (5) 38 76 140 209 264 302 334. 368 373 2,104
^	 Gross Interest 47 45 42 39 36 33 30 32 32 31 320
Pa,e-Tax Earnings
`.	 Eac.. Tax SMl
(52)
(17
(7)
(3)
34
15
101
45
173
78
231
104
272.
122
302
136
336
351
342
154
1,784
802
'
E£f. Rate ^ cr cr 45=^ 458 45a 458 458 458 458 95s 458
Net Earnings
Airline Operations SMil (51) {4) 19 56 9S 127 150 166 185 188 967
'Nettings" " 46 32 41 34 35 33 30 34 35 ^	 42 .316
Reptd to Stockholders (5) 28 60 90 130 160. 180 200 220 230 1,298-
RATIOS
t
t	 Traffic (A31 Services) Bil/BChg
RPMs'- DOGS' '" 3 28.`l/(4) 32.x'14 34.$8 37.^^7 39.$7 42.7 45.x/6 48.Q^6 50.x'6 53.x'6 25.x':.5 GRC
RP^.v -System "'	 /	 " 28,.2 / (4) 32.3/ 14 34. $^ 8 37.?/ 7 39. $/ 7 42. $^ 7 45. $/ 6 48. ry 6 50.9' 6 53.9! 6 25. x 7.5 GRC
ASMs -System " / 48.7/ (1) 54.Q^11 57.$6 60.Ey'6 64.3/6 66.x/6 72.7/6 76.$!6 81.y6 86.y6 37..x.6.6 GRC
^^	 7aad Factor -System 8 57.9 59.8 60.5 61.3 61.8 62.3 62.5 62_5 57.5 62.5 4.6 j	 (((
^	 Yield -Dom fiRPM/8Ch4 6.74 /	 1 7.1^/ 6 7.4^ 5 7.7C/ 5 B.OE/ 4 6.37/ 4 8.6^ 4 8.9^' 3 9.3Q' 4 9.67/ 3 2.68' 4.0 GP.0 I{
Yield -System ;' / 6.74 / 1 7.	 J/ 6 7.4g/ 5 7'.7C/ 5 B.OF/ 4 8.37/ 4 8.6^' 4 8.9^' 3 9.3q' 4 9.67/3 2.8$^ 4_0 GRC
COST INCREMENT (COE} ,
Iabor (Non-Add}' SMil/ ' 8 68 / 8 104 / 10 '106 / 9 109 / 8 102' / 7 116 / 7 128 / 7 144 / 7 156 / 7 174 J 7 1,139.
Fuel	 " " /	 " 73 /25 75/18 35/7 34/6 29/5 29/4 38/4 33/4 35/4 35/4 333
^	 - pthez /--	 "	 ^' 86 / 15 (5)/ (1) 40 / 5 35 / 4 38 / 4 41 / 4 51 / 4 46 / 4 49 / 3 60 / 4 355
-Total / ' 227 / 13 174, / 11 181 / 8 178 / 7 169 / 5 186 / 6 207 / 5 223 / 6 340 / 5 269 3 6 1, 827
FYeighted Index (1967100} No /$Chg :194 / 13 215 / 11 232 / 8 247 / 7 261 / 5_ 776 / 6 39l/5 307 / 6 324 / 5 343 / 6 149 / 6.5 8AC
A
HERO AD: EARNINGS 1976-1964
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..Flight Equipment"
,;
^	 Possessing 'the largest as well as th? oldest fleet in the industry, United is fi
facing a massive $2,8 billion reed for new aircraft by 19$4. 	 By increasing seating
and.. utilization on existing aircraft, UAL will not have to_ start this. major buying j
program. until 1979..	 However, to meet .. specif^c needs UAL has recent^y purchased. 6
DC 8-50s whose leases had expired, and has a tentative agreement to purchase 2 used
DC ^8-6Is for 1977 and 1978 delivery. 	 .Sri&E believes that UAL will reach a .
 satisfactory ^
^	 'agreement with the lessors of the 23 727-100v which expire
	 e 1978 and that these ^
'planes 'will be bought by the carrier,
	 Asc^ there is a: possibility that some of the ^
727-200	 tha	 have been bought fear 197
	 delivery will come into the fleet a year
earlier, ^	 i
}
New bins are predicated on keeFing UAL's ASM/range at approximately 2J3 long-range ^	 ^'
and,1/3,short-to =medium..' Until•. the air freight case now before the CAB _is decided
United has no plans to sell any of its DC-8 freighters or
	
to purchase a 747F.	 However, ^
we would not be surprised if UAL placed an order for awide-bodied cargo plane in the
next few years.
United, along. with all other carriers,. is anxiously awaiting the DOTs ruling .
 on
retrof	 and.. other environmentaT..issues.
	 In 1976 only 39^ of UAL'S ASMs will be flown ^ ^
by environmentally acceptable aircraft.
	 Even with the $2.8 billion in new aircraft.
UAL'will still be flying 218 planes in 1984 which do not meet FAR-part 36 .regulations.. a i
To replace these aircraft, which are generating about 27 billion ASMs, would require '
another-$2.5 billion in capital expenditures. 	 Obviously, if the carrier is forced to
"` rep aca these additional aircraft, thz other:3 schedules in this report would have to be
drastically altered and Unted`s<outlook would become dimmer.
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^^ £L?GHTE9UIPbLNT. -:PURCH7.SE / REMOVALS / PAYPSENTS / ZFP.SES ^'
GROUND PROPERTX ^ EQUIPPSENT (projected costs) ;;
Fi 1976-
«; Unit	 1975	 1976	 197T 1978	 1979' 1980 1981 1982 198 1984 1984
a ?YlFCCHAS^nS/LEASES (L)	 Actual - -	 -	 - - - - - -P R -0 J E C' T E D - - - - - -	 -	 y -	 - -
- - -	 -	 - - - -	 - - - -
-	 -
Additions-
	 No. A/C
727=20p	 -	 - -	 15 12 -
'.
- 27
DC-10-10	 7 -	 - -	 3' 6 6 2 - 6 23
747	 - -	 - -	 - 2 3 3 2 - 10
180 . Seat M/R	 - -	 - -	 - - 7 _	 ].5 15 10 47.
' Tota1. Additions
	 7 -	 - -	 ^$ ^^ ^- 20 —I^, ^I^ 107
Total Cost. A/C ,Typel/
	$Mill ,
727-200.	 ^- -	 - 172 144 - - - ; 316
DC-10-10	 150 -	 - -	 84 176 186' 65 - 214 725
.' 74Z	 _ _	 _ _	 - 94 147 155 108 - 504
280 Seat M/R -	 - -	 - - 185 397 418 293 1,293
'
I
Total Cost. Aircraft
	 1t0 -	 - -	 256 ^' -ZSr X17 526 ^^ 2.•838 `
Removals	 No A/C
737	 2 2	 - -	 - - - - 2 ^
L)C-8-20 -	 - 10"	 9 10 - - - - 29
DC-8-50	 - -	 - -	 - - - 5 5 6 16
727-100s	 - - -	 - - 15L 15L - - 30
Total Removals
	 2 2	 - —1^	 9 ^ 15 20 5 ^ '°^17 ^	 '
1
^	 ^
yyy
1• PAY MEN TS 4/
^Flight Eq'Payments	 $ Mi1Z
-
-	
32 114	 170. 184 147 108 85 95 930F<dvance Deposits
1l0 7	 4 24	 102 165. .207 247 210 203 1,170Delivery
Sparess Nodifs etc	 40 33	 34 22	 28 31 3b 35 45 42 310
Total Flt;Eq Payments	 "	 150 40	 70 360	 - 3U^ 380 390 390. ddb- -3d6' 2,410 ^
.^ Total Flt Eq Leases 2/ 80 120 16D 190 160 150 860 ^
E Total Flight Equipment	 150 40	 70 160	 380 500
550 580 500 490 3,270 4	 7€
GRIT, PROP,. & EQUZP 3/ 	 34
'I
60	 70 SO	 50 50 60 50 7U 70	 - 540
r	
^ ,`,"01 5: {L-Leased, :all others 70€ p^irchased)
k	 ^ 1/ Cost p=_r Aircraft Twe - numbeX x cost per aircraft izrcl baseprice ± CFE/MC/spares. SHSE derived.
2/,L=aces - @ 30$ of total aircraft cost per year :(1979-1984). AFRO AD: FLT. EQUIP/GPE 1976-1984 '^^'
3/ Grct.;Prep &.Equip. -Subject to management reprogramming.
4/:Pawn=_nts -{SH &z derided; reflect escalation)
'Advance Dez>o$its -pre-delivery @ 30$ of unit price. U N Y T E D
Delve.
	 -balance remaining @ aircraft acceptance
'Spar2s,Aiodifs, etc - @ 10i of aircraft cost (oz derived) {	 ^:.
,,=
p
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"Capital Needs and Sources"
4
Unted's strong cash f10-^ permits the carrier to fund over 7G$ of its capital:
expenditures with internally generated cash. fihe remaining needs are filled by
,,
leasing 30^ of UAh's'incoming fleet and by a minimal $110 million in borrowings,
United could, of course,'decde to reduce its".lease financing, and"with its D/E
` ratios and earnings in good shape (see :other. 'schedules) UAL would have no problem
borrawng from the-manufacturers, banks, or' insurance companies;. it caul qualify
under the N.Y. State" insurance Law by 1980; or selling .debt or equity to the public.
GPE expenditures are considerably higher than in 1975-:as-United is doing some
major work ,at its San Francisco terminal and is installing a new computer system at
its' r:,aintenance center. 'Major debt.. retirements' start in 197^i but it is a well `managed
debt payment scT^edule which should prove to be no problem to United.. Working capital
remains at eery high-levels during the next.
 few years so that when UAL starts its
fleet buying in 1979 it will 'be able to eat into working capital without violating
the 3 week' norm.	
,.
SH&E .has projec edcaptal exnerditures'of $3.8 billion for United oven the
1976-19.84 .period.. If these outlays are discounted back to the present at a 5$ rate,
the present value of these expenses are approximately $3 billion. To put this number
""	 in perspective during the same 9 year span. 1966-1975 United spent about $2.8 billion
for new flight equipment, including leased aircraft, .and GPE.
Based on SH&E''s- parameters "UAL. will have no problem financing its capital needs..
If the carrier is farted to replace its first generation jet arcraft'at a faster-
rate than we had projected, the numerous capital resources available to UAL`smanagement
would probably see the carrier through, though obviously the schedules in thin report'..
would not look as good.
Recap 1976-1985'
Needs: $4.'92 b^.lion (66o flight equipment, 11^ GPE, 1O^ debt retirement, and 5^
dividends.)
Sources': $3.37 billion or 69$-from operations (2b^ earnings, 40$ depreciation)
^	 $1.24 billion or 25^ new financing.'
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ICApIT^:L NEEDS A.^lD SOJnCES ($ MILL)
	
- calendar years -
	
j
`	
197b-
	
'
	
'	 1475	 1976	 1977	 1978	 1979	 1980	 1981	 1982	 1983	 1984
	 1984CA?ITALN`EDS
	 ACTUAL- --	 ---- ------- P ROJECTED---
- -- - -------------- ___-
Flight Equif m^:nt,
 Payments
- ?tdvance uezbsats
	 -	 32	 119	 179	 184	 147	 108 ~	 85	 95	 930	 ;i
- Belivex`y	 110	 7	 4	 24	 102	 i55	 207	 247	 210	 303
	 1,170	 '
	
'	 -'Spares, Morli_`, etc.	 40	 33	 34	 22	 29	 31	 36	 35	 45	 42	 310
	^';	 2bta1 FIt Equig 'Fayments
	 1S0	 40	 70	 i6o	 300	 380
	 390.	 390	 340	 340	 2,410	 ;^
	
^^^	 Adds Flt £quip Leases
	 ^_	 -	 80'	 120	 160	 190	 160	 ?^:_	 860
Total Flight Equipment
	
150	 40 -	 70	 160	 380	 500	 S50	 580
	 500	 1490	 3.270
	
!	 —'Ground Prog 6 Eq/Other
Grd_Prop &Equip .
	34	 60	 70	 50	 50	 50	 60	 60	 70.	 70	 540 i
Debt Retirement
	 20	 43	 ^5	 53	 53	 53	 69	 61	 61	 61	 .510
Dividends..	 15	 l5	 15	 20	 25	 25	 35	 35	 40'	 45	 250	 j
	
e	 Other
	
-	 2	 -	 7	 2'	 2	 6	 4	 9	 4	 40
	
^	 Total GPE s Other	 69	 12A	 190	 130.	 130	 130	 170
	 160	 180.	 180
	 L, 340	 a
	
'^	 En3 F7icg Cap (3wks COE prof)
	 311	 380	 440	 450	 390	 310	 220.	 250	 280	 310
	 310;,
TOTAh CAPITAL NEEDS 	 530	 540	 6z0	 740	 900	 940.	 940	 990	 960.	 .980
	 4 20
	
u	 -
C^IPITAL SOURCES
^:
	
f 	^ Beginning s^orking Capital
	 341	 311	 380	 440	 4	 ^	 ^
	
50	 390	 ^-'^^ ^' Q_ _Z.^_ ^ZflO_ _320_
	
^`	 Cperations
	
G	
e
- t7et Earnings (Rept'd}	 (Sj	 28	 60	 90	 I30	 160.	 180	 200	 220	 230	 1,300
	
^	 -Depreciation/A_*rort	 179'	 190	 194	 199	 206	 216	 226	 229	 236	 259	 1,950
- Pxaperty Sale/Other
	 13	 18	 16	 11	 lO	 9	 10	 11	 12	 11	 210	 {
- 
Ather	
-__2__' ^ _.SZL	 -	 4	 5	 4	 -	 2	 -	 IO
.Total Operations'	 '189	 229
	 270	 300	 350	 390
	 420	 440	 470	 500	 3,370
•
Financing krrangements
- Seniox Debt-Banks	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 80	 30	 -	 110	 f
_ ^^	
^ -Inscojf3thers	 _	 _	 -	 -	 -	 -	 _	 _	 -	 _	 _	 l
-'Subord Debt.	 -	 -	 _	
-	 -	
-	
-	 -	 -	 (
- Leases.CCag @ AC Cost) 	 _	 _	 _	 -	 $0	 120	 160	 19A	 160	 150	 860
- Deposits returnable 	 _	 -	 20	 40	 50	 6L^	 50	 50	 270	 d^,
- Stock Sales	 -	
-	 -	
-	
-	 ^ -	 ^	 -	 -	 -
Tot Financing Arrangements 	 -	 -	 100..	 160	 210	 330.	 240	 200	 ^ 240	
.^^
TOTAL CAPITAL SOURCES	 530	 540	 650	 740	 900	 940	 '940	 990	 96C	 980	 4.920
FT:IANCING TU BE ARRPNGED 	 -	 -	 -	 -	 100	 i60	 210	 3.30	 240	 200	 1,240
AERO ADtCAPZTAL'NEEDS.& SOURCES 1g7lr^1984
3
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"Moneyability"
UAL is currently in a strong financial position and with capital expenditures at a
rather modest level during the next three. years 	 the carrier will be in excellent shape
r'' to meet'its'huge fleet buying requirements starting in 1979. 	 Its cash generation ratio
^'' fell precipitous yin 19"75, but with earnings improving, this vital indicator is point-
r j ing upwards... and,by,1978 UAL will be comfortably above the 5 mills norm. 	 As a result of
^'' thi	 strong internal ability to finance itself, together with its superior working cap-
#^ ital position	 (in 19.77 .and 1978 over $400 million in W°.C. which is more	 han 8 weeks of, ;
cash operating expenses) and 	 ts,tailingne s to lease 300 of its incoming aircraft, UAL
,, will only have to borrow-.$110 million over the next 9 years.. 	 Consequently, its D/E ^
^„ , ratios fall `dramatically, ^
^ If> United decides not to lease the 30^ of incoming flight equipment.. pararietered into
'	 ' the stud	 '-y, its ^.reasurer will have a host of other financing options.` 	 With the senior
debt/equity ratio in goon shape U,AL could borrow considerably more from the banks, and ^	 ^.
starting in 1980 it qualifies under the N. Y. State Insurance Law.	 Possessinga strong ^	 ^^!
earnings outlook., UAL might even decide to go to the public marketfor a debt or equity ^	 y
offering.
•^
UAL`s good, but not great, earnings outlook means that the . crucial operating ratio ^'
will drop from ,the uncomfortably high levels of 175 and 1976 and the carriers ROI will
^; improve tremendously, even though:. it never reaches 120.
A ;$37 million elimination of a self-insurance reserve is a major reason why 1976's
depreciated cost'of flight equipment falls $15.6 million•. from its 1975 level. 	 Revenue
I_j as a percent of Inve ted Capital jumps 23^ thus ,. year because . of last year`s strike; the
^^ strong RPM and yield increases this year, and a reduction in the carrier's :investment'
base.
^ One caveat to this basically healthy outlook is the possibility.. that :UAL might have.
to speed up its fleet revamping for .environmental reasons (see Flt Equipment. schedule).
If' heis forced to invest additional hundreds 	 of millions or even billions in, .carrie
new flight equipment, its financial resources would come under tremendous strain.	 How- e
ever, its ability to build up and strengthen its balance sheet over-the next ` few years
! would probably still give it enough financing .options to see it through.
I
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^, t:APITAL NEEDS AND` SOURCES ($ MILL)
f
^" -calendar years -
1976-
^ 1975 1976. 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1984
CAPITAL°NEEDS ACTUAL-
---- ---- -- ------ P RO.JE-CTE D--- = -_	 --- - ------ 
---^-- ----
Flight Equpment'Payments
-1 Advance':Deposts
- 32 114 170 184 1^7 108 85 95 930
^'t, -Delivery_ 110 3 4 24 102 165 207 247 210 203 1,170.
^' -Spares, hsodif.:etc. 40 33 34 22 28 31 36 35 45 42 310
Total Flt Equip Payments.. 1^- 40 70 160 300 380 390 390 340 340 2:,410
^^
Add:.. Flt Equip Leases ^, 80 120 160 190 160 150 860 '
,i Total Plight Equipment 150 40 70 160 380 '' 500 550 '	 S80 500 _490 3.270
1 Ground Prog	 & Eq/Other
Grd.prop 6 Equip 34 60 70 50 50 50 60 60 70 70 540
Debt Retirement 20 43 55 53 53 53 69 61 61 61 510
^, Dividends 15 15 1S 20 25 25 35 35 40 45 250 ^	 `,
rg Other - 2 - 7 2 2 6 4 9 4 40 s	 '
E{ Total GPE &Other 64 120 140 ..130 130 130 170' 160 180 180 1,340 ^
Is
End Wkg Cap (3wks COE proj) 311 380" 440 4S0 390 310 220 250 280 310 310
TOPAL CAPITAL NEEDS 530 S40 650 740 90D 940 940 990 960 980 ^'^20
^
^
__.
';
^!
CA_^ZTAL SOURCES
^ Beginning Working Capital 341 311` 380 440 _ 450 390 :310 220 ,2^0 2sa 31Q
Oy^erations
- taet Earnings (Rept'd} (5) 28 60 90 130 160 180 200 220. 230 1,300 a	 '
r - Depreciation/Amort 179 .190 194. 199 206 216 226 229 236 259 1,950
-Property Sale/Other 13 18 16 11 10 9 10 11 12 11 lI0 £	
i
-Other ? (7)
- - _^_ ^^ 4 2 - 10
tTotal Operations	 '- 189 229 270 .300 350 390 420 440 4?0 500` 3.370
Financing Arrangements -
i	 +r
-Senior Debt-Banks - - - - - - RO 30
-
:110.
-	 -Snsco/Others _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _
- Subord Debt _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
-Leases {Cap @ AC Cost) - - - - 80' 120 160 190 160 150 860
^^ -Deposits. returnable _ _ _ - 20 40 SO 60 50 50 270
``
^,
a, -Stock Sales - - - - - - - - - -
Tot Financing Arrangements - - - - 100 160 210 330 240 200. 1240 ^ ^
TOTAL CAPITAL SO(7RCES 530 S40 650 740. 900 940 940 990 960 980' 4 .920
r^L'tANCING TO SE ARRA2JGED - - -
_ 100 160 210 330 240 Z00	
1
1,240 i
ij
....
4
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(System`- All. Services) ,;
` 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 .1980 1981 1982: 1983 1984
1976-
1984.
1
^	 '
f
1?I'^STED CAPIT:,L	 'UNIT Actual --------------------------- P R O J E C T E D------------------------------------------ --------^
°'
Debt	 S, Mil
'"Se^_ior Debt -Banks: - - - - - 80 110 110 110
Se.-iior Debt-Insco/Other 63:7 593 543 502 460 418 360 310 261 211 (425) ;
Senior Debt-Leases Cap'd 	 " 473 425 377 333.. 365 436 536 653 733 805 332
Senoz Total'- Reptd	 " 637 593 543 502 460 418 360 390 ^^- ^3 T^
9 Senior Total.+Cap Lses	 " 1110 1018 920 635 825 854 896 1043. 1104 1126 16 '
^} Subordinated 182 182 177 165 154 143 131 120 106 96 {d6)
t Total Debt - Reptd 819 775 720 667 624 561 491 5.10 479 417 (402)
^ Total Debt +Cap Lses 12.92 1200 1097 1000 979 997 1027 1163 1212 1222 (70)
Y 4
Stocc	 " 628 641 686 756 661 `996 1141 1306 1486 1671 1,043 1
Stock'+ Sub.-Debt	 " 810 823' 863, 921 1015 1139 1272 1426 1594 1767 957 '
Tat Inv Capital-Reptd
	 " 1447 1416 1406 '1423 1475 1557 1632.' 1816 1965 2088 641
Tot Inv Capital +Cap Lses 1920 1841 1783 1756
-
1840 1993 2168 2469 2698 26.93 973 ^
,
ZIGh'T EQUIP!".E :'T - -
Depr Cost 1271 1115 lOb7 904 :320 :1038 1222' 1473 1654 1800 529
J
Depfi cost +Mfr Deposit 1271 1115 1039 1050 1],59 .1337 1513 1686 1794.. 1883 612	 ,_ i
DepSr Cost + ' " +Cap Lses 1744 1540 1416 1383 1524 1773 2049 2339 2527 ,2688. 944 ^	 •'
St2`.RKTNG Ce1PZTAL ,
Inc1 Cur Debt/Equiv Wks C0E
	 SMll/Wks 311' / 8 380 / 8 440 / 9 450 / 8 - 390 i' 6 ' 310 / 4 220 / 3 250 / 3 280 / 3 310 / 3 -	 / (5)
R3TI0'A::ALYSISl/ 	(G)
	
UNIT/NORM' {.Sr Debt .. .,
Equity (Stk +Sub)
	 ^-150$ 137 124 107 91 Bl 75 70 73 69 64 (73)pts.
r Sz Debt I
Fl wr, (Net + Dep + Lse)
	 8- 80^ 64 66 65 60 54 48 4A 45 44 42 (22)pts. t^	 ;
Cap Lses Share Fl t.Eq 	 $- 338 27 28 27 24 24 25 26 28 29 30 3 pts. }
^ Tota1'Debt
Stock' Equity	 8-1.758 206 187. 160 132 114 200 90 89 82 73 (133)pts.
:I °State Ins Law 1Fix Chg Cov = 12 gas	 ::-1.5 0:7 1.0 1.2 1.6 2.0 2.3 2.4 2.4 2.4' 2.4 L7 x
Fix _Chg Cov.	 Syr Avg	 x- 1.5 1.2 1.2 1.2 1, 2 1.3 1.6 1.9 2.1 2.3 2.4 1.2 x !!
Open Ratio (Airline)
	
8 100 99 97 96 94 94 93 93 93 94 (6)pts.'
Return On Tny (Corp).	 8 3:3 5.2 7.0 8.5 ]q.2 10.9 10.9 10.6 10.6 10.3 7.0 pts.	
_,
:i
^ Rev	 Tot Inv Cap	 $ 1.16 1.43 1.66 1.88 1.99 -2.04 2.OT 2.00 2.01 2.05 0.89
I' met Cag CosRES2/	 S Mil 83 350 640 980:. 1160 1250 1210 1130 .3050' 1000.
Fin Argd / 8 Ar4d
	 "/8 -o-/_ -/-
_
- /- - /- - /_ - /_ - /_ -	 /- - /- - /- -/ - i
Cash Generation
Fiow per $Equity
	 G/a Chg-30 16,/(45) 23 / 4^ 25 / 9 28 /12 30 / 7 30 / - 30 . / - 28 / (7} 26 / (7)	 25 / (4) 9 / 56 ;',
Rev. Less COE 	 Mills/^ Chg-5.00
per ASM 3.57 /(52) 4.2'y 18 4..7q'11 5.5^ 19 6, 4$^ 15 7:D$^ 9 7.3^/ 4 Z 3^ - ..7.41/ 1 7,. 3^ (1) 3.7E 105
Moneyability
2iote:	 (G)	 $ee Glossary. AEROs Inv. Capital 1976-1984.
1/ 12 months basis: 8 Cnanges aze Prom end of prior year. UNITE D
2/	 Net Cap . Comts = '37ext- 2.years pzojected capital expenditures
,..for .flight egiupment a,-^d GPE.
,..	 ,	
.--.
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P A R A M E T "E R S
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------U.S_ TRUNKS & PAA'_ ------'----_ _ -__ -___ __ __WESTRiccv`-'---- 	 ----`-	 --_	 -^-
ECONOMY,USA Strdng growth into 1977.	 Thereafter resumption of secular DIT?`O
A GNP real gro.^ h at 3-4^s rate.	 Inflation rate to be about
58 per. year in 1976'and 1972	 Thereafter inflation to drop
to 3§-48 per year.
	
Unemployment sate to continue slow drop;:
^ consumer income and confidence to continue to advancei
Turnaround from recession levelsalower than U.S. with DITTO)^	 World
K 'inflation rates to continue above USA's.
i 1975-1980	 1980-1984 1975—T980 	 1980-1984
^' Growth Rate Compounded "GRC" Growth Rate Compounded "GRC"'
TRAFFIC Dom RPMs (All Services)
	 7.53	 6.18 Dom RPMs (All Services)	 7.1$	 S.9R
Int'1 RPMs	 ("	 "	 )	 9.3.9	 7.4$ Int'1 RPMs ("	 )	 8.88	 6.98
.CAPACITY ASMS ad hoc by carrier, but to generally increase at a ,
lower rate than RPMs.	 1976-1977 and part of 1978's System ASMS (A11:Services). 	 7.58	 4.88
^ increase mostly due to seating changes :and .maximum
,,
utilization..
a
;,t	 LOAD FACTOR Ad hoc by carrier; generally increasing;,between 3 and 4 LOAD FACTOR System (A11 Services) to increase from 60.78 '	 i
percentage points. in 1975. to 62..58 by 1984. ^	 ^s'
1976-1984 1976-1984 ^	 r*i
R '.. n GRCn ^GRC"
COST `Labor .(System)	 (Avg . Compens/Empl)	 7.78 Labor (System)	 (Avg Compens/Empl)	 7.7$	 ^ ^
,,,	 INCREMENT Fuel	 (	 ^^	 )	 (fi-gal)
	
5.38	 _ Fuel	 (	 )	 (fi ga17	 5:1^	 ^ 3	
r
RATE Other (	 )	 (Industrial Prices) 	 4.28 Other (	 )	 (Industrial Prices) 	 3.68 3
XIELDS Carriers' need to stay at least even with general Yields -Dom (fi/RPM) 	 4.18
(, inflationary trends, necessitates annual yield increases "	 - Int'1	 '(')	 3.78g)
,:
between 3-59-minimum. 	
^
f
i
.,
,
EQUIPMENT Buys to concentrate on presently available aircraft through Buys concentrate on DC-lOs,,727-200s and 180 seat M/R to allow for ^!
' 1980.	 By 1981-1982 new technology aircraft parametered in route expansion. and SN!/range ciistzibuton.
	 Carrier is especially_ ^^
^,	 `are: -18D seat medium range type vulnerable to environmental noz^^ <_ysmog legislatio^^ at operating
200 seat long range type headquarters (LAX), so study phau;es,out 7208s, 707- 320Cs and '7375.
	 -
t to help with pressing need for fuel economies and to meet
t	
^^
C the ^:vironmental imperative of the late 1970's and early
,k ) 1980'x.
^^	 MONEYABILZTY Cost of Capital - Ad hoc by carrier.
	 Prime lending rate DITTO °
at 8-8.59 with carriers paying between ^ and 1'percent above
prime.
f' Availability of Capital —.very restricted until deregulation Improved earnings power gives management aide range of financing
debate is settled.
	 Funds 'to come from banks,; manufacturers' option:	 Requalification for insurance company financing in 1977 `%
and through leasing:	 Loans from insurance companies.- (after short term disqualification during 1976) provides live
I restricted Y.o a very few carriers, due to constrained cash option alternative and/or supplement to, bank loan's and aircraft
generation and earnings outlook. leasing,.'.
'CAB Proposals under Aviation Act of 1975 not parametered into DITTO
^ study::	 AFRO ADVAFvCED will be re -doAey when and i£ the '
various proposals have been enacted and:'a time frame is
I established.
-
I..
^' AFRO. AD: PARAMETERS 1976-1984.
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C O M M E N T A R Y
,' EARNINGS ^^
Western's 1976 reported earnings will be only fractionally higher than las year's figure;
but operating income will have more-.than doubled. The major difference is in our "netting°
figure which is $5.9 million lower this year. Last year WAL made'an accounting-change in regard
to its major flight.-equipment maintenance which contributed $7.16 million to net income.
Western's 2rd'zalf 1975 RPM's will be virtually flat as last year's period was distorted
by strikes agans-t competitors National,'Northwest and United.. However., yield increases will
''	 cause revenues to increase .about: l0% during.. the 2nd. , half and 14^.forthe full . year. Cargo
revenues will be up; about 250 over 1975 'as the freight business is very strong in both the domestic
and international markets.
WAL's cash operating expenses were up 15d during the_lst half 1976 but the rate of .increase.
r	 should moderate to 12o for the full year. For the six months 'unit labor costs were 15^ higher
l
	
	
than last year, fue 7o higher, and "other"-were-actually.<down 3^, which, aver aged out to 8^. For.
all of` 1976 unit costs should increase about 7.30.
^•K
	
	 1977 looks' to be a,'good year for Western as above average RPM growth (mainly from carry-oven-
on the newl^r i.augurated Honolulu-Vancouver and Los Angeles-Miami routes) plus higher yields
should translate into a 50% increase in operating earnings. The neca tax law .just signed by
President Ford will decrease the carrier's tax .rate and the net result will be-a healthy. 54$
increase in reported net income.
The longer term outlook for Western is good but not spectacular. Reported earnings far the
9.:year,perod are 4.24 of revenues and, the carrier does ':not earn the CAB's 12% ROI;standard until
].981 (see Moneyabilty-schedule). Ta put those numbers in: perspective, it hould be noted that in
1974 WAZ, returned 13.1, on its investment while earning 4.930 on every,dallar of revenues.
With over a third of its 1975 RPM's being flown to A4exico and Hawaii, Western is potentially
vulnerable to increased competition from ABC and -0TC charters. Y^estern is also faced with the
prospect that a large part of its business (..Alaska, Hawaii and Mexico) is not coverad under the
CAB's domestic rate--making cases, and it may have trouble getting adequate fare increases in these
predominantly pleasure markets.'
N.B. By undercharging its"6 moo. 1976 advertising expenses and by reducing pension costs,
WAL contributed $1.72 million to 6 mos. operating income .,: or 19$ of total.
^:
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EARNINGS ^	 .^
-'calendar years - ,'
1976-
Unit ' 1975 1976 1977 1978' 1979 1980 1981 1982 >1983 1984 1984
Actual" ---- --	 --- ---- PROJECTED- --------------------- i
^^i
^`.
Revenues
469 534 604 674. 748 829 915 1004 1101 1204 7613 fPassenger $Mil •
'^1 Freight 24 30 35 40 45 51 58 65 73 82 479
K" j
^ Total Revenues 519 590 670 745'. 830 '920 1010 1110 1220. 1340 8435
^.f, -
"• h,
^',^
Cash	
...E
OPer xQ
^' Labor 202 225 25^, 280 308 339 377 422 468 521. 3191
93 103 '_19 133' 147 i57 167 180 194 209 1409^I Fu^ _
" 130: 204 230 256 281 307 333 364 396 429 2800.
i^ Tor_a.1 COE 475 532 600 669 736 803 877	 -- 966 1058 1159 7400
^: , ^ y	 ,
^; Depr/Am^rt 36 38 40 43 42 44 40 ' 45 51 56 399"
'h ^.btal Open Exp " 510 570 640 712 778 847 ^SI^ -Iblr .1109 1215 7799
^i Oper_ Earnings 8.6 `^G-` '^^ ^3' ^^ 73 93 99 .111 125 636
^ ^ ^ Gross Z-^te^ est 9.0 9 Il 13 15 18 19 21 22 23 151 ^	 ^^:
^.' aze-Tax iarnings (.4) 11 19 20 37 55 74 78 89 102 485
)' ^ Inc. Tax $Mil (.8J 4 3 2 9 19 26 31 36 S1 173
^;'' Effy Rate g cr 40^ 16$ 10$ 25$ 34$ 38$ 40# 40^ 404 36i
s
^]et Earnings
^^' Airline Operations $Mil .4 7 16 IB 28 36 46 47 53 61 312
^^ '!lettings" "' 11.9 b 4 7 2 4 4 3 7 9 46 '
P.eptd to Stockholders ^ 12.3 13 20 2S 30 40 50' S0 60 70 358j ^
I
^: R$TZOS i
Traffic (^11 Services) Bil/BCh3
,'' Ra:"s - DOM /' 6.52 / 5' 7.06/8 . 7.60/8 8.11;7 8.64,'7 9.21/7 9..76/6 10:4/6 11.0/6 11.6/6 5,08/6.6 GRC
"
,?
RP:"s -System / 7.10 / 5 7.68/8 8::29/8. 8_86/7 9.45/7 10.1/7 10.7/6" 11.4/6 . 22.0/6 12.7/6 S.bO/6.7 GRC
`"
7^SYs - System / 1L.7 / 5 12.9/10 14, 0/B 15.0/7 15.9/6 16.8/6 17.5/4 18.5/6 19.4/8 20.3/5 8.60/6.3 GRC
Load Factor -System $ 60.7 59.4 59:2 59.1 59.5 60..0 61.0 61..5 62..,0 62.5. 1.8pts.
Yield -Dom RPM/$Chg 6.65 / 1 7.02/6 7.36/5 7.69J5 7.99/4 8.31/4 8.,:69/4	 .8.94/3' 9.24/3 9.56J4 2.91/4.1 GRC
3Cield -System / 6.61 / 1 6..95/5 7:29/5. 7:62/5 7.9I/4 8.23/4 8,.5`i/4 8.85/3 9..15/3 .9.47/4 2,86/4.1`GRG '-	 `,
COST ZNCRE!^LC'T (COE) i
- Zabor (Non-Add) $Mil/ :^ 26 / 15 22/11 19/9 21/8 20/7 22/7 25/7 28/T 31/7 34/7 222
^ -^ Fnel " ! 19 / 25 6/7 10/9 8/6 7/5 6/4 6/4 7/4 7/4 8/4 65
_Daher	 '• / ' " 16 / 10 5/3 9/4 -.10/4 11/4 11/4 13/4 12/3 14/3`' IS/4 1A0
-Total / 61 / 16 33/7` 38/7 39/6 38/6'. 39/5 44/6 47/5. 52/6 57/6. 387
i' Aeghted Index {1967=100) No /^C.hg 205 / 16 220/7 236/7 251/6 265/6: 280/5 •296/6 312/5: 330/6 350/6 145/6.1 GRC
°
,,
AFRO AD: EARNINGS 1976-1984
WESTERN •
ri; `,
r Lt^n^l ^^u.Lrri^eal
Having been awarded.. two new'long-haul routes (Honolulu-Vancouver, Los Angeles-r •Zami) and
experiencing strong traffic growth (system PM's were up 16^ for the. first 6' months), Western
earlier this year exeresed_optbns for a DC-10 and 5 727-20Os: We believe tha by the beginning
of next year Western will exercise its option for another 5 7.27-2OOs for 1978.delivery,^and it
is possible that they could order additional DC-10s before the 1979 order we have projected into
the study. The current DC-1.0 fleet's daily:: utilization-is over 12 hours which is the highest
among the trunks flying. ;that typF? sf aircraft:
Of the:5 smaller trunks .':(Bral:iff, Continental,..National, Northwest and Western) • WAL is the'
only oize who has not either simplified ',its fret or is in the process of doing so. As Northwest
has so well illustrated, there"are great cost savings to a'carrer. which standardizes ..its flight:
equipment. As of now, WAL's management has given no sign that i yc;wll start disposing of its
relatively inefficient 720Bs'and 707s during the next few years.
Our study projects that by the end of 1984 Western. will still be flying over 10^ of-,its
^-1Si's with aircraft that do not meet the environmental restrictions of FAR Part 36. To completely
replace. these .planes (737s and o der; 727-200s) ^^ou d cost 
. about $240 million in 1984,dollars. Being
a .Los :Angeles based carzier,' WAL must be particularly
.:concerned about thG subject, and there is
the possibility that WAL might be forced to revamp its fleet much sooner tY?an we have projected.
Not having'the_strongest balance sheet in the industry, Western could be hard pressed to mee an
immediate tightening of. environmental restrictions, but should be able to manage it (see Moneyability
schedule).
N.B. Western's load factor cnlg increases 1.8 pExcentage points .between. 197:5-1984. Because
many passengers have been turned-away at peak'perods when load factors approach 60^, we have
projected a slight decrease in WAL' L.F'. aver the next three year beforelettng i rise to otu
maximum 62.5 in 1984.
"FLIGHT EQUIPMENT"'
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FLIGHT'£Q(JIPt^iE;7T -PURCHASE / REIOVALS / PAY:^.ENTS / LEASES
GRO[T7D PROPERTY.& EQUIP?ANT (projected costs)
- 1976-
Unit 1975 1976	 1977 1978 1979.	 1980 1981 1982, 1983 1984 1984 '
$URCHASES/LEASES{L) ` Actual ---- ---'-----P ROJECTED ----------- ------------- ---
,^.
^.1 Additions tr'o. A/C
^;	 ^ DC-20 1L 1*L	
- 2	 3 3 1 1 1 12
727-200 3 _	 5* 5 -	 - - - - - 10
1
180 Seat M/R - -	 _ - -	 - - 5 4 3 12
"'.{ Total Additions 4 1	 5 S 2	 3 3 6 5 4 34
`	 ^
Total Cost A/C Typel/ $ MiTl j
i	 I DC-10 23 27	 - - 56	 88 93 32 34 36 366: i
?27-200 25 52' S5 107.
I 380 Seat M/R - - -	 - - 139 111 88 338
V	
^	 j.
^
i	 ^
total Cost Aircraft 48 27	 ^2 55 56	 88 83 171
__
145 124. 811
^
€i' i	 ^
iit ^^s^emavals No A/C
'	 ^ X37 1 1	
- - -	 - -
4 4 4 13
'^
^	 ^
i
Total Removals
_1— 1
-
^ ^ _^. ti 7 ,^._ _36.-
a: -- —
I'
r
- - PAYMENTS 4/
^	 riz. ght Eq Payments	 $ Nall
Advance Deposits	 " 7 23 18 28	 37 45 46
^	 Balivery 22 - 37 38	 39 35 37
E I
	
Spares, Modi£s.etc	 " 2 4 5 4	 4 10	 ^ 7
^ ^	 :"ot<.1 Flt Eq Paynents-	 ":. 31 27 60 70	 80 90 90
1	 ^ota1 FIt'Eq Leases 2/	 '^ 23 26 ___ -	 - 3C 30
F	 ^	 Total Flight Equipment 	 "1 54 53 60 70	 80 120 120
^sRD, PF,OPs b EQJIP 3/	 "
^	
S-	 3'	 1	 h	 08	 h	 d
11 7 10 10	 10 20 20
t.OTE.._(L-Lease a 1 of ers ^, pure ase ) M/R =Medium Range.
3/'_ost' oer AircrafE Tvae - nunber x cost per aircraft intl base price + CFE/MC/spares.. SH&E derived.
2/r^^ases - a 303 o£'total aircraft cost .per year (1960-1984).	 AERO AD: FLT. EO/GPE 197.6-1984
3I Grd_ Proo b ?;"avio. -Subject to managemeat reprogramming.
4/ Pa :eats -{SHSE derived; reflect escalation)
^yance Deposits'- pre-delivery'@ 30$ of unit price. 	 WESTER N
Delivery -balance remaining @aircraft . acceptance
M	
- ----^
,I'
FI
^^	 C O M M E' N TAR Y
^ I
	"CAPITAL NEEDS AND SOURCES"
^I	 .
a	 Western should not have any problem supp]>_ying the .-$1.5 billion in capital heeds projected
for the 197.6-1984 period'.	 Internal cash flow 'together with sales of property should account
far about 55-600, with the remainder coming from outside. sources including lease
ik On June 30th o^ this year WRL paid back the remaining amount of its old bank loan agreement
and immediately enured..nto a new $75 million revolving credit. at	 lightly higher rates"(as had
`J	 been forecast in last year's Aezo Advanced.Study.).
	
$18.75 million was •drawn down right awa„y,,and
'^	 we project the remaning'$56:25 million will be used by the end of 1978 when the credit turns''
into a term loan.;^
Back in April WAL repurchased 2.5P^i'of its common shares for $7.3 million in cash and a $23
I	 million subordinated note. 	 Thistransaction is the $30 million shown under "other" in the 1976
column.	 The only other financing Western, did this year was to lease its .fourth ;DC-10 in June.
;No planes are leased between 1977-1.979 because the benefits in the recently passed tax bill
^	 make _it advantageous for the carrier to buy its equipment. 	 Starting in 1980, 30% of the .value of
incoming flight;,. equipment is leased.	 baestern qualifies .under the NY State Insurance Law from 1980
^	
on	 and a good part 'of the new $°0 million. in projected Sr. Debt (excluding bank) will dome from
^	 this source.
^	 E,etween 1967-1975 Western spent about $620 million for flight equipment and..GPE. 	 Our pro-
jections show them spending $l.l billion beLT7e?n 1976-1984, but. if these outlays.. are discounted
at,a 5$ rate, the resulting present value is only $870 million..
	 In real terms WAL's capital spend- ^
ing will be up 40% which is one of the largest increases among the trunks. ^
jN.B.	 We have discontinued WAL's 50^ dividend policy after 197, 6 in order to conservz cash for ^	 s^
the carrier's capital spending program. 	 S+7estern has a liberal depreciation policy for its flight
equipment.	 For the first six months of 1976 it charged $14.3 .million to F.E. depreciation, while
if it had used CAB depreciation standards; it would have had to charge another $2.4 million.
Recap: '.1976-1984
Needs:	 $1.52 billion'(62$ flight_equpment^ ll% GPE, 14 % debt retirement).
Sources;:	 $850 million or 56% from operations (24% earnings, 26% depreciation).
$650 million or 43% new f:^ancng,l.$520 million.., or 34,$ to be arranged).
.
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CAPITAL NEEDS AND SOURCES ($ MILL)
- calendar yzars -
1975' _ 1976 1977 1.978 1979 1980 1981 1982_. 1983 1984
CAPITAL t7EEDS ACTUAL - - -	 - - - - - - - - -	 - P R O J E C T' E D - - - -
	 - - - - -	 - -	 - -	 - - - -
Flight Eguipment Payments
#	 ! -Advance Deposits 7' 23 18 28 37 45 46 3L 35 40
-Delivery 22 - 37 36 39 35 37 68 58 50
-Spares, Siodf. etc. 2 4 5 4 4 l0 7 11 7 10	 I
Total Flt.Equip Payments 31 27 60 70 80 90 90 110 100 100	 i
^ Add: Flt Equip-Leases 23' 26 - - - 30 30 50 40 40	 Ji
^. Total Flight Equipment 54 53 60 70 80 120. 120 160 140 140
.--
Ground Prop
	 & Ec^/Other
P Grd Proo &Equip 11'_ 7 10 10 10 20 20 20 30 30
Debt Retirement 21 27 8 8 27 26 30 30 26 33
Dividends 7'- 7 5 7 8 10 10 10 14 17
Other 2 30 3 5 5 4 -
_ - -
7bta1 GPE ^ Other 41 71 26 30 50 60 60 60 70 80
v End GTkg Cap {3wks COE oroj) 18 26- 34 40 40 50 50 60 60 70
4,.
^I TOTAL CAPITAL NEEDS 113_ 150 120 140 170
__
230. 230	 - 280 270 290
G;
CAPITAL SOURCES
Beginning Working Capital 14< 18 26 34 40 40 50 50 60 60
rations
- Net liarnings (Rept'd) 5 13 20 25 30 40 50 sn 60 70
- Depreciation/Amon 35 38 40 43 42 44 40 45 51 56
- Dr^perty Sale/Other 3 5 4 4 8 6 10 15 19 14
' ^- Other 9 1
-
4
- -
_ _ _
2^^ta1 Operations 52-' S7 64 76 80 90 100 i10 13D 140
Financing Arrangements
'^s 19 30 26 30 SD - 30 20
- Senior Debt-Hanks
- 40 - 30 20_	
"	 -Insco/Others - - - 4 - 20 - -
^ - Subord Debt
-
23 20 10
30
-
30 50 40 40
k -^ Leases (Cap',@ AC Cest) 23 26 -
-
10 10 20 10 10
^, -Deposits returnable 16- 7 - ---
-
_
- - - -
^ -Stock Sales
-
_
-
-
47 75 30 30' 50 100 80 120 80 90
'r; ToL Financing Arrangements
TOTAL CAPZTAT, SOURCES. 113 150 I20 140 170 230 230 280
270. 290
^" FINANCING TO BE 7sRRA.yGED - - 4 50 100 80 120
80 90
^^
1976-
1984
300
360
60
7.20
220
940
160
210
90
50
510
70
1520
20
360
400.
90
850
200
9C
70
220
70
650
1520
520
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C'OMMENTA`R,Y
"MQNEYABILITY"
T^lestern's "Moneyabilty" posture should be perfectly adequate to meet the rather heavy ,
capital spending program that we have projected fcr the carrier-(see Capital Needs & Sources
schedule). .The crucial indicator is, as al^,^ays, the cash generation per ASM'rato. After
nose-diving in 1974 this key ratio will rebound smartly in 1976 (it was up to 4.38 for the
12 mcnths ended 6/30/76, an increase of 16o from year-end 1975), and from 19T7 on will stay
abo=,re the 5_ mills norm.
This solid cash flow permits WAL to bring on debt at only a 1.13:1 ratio to each additional
dcllar of equity;. Starting with a 60240 Debt/Equity ratio as of 12/31/75, this internal cash
generation lowers the . D/E ratio to 54c46 by the end. of 1984:
^	 Western fails to qualify.. under the NY State .Insurance Law in 1976, .but it does manage to
l
	
	 requalify in 1977. However, in 1978 and 1 .979.WP^ again does not qualify for 'insurance company
money, as it does not meet the fixed charge ooverage test on a five..year average. From. 19$0
^
	
	 on Tr7estern does qualify under the laws and agood part of .the projected $9^ million in Sr. Debt-,
excluding bank, (see Capital Needs Sources schedule).could be supplied by the insurance
companies.
Western's operating rat^.o falls to 91% by,19.81.whch means' that the complementary ROI ratio
is able-to go a}^ove the CAIT's-12% standard. °Phe revenue invested capital ratio increases
sharply, over the next four years, but then decreases as WAL's i.n^restment base swells.' No air-
.craft axe leased between 1977-1979 because of the tax advantages yr buying aircraft in the new
tax law:: If, horaever WAL wanted to lease some the the 12 planes we have projected that they will.
receive during the period (see F1't Eguip/GPE' chedule), there would be no problem.
	 ^'
Earlier this year We t^r::rn bought ",back and retired 2.5A4Ai of its common shares for $7.-3MBi
in cash,: and a $23^-i^i subordinated ncte. It is this transaction; that causes the.debt/stock equity
ratio to jump from 148% in 1975 to 211% at the end of this year.
On June' 30th • Wester"n paid off the outstanding .
 $29.9P92^i.of its . . old bank loan., and immediately
signed a new: $75AA4 revolving, credit agreement. The carrier drew down $18.75A4 pi of the new credit
but then paid back $S.25MH. We expec that this credit will be fully utilized by .the-end of"1978
when it-=turns into a term loan.
-"MONEYABILITY"
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M O N E Y A B I L I T Y	 - INVEST E D	 C t1 P S T i^ L
(System - All Services)
1976-
1975: 1976- 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983. 1984 1984
' ZNVESTED^,A°ITi',L IINIT Actual ---- --------- ------:Projected-------- --- -- _ ---
-- -----
Debt $ MiT
''` Senior Debi:`-Banks 21 19 49 75 88 122 105 118 110 120 99
w Senior Debt-Insco/Other 72 66 60 58 53 46 77 67 83 93 21
^ Senior Debt.-Leases Cap'd 80 100" 93 86 79 96" .113 150 177 195 115
Senior Total - Reptd 94 85 109 133. 141 168 182 185 193 213 120 ^'
Senior Total +Cap . Lses 174 185 202 219 220 264 295 335 370 408 235.
r Subordinated 30 53 51 48 64 70 67 83 79 67 37
Total Debt - I:egtd " 124 138 160 181 205 238 249 268 272 280 157
E^
,
Total Debt +Cap Lses " 204 238 253 267 284 334 362 418 449 475 2
f
^ Stock 136 113 128 146 168 198 238 278 324 377 239
'
j
Stock + Sub'Debt 168 166. 179 194:' 232 2b8 305 361 403 444 276
f Tot Inv Capital-Fccptd 262 251 288 327 373 436, 487 546 ,596 657 395
4
Tot Znv Capital +_gip Lses 342 351 381 413 452 532.
-
600 696 773 852 510. r
M
"rT,IChfi E^OIPMEI'T ^
f Depr Cost 263 240 259 278 300 326 359 438 492 530 267 ,^
r Deng Cost + *sfr Deposit 264 257 278 309 351. 396 447 505 550 591 327
^
^{ Depr Cost'+	 +Cap Lses " 344 357 371 395 430 492 560 .655 727 786 442 1
i
WOP?CIi7G ChPITAL '
^
i
Incl'Cur Debt/Equv 571cs COE $M±11/Wks 18/2 26/3- 34/3 40/3 40/3 50/3'
-
50/3 60 /3 60/3 70 /3 52 /1 ^
^\ P.nZ`i0 A:IALXSZSl/
	{G) U:7ZT/fiORt^ d	
i
Sr Debt
Equity (Stk +Sub} $-150$ 104 111 113 113. 95 99 97 93 92 92 (12)pts.
,	 i Sr Debt = n i
Fl Eq (het.+ Dep + Lse) $- 808 51 52 54 55 51 54 53 51 51 52 1 pt.
f Cap Lses Share Flt Eq ^- 338 23 28 25 22 18 20 20 23 24 25 2 pts.
'	 ^ Total Debt ,I
I	 ; Stock Equity ^-175$, 148 211 198 183 169 169 152 150 138 126. {22)pts.
;7 ° State Ins Law
Fix Chg Cov - 12 :os .:-1.25 1.0 L$ 1.5 1.5 1.9 2.1 2. 4 2.3 2.3 2,4 1.4x
Fix Chg Cove- 5 yr Avg x-1.25 1.6 L 6 l.6 i.46 1.4 1.7 1.9 2.0 2.2 2.3 0.7x
Ober Ratio-(Airline) $ 98 97 96 °6 94 '92 91 91 91 91 (7)pts.
Return On Inv (Corp) 8, 7.0 7.2 9.1 10.L 10.7 11.7 12.3 11.1 11.6 12.0 S.Onts.
Rev'.: Tot Znv Cap.'. $ 1,52 1.68 1.75 L 8G 1.84 1.73 1.68. 1.59 1.5$ 1..57 .OSS jP7^-t 'Can Coasts ?/ $` Mil 56 i50 170 230. 260 320 350. ;440 340 350 -
Fin Argd / t Argd /$ 37/66 56/37 26/15
-/- -/- -1- -/- -/- -/- ->- -/- ` d
Cash Generation _ ^ '......!
Flow. per $..Equity.. ^/^ Chg-30 21/{38) 27/29 31/15 3T/- 30/{3) 30/- 26/(7) 25 /(11) 26/4 26/- S/24 Nj^(
Rev Less t7JE	 Mills/^ Chg-5,00 ^j
pex AS,S 3..79/(46):4.50/19 5.00/I1 5.07/1: 5.91/17. 6.96/18 7..60/9 7.78/2 $.35/7 8.42/7 5.13/135
E
N,oneyability - ^4
AFRO• Inv. Capital	 1976-1984 7^
^,^
Note:	 (G)	 See Glossary. !<
^ ;
1J	 12 months basis.	 ^ Chsrges are fxom end oz prior year. W E S'T E R N ^^2^ Net Cap. Courts. =.Next two years projected capital experrditn^es £or night equipment and GPE. ^?
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